Depending on how they act, I might (if I were to fly in a plane) cause enough stirrup to stand up for my rights, taking into account the calculated risk of ending up worse off. There is an externality of signalling to other people what my (and their) rights are, which has additional positive value.
If someone suggested the idea of reducing your recline by 50% politely, would you really, in actual lived life, reply making a protest of your “rights”?
I implore you to really think of what this would be like in real life. Someone nicely asking for this. It’s a long flight.
Also, to consider the views of other people here and the positive effects of your signaling is speculative at best. You don’t know how people will perceive you. Sure, you think you are standing up for what is obviously you right. You have no way to verify this is what other’s believe though.
That just seems like something rather shaky to consider a positive externality. Alternatively, you could maybe make the case that there is always value to protecting your rights, a la MLK’s famous “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”, and I would salute your courage to die on that hill, as you surely would die.
I, like, I assume, everyone else, occasionally encounter situations of having to speak up in very uncomfortable situations, in “actual lived life.” In this hypothetical situation, I’d probably reduce my recline. I’d speak up if they reclined into me too much, leaving me not enough space.
We never know how other people will perceive us, or the consequences (or, for that matter, what’s right) with certainty. But the null decision (or the decision to do whatever causes the least stirrup) is a decision as well—namely, it’s a decision saying “the balance of evidence is such that I believe the right thing to do is to cause the least stirrup possible” (assuming the idealized case of an agent who optimizes for doing what is right).
Depending on how they act, I might (if I were to fly in a plane) cause enough stirrup to stand up for my rights, taking into account the calculated risk of ending up worse off. There is an externality of signalling to other people what my (and their) rights are, which has additional positive value.
How would they have to act for this to happen?
If someone suggested the idea of reducing your recline by 50% politely, would you really, in actual lived life, reply making a protest of your “rights”?
I implore you to really think of what this would be like in real life. Someone nicely asking for this. It’s a long flight.
Also, to consider the views of other people here and the positive effects of your signaling is speculative at best. You don’t know how people will perceive you. Sure, you think you are standing up for what is obviously you right. You have no way to verify this is what other’s believe though.
That just seems like something rather shaky to consider a positive externality. Alternatively, you could maybe make the case that there is always value to protecting your rights, a la MLK’s famous “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”, and I would salute your courage to die on that hill, as you surely would die.
I, like, I assume, everyone else, occasionally encounter situations of having to speak up in very uncomfortable situations, in “actual lived life.” In this hypothetical situation, I’d probably reduce my recline. I’d speak up if they reclined into me too much, leaving me not enough space.
We never know how other people will perceive us, or the consequences (or, for that matter, what’s right) with certainty. But the null decision (or the decision to do whatever causes the least stirrup) is a decision as well—namely, it’s a decision saying “the balance of evidence is such that I believe the right thing to do is to cause the least stirrup possible” (assuming the idealized case of an agent who optimizes for doing what is right).