That’s a shockingly poor argument. Who can constrain the future more effectively: someone who knows the thermodynamics of combustion engines, or someone who only knows how to start fires with a flint-and-steel and how to stop them with water? Someone who can use X-ray crystallography to assess their metallurgy, or someone who has to whack their product with a mallet to see if it’s brittle? Someone who can fire mortars over ranges requiring Coriolis corrections (i.e., someone with a correct theory of mechanics) or someone who only knows how to aim a catapult by trial and error? Someone who can insert and delete bacterial genes, or someone who doesn’t even know germ theory?
Someone who actually knows how human cognition works on all scales, or someone with the equivalent of a set of flint-and-steel level tools and a devotion to trial and error?
‘Correctness’ in theories is a scalar rather than a binary quality. Phlogiston theory is less correct (and less useful) than chemistry, but it’s more correct—and more useful!--than the theory of elements. The fact that the modern scientific theories you list are better than their precursors, does not mean their precursors were useless.
You have a false dichotomy going here. If you know of someone who “knows how human cognition works on all scales”, or even just a theory of cognition as powerful as Newton’s theory of mechanics is in its domain, then please, link! But if such a theory existed, we wouldn’t need to be having this discussion. A strong theory of cognition will descend from a series of lesser theories of cognition, of which control theory is one step.
Unless you have a better theory, or a convincing reason to claim that “no-theory” is better than control theory, you’re in the position of an elementalist arguing that phlogiston theory should be ignored because it can’t explain heat generated by friction—while ignoring the fact that while imperfect, phlogiston theory is strictly superior to elemental theory or “no-theory”.
You’ve misunderstood my emphasis. I’m an engineer—I don’t insist on correctness. In each case I’ve picked above, the emphasis is on a deeper understanding (a continuous quantity, not a binary variable), not on truth per se. (I mention correctness in the Coriolis example, but even there I have Newtonian mechanics in mind, so that usage was not particularly accurate.)
My key perspective can be found in the third paragraph of this comment.
I’m all for control theory as a basis for forming hypotheses and for Seth Roberts-style self-experimentation.
As best I can tell, you agree that what I said is true, but nonetheless dispute the conclusion… and you do so by providing evidence that supports my argument.
That’s kind of confusing.
What I said was:
One of the most frustrating things about dealing with LW is the consistent confusion by certain parties between the terms “correct” and “useful”.
And you gave an argument that some correct things are useful. Bravo.
However, you did not dispute the part where “useful” almost always comes before “correct”… thereby demonstrating precisely the confusion I posted about.
Useful and correct are not the same, and optimizing for correctness does not necessarily optimize usefulness, nor vice versa. That which is useful can be made correct, but that which is merely correct may be profoundly non-useful.
However, given a choice between a procedure which is useful to my goals (but whose “theory” is profoundly false), or a true theory which has not yet been reduced to practice, then, all else about these two pieces of information being equal, I’m probably going to pick the former—as would most rational beings.
(To the extent you would pick the latter, you likely hold an irrational bias… which would also explain the fanboy outrage and downvotes that my comments on this subject usually provoke here.)
I did not simply argue that some correct things are useful. I pointed out that every example of usefulness you presented can be augmented beyond all recognition with a deeper understanding of what is actually going on.
Let me put it this way: when you write, “how were people were to start and put out fires for millennia...” the key word is “start”: being satisfied with a method that works but provides no deep understanding is stagnation.
Ever seeking more useful methods without seeking to understand what is actually going on makes you an expert at whatever level of abstraction you’re stuck on. Order-of-magnitude advancement comes by improving the abstraction.
However, given a choice between a procedure which is useful to my goals (but whose “theory” is profoundly false), or a true theory which has not yet been reduced to practice, then, all else about these two pieces of information being equal, I’m probably going to pick the former—as would most rational beings.
I would also pick the former, provided my number one choice was not practical (perhaps due to time or resource constraints). The number one choice is to devote time and effort to making the true theory practicable. But if you never seek a true theory, you will never face this choice.
ETA: I’ll address:
As best I can tell, you agree that what I said is true, but nonetheless dispute the conclusion… and you do so by providing evidence that supports my argument.
by saying that you are arguing against, and I am arguing for:
But things that are correct are usually rather useful, and things that are not correct are less so.
That’s a shockingly poor argument. Who can constrain the future more effectively: someone who knows the thermodynamics of combustion engines, or someone who only knows how to start fires with a flint-and-steel and how to stop them with water? Someone who can use X-ray crystallography to assess their metallurgy, or someone who has to whack their product with a mallet to see if it’s brittle? Someone who can fire mortars over ranges requiring Coriolis corrections (i.e., someone with a correct theory of mechanics) or someone who only knows how to aim a catapult by trial and error? Someone who can insert and delete bacterial genes, or someone who doesn’t even know germ theory?
Someone who actually knows how human cognition works on all scales, or someone with the equivalent of a set of flint-and-steel level tools and a devotion to trial and error?
‘Correctness’ in theories is a scalar rather than a binary quality. Phlogiston theory is less correct (and less useful) than chemistry, but it’s more correct—and more useful!--than the theory of elements. The fact that the modern scientific theories you list are better than their precursors, does not mean their precursors were useless.
You have a false dichotomy going here. If you know of someone who “knows how human cognition works on all scales”, or even just a theory of cognition as powerful as Newton’s theory of mechanics is in its domain, then please, link! But if such a theory existed, we wouldn’t need to be having this discussion. A strong theory of cognition will descend from a series of lesser theories of cognition, of which control theory is one step.
Unless you have a better theory, or a convincing reason to claim that “no-theory” is better than control theory, you’re in the position of an elementalist arguing that phlogiston theory should be ignored because it can’t explain heat generated by friction—while ignoring the fact that while imperfect, phlogiston theory is strictly superior to elemental theory or “no-theory”.
You’ve misunderstood my emphasis. I’m an engineer—I don’t insist on correctness. In each case I’ve picked above, the emphasis is on a deeper understanding (a continuous quantity, not a binary variable), not on truth per se. (I mention correctness in the Coriolis example, but even there I have Newtonian mechanics in mind, so that usage was not particularly accurate.)
My key perspective can be found in the third paragraph of this comment.
I’m all for control theory as a basis for forming hypotheses and for Seth Roberts-style self-experimentation.
As best I can tell, you agree that what I said is true, but nonetheless dispute the conclusion… and you do so by providing evidence that supports my argument.
That’s kind of confusing.
What I said was:
And you gave an argument that some correct things are useful. Bravo.
However, you did not dispute the part where “useful” almost always comes before “correct”… thereby demonstrating precisely the confusion I posted about.
Useful and correct are not the same, and optimizing for correctness does not necessarily optimize usefulness, nor vice versa. That which is useful can be made correct, but that which is merely correct may be profoundly non-useful.
However, given a choice between a procedure which is useful to my goals (but whose “theory” is profoundly false), or a true theory which has not yet been reduced to practice, then, all else about these two pieces of information being equal, I’m probably going to pick the former—as would most rational beings.
(To the extent you would pick the latter, you likely hold an irrational bias… which would also explain the fanboy outrage and downvotes that my comments on this subject usually provoke here.)
I did not simply argue that some correct things are useful. I pointed out that every example of usefulness you presented can be augmented beyond all recognition with a deeper understanding of what is actually going on.
Let me put it this way: when you write, “how were people were to start and put out fires for millennia...” the key word is “start”: being satisfied with a method that works but provides no deep understanding is stagnation.
Ever seeking more useful methods without seeking to understand what is actually going on makes you an expert at whatever level of abstraction you’re stuck on. Order-of-magnitude advancement comes by improving the abstraction.
I would also pick the former, provided my number one choice was not practical (perhaps due to time or resource constraints). The number one choice is to devote time and effort to making the true theory practicable. But if you never seek a true theory, you will never face this choice.
ETA: I’ll address:
by saying that you are arguing against, and I am arguing for:
Deep theory has profound long-term impact, but is useless for simple stuff.
What is considered simple stuff is itself a function of that profound long-term impact.