The same argument applies just the same to perceived knowledge as evidence of a reflective inconsistency in the system. To the extent that someone benefits from spending resources misrepresenting their state of knowledge the system is reflectively inconsistent.
I have about 85% confidence that what you’re saying is correct, but I can’t quite grasp it enough to verify it independently. Maybe I need to reread the TDT paper.
The same argument applies just the same to perceived knowledge as evidence of a reflective inconsistency in the system. To the extent that someone benefits from spending resources misrepresenting their state of knowledge the system is reflectively inconsistent.
I have about 85% confidence that what you’re saying is correct, but I can’t quite grasp it enough to verify it independently. Maybe I need to reread the TDT paper.
Yes, that’s where I got my insight into the reason why reflectively consistent decision theories don’t have negative knowledge values.