But … “they thought they were right” isn’t an argument. Compare how they derived their bottom lines to how we have. Compare their evidence and reasoning to ours, and compare both to the kinds of evidence and reasoning that works (literally does good work) elsewhere, and the answer will probably be straightaway obvious which is the more reliable.
We have no evidence and reasoning about morality that doesn’t depend on morality in the first place, is-ought problem which I won’t repeat here.
Empirically, everyone derives their morality from society’s norm developed in messy historical processes. Why one messy historical process is better than other by any objective standard is not clear.
modern moral standards say it’s fine to let 1.5 million children a year die of diarrhea because they happen to be born in a wrong country.
...and expect me to draw your implied conclusion refutes the very claim itself. What do you think makes me appalled that children are dying of diarrhea, aesthetics? That we haven’t yet fixed a problem doesn’t prove that it meets our approval—after all, people still die everywhere.
That’s not even empirically true. At best, morality is the (really complicated) function relating “is” and “ought”—which means errors in the “is” can make vast differences to the consequent “ought”.
(For example, in the Americas a couple centuries ago, it was widely believed that black people were not capable of being successful and happy without supervision of white people, and it was consequently meet to own such people in the same way as livestock is owned.)
(For example, in the Americas a couple centuries ago, it was widely believed that black people were not capable of being successful and happy without supervision of white people, and it was consequently meet to own such people in the same way as livestock is owned.)
As much as I keep citing this as an example myself, I don’t think we’re literally talking about sole prior cause and posterior effect here.
Edit: To be precise, to a major extent, the causality is probably in the opposite direction—because treating people the way slaves were treated is wrong, those with a stake in the matter had it widely argued that the chattel slaves were not people in the proper sense of the word.
At best, morality is the (really complicated) function relating “is” and “ought”—which means errors in the “is” can make vast differences to the consequent “ought”.
You’re right; forgive my imprecision. But I doubt that people from the past could be said to be using the exactly the same function as us, nor even that I’m using the exact same function as you. It would just be too much coincidence.
I think I see the difficulty—my language is phrased in terms of an absolute morality to which all historical systems are approximations of varying accuracy. Do I correctly infer that you reject that concept? If so, I believe it reasonable to assume that the remaining confusion is a matter of phrasing.
But … “they thought they were right” isn’t an argument. Compare how they derived their bottom lines to how we have. Compare their evidence and reasoning to ours, and compare both to the kinds of evidence and reasoning that works (literally does good work) elsewhere, and the answer will probably be straightaway obvious which is the more reliable.
We have no evidence and reasoning about morality that doesn’t depend on morality in the first place, is-ought problem which I won’t repeat here.
Empirically, everyone derives their morality from society’s norm developed in messy historical processes. Why one messy historical process is better than other by any objective standard is not clear.
By some standards we have less suffering than past times, but we’re also vastly wealthier. It’s not clear at all to me that wealth-adjusted suffering now is lower than historically—modern moral standards say it’s fine to let 1.5 million children a year die of diarrhea because they happen to be born in a wrong country. I can imagine some of the past moral systems would be less happy about it than we are.
One: See above.
Two: The very fact that you can say:
...and expect me to draw your implied conclusion refutes the very claim itself. What do you think makes me appalled that children are dying of diarrhea, aesthetics? That we haven’t yet fixed a problem doesn’t prove that it meets our approval—after all, people still die everywhere.
In questions of morality, there’s nothing but the (really complicated) bottom line.
That’s not even empirically true. At best, morality is the (really complicated) function relating “is” and “ought”—which means errors in the “is” can make vast differences to the consequent “ought”.
(For example, in the Americas a couple centuries ago, it was widely believed that black people were not capable of being successful and happy without supervision of white people, and it was consequently meet to own such people in the same way as livestock is owned.)
As much as I keep citing this as an example myself, I don’t think we’re literally talking about sole prior cause and posterior effect here.
A fair point, to be sure.
Edit: To be precise, to a major extent, the causality is probably in the opposite direction—because treating people the way slaves were treated is wrong, those with a stake in the matter had it widely argued that the chattel slaves were not people in the proper sense of the word.
You’re right; forgive my imprecision. But I doubt that people from the past could be said to be using the exactly the same function as us, nor even that I’m using the exact same function as you. It would just be too much coincidence.
I think I see the difficulty—my language is phrased in terms of an absolute morality to which all historical systems are approximations of varying accuracy. Do I correctly infer that you reject that concept? If so, I believe it reasonable to assume that the remaining confusion is a matter of phrasing.
Yes.