I agree that it needs a summary. But I think it wiser to write first and summarize afterward—otherwise I am never quite sure what there is to summarize.
There needs to be a separate word for that subset of our values that is interpersonal, prosocial, to some extent expected to be agreed-upon, which subset does not always win out in the weighing; this subset is often also called “morality” but that would be confusing.
I’m not entirely sure why, but this comment was inordinately helpful in doing away with the last vestiges of confusion about your metaethics. I don’t know what I thought before reading it—of course morality would be a subset of our values, what else could it be? But somehow it made everything jump into place. I think I can now say (two years after first reading the sequence, and only through a long and gradual process) that I agree with your metaethical theory.
I agree that it needs a summary. But I think it wiser to write first and summarize afterward—otherwise I am never quite sure what there is to summarize.
There needs to be a separate word for that subset of our values that is interpersonal, prosocial, to some extent expected to be agreed-upon, which subset does not always win out in the weighing; this subset is often also called “morality” but that would be confusing.
I’m not entirely sure why, but this comment was inordinately helpful in doing away with the last vestiges of confusion about your metaethics. I don’t know what I thought before reading it—of course morality would be a subset of our values, what else could it be? But somehow it made everything jump into place. I think I can now say (two years after first reading the sequence, and only through a long and gradual process) that I agree with your metaethical theory.