According to classical philosophy (e.g. Aristotle), sense knowledge is knowledge, but knowledge of a kind which does not depend on a rational faculty. One could call that irrational, a-rational, non-rational, pre-rational, etc., depending on the how one has sliced up the phenomenology.
That could perhaps be called arational knowledge. The preference-like component of ethics, morals or desires which you have just because you have them.
I personally do—but it isn’t even an (absolute) human universal much less a logically necessary preference.
should have, should keep?
An agent could plausibly intrinsically value keeping all of their preferences/ethics/morals exactly as they are, in which case such an agent can be expected to believe that they should keep them. They may also instrumentally value keeping them if it helps them to achieve/live by/etc their preferences/ethics/etc. The moment they discover a better way to achieve preferences or live by ethics than by maintaining the representation in themselves the instrumental consideration no longer applies.
Nothing evades the judgment.
So? This doesn’t impact imd’s consideration at all. A rock that doesn’t evade the judgement is still a rock and arational
knowledge would not cease to be arational knowledge just because it does not evade judgement.
All the kinds of knowledge you describe are subclasses of rational knowledge. Is there irrational knowledge?
According to classical philosophy (e.g. Aristotle), sense knowledge is knowledge, but knowledge of a kind which does not depend on a rational faculty. One could call that irrational, a-rational, non-rational, pre-rational, etc., depending on the how one has sliced up the phenomenology.
Believe stuff for crazy reasons (biased instincts, poor processing of data, etc). That’s irrational knowledge—even if it happens to be wrong.
I was thinking more something like ethics.
That could perhaps be called arational knowledge. The preference-like component of ethics, morals or desires which you have just because you have them.
But is it something you wish to have, should have, should keep (in this particular form)? Nothing evades the judgment.
I personally do—but it isn’t even an (absolute) human universal much less a logically necessary preference.
An agent could plausibly intrinsically value keeping all of their preferences/ethics/morals exactly as they are, in which case such an agent can be expected to believe that they should keep them. They may also instrumentally value keeping them if it helps them to achieve/live by/etc their preferences/ethics/etc. The moment they discover a better way to achieve preferences or live by ethics than by maintaining the representation in themselves the instrumental consideration no longer applies.
So? This doesn’t impact imd’s consideration at all. A rock that doesn’t evade the judgement is still a rock and arational knowledge would not cease to be arational knowledge just because it does not evade judgement.