The negative value isn’t on actual knowledge, it’s on perceived knowledge. Genuine ignorance is advantageous only in the special case where knowledge is difficult to hide.
The same argument applies just the same to perceived knowledge as evidence of a reflective inconsistency in the system. To the extent that someone benefits from spending resources misrepresenting their state of knowledge the system is reflectively inconsistent.
I have about 85% confidence that what you’re saying is correct, but I can’t quite grasp it enough to verify it independently. Maybe I need to reread the TDT paper.
The negative value isn’t on actual knowledge, it’s on perceived knowledge. Genuine ignorance is advantageous only in the special case where knowledge is difficult to hide.
The same argument applies just the same to perceived knowledge as evidence of a reflective inconsistency in the system. To the extent that someone benefits from spending resources misrepresenting their state of knowledge the system is reflectively inconsistent.
I have about 85% confidence that what you’re saying is correct, but I can’t quite grasp it enough to verify it independently. Maybe I need to reread the TDT paper.
Yes, that’s where I got my insight into the reason why reflectively consistent decision theories don’t have negative knowledge values.