> This includes “What would this specific and superintelligent CEV-universe-simulation say about this plan?”.
> This doesn’t include (somehow) getting an AI which correctly computes what program would be recommended by AGI designers in an altruistic and superintelligent branch of humanity, and then the AI executes that program and shuts itself off without doing anything else.[5]
But isn’t 1 here is at least as good as 2, since the CEV-universe-simulation could always compute X=[the program that would be recommended by AGI designers in an altruistic and superintelligent branch of humanity] then return 1 iff input-plan = ‘run X then shuts itself off without doing anything else’ (by doing a simple text match), 0 otherwise, so there’s no chance of adversarial inputs? Not to say this is a realistic way of getting an aligned AGI, but just that your argument seems to be proving too much, if it’s saying that 2 is safer/better than 1.
Is your issue here that there exist a specific CEV-universe-simulation that makes 1 just as safe as 2, by basically emulating the latter situation? If so, why do you think this is a point against Alex’s claim(which strikes me more as saying “there are a lot more cases of 2. being safe than of 1.”)?
Is your issue here that there exist a specific CEV-universe-simulation that makes 1 just as safe as 2, by basically emulating the latter situation? If so, why do you think this is a point against Alex’s claim(which strikes me more as saying “there are a lot more cases of 2. being safe than of 1.”)?