I don’t want a range of outcomes. I want a good outcome.
These are synonymous when we must remain agnostic as to what each individual would select as a “good outcome” for his or her self.
Are you trying to figure out what makes me happy, or whether or not I care about freedom on moral grounds?
No. My argument is one of practical utility, not of moral virtue. If we expand universally the range of available outcomes then the number of “good outcomes” increases for each individual because each individual is more likely to have access to the things he or she actually wants as an individual.
If we expand universally the range of available outcomes then the number of “good outcomes” increases for each individual because each individual is more likely to have access to the things he or she actually wants as an individual.
Are you saying that freedom is an instrumental value, and that we actually agree on terminal values?
Are you saying that freedom is an instrumental value, and that we actually agree on terminal values?
I would be more inclined to say that if you prefer to be happy then you should have the freedom—the option—to be happy.
So I don’t know that we agree on that—as I would not prefer to be “happy” (in fact, I worry very much about becoming content and as a result sliding into complacency; I believe dissatisfaction with the now is an integral element of what makes me personally a “worthwhile” human being) -- but I do know that my belief in freedom as currently expressed means that just because I want to be one way does not mean that I am asserting that all people should wind up like me.
Diversity of individual outcomes in order to allow individuals to seek out and obtain their individual preferences (in a manner that does not directly impede the ability of others to do the same) is (or is close to) an intrinsic good.
So, freedom is an instrumental value, but happiness is not the terminal value?
I’m not sure that the mere fact that something is a terminal value prevents it from also being an instrumental value. Perhaps I might agree with the notion that “maintaining high instrumental value is a terminal value”—though I haven’t really put deep thought into that one. I’ll have to consider it.
It sounds like your terminal value is preference fulfillment or something to that extent.
Edit: Whoops. I didn’t notice that you weren’t the person I was originally talking to.
The Link is irrelevant. It’s about instrumental values. I was talking about terminal values. I’m not sure what Logos01 was talking about, but if it is instrumental values, this isn’t so much a debate as a mutual misunderstanding, and not much is relevant.
These are synonymous when we must remain agnostic as to what each individual would select as a “good outcome” for his or her self.
No. My argument is one of practical utility, not of moral virtue. If we expand universally the range of available outcomes then the number of “good outcomes” increases for each individual because each individual is more likely to have access to the things he or she actually wants as an individual.
Are you saying that freedom is an instrumental value, and that we actually agree on terminal values?
I would be more inclined to say that if you prefer to be happy then you should have the freedom—the option—to be happy.
So I don’t know that we agree on that—as I would not prefer to be “happy” (in fact, I worry very much about becoming content and as a result sliding into complacency; I believe dissatisfaction with the now is an integral element of what makes me personally a “worthwhile” human being) -- but I do know that my belief in freedom as currently expressed means that just because I want to be one way does not mean that I am asserting that all people should wind up like me.
Diversity of individual outcomes in order to allow individuals to seek out and obtain their individual preferences (in a manner that does not directly impede the ability of others to do the same) is (or is close to) an intrinsic good.
So, freedom is an instrumental value, but happiness is not the terminal value?
It sounds like your terminal value is preference fulfillment or something to that extent.
I’m not sure that the mere fact that something is a terminal value prevents it from also being an instrumental value. Perhaps I might agree with the notion that “maintaining high instrumental value is a terminal value”—though I haven’t really put deep thought into that one. I’ll have to consider it.
Passively, yes.
Possibly relevant
Is that a yes?
Edit: Whoops. I didn’t notice that you weren’t the person I was originally talking to.
The Link is irrelevant. It’s about instrumental values. I was talking about terminal values. I’m not sure what Logos01 was talking about, but if it is instrumental values, this isn’t so much a debate as a mutual misunderstanding, and not much is relevant.