Are you saying that freedom is an instrumental value, and that we actually agree on terminal values?
I would be more inclined to say that if you prefer to be happy then you should have the freedom—the option—to be happy.
So I don’t know that we agree on that—as I would not prefer to be “happy” (in fact, I worry very much about becoming content and as a result sliding into complacency; I believe dissatisfaction with the now is an integral element of what makes me personally a “worthwhile” human being) -- but I do know that my belief in freedom as currently expressed means that just because I want to be one way does not mean that I am asserting that all people should wind up like me.
Diversity of individual outcomes in order to allow individuals to seek out and obtain their individual preferences (in a manner that does not directly impede the ability of others to do the same) is (or is close to) an intrinsic good.
So, freedom is an instrumental value, but happiness is not the terminal value?
I’m not sure that the mere fact that something is a terminal value prevents it from also being an instrumental value. Perhaps I might agree with the notion that “maintaining high instrumental value is a terminal value”—though I haven’t really put deep thought into that one. I’ll have to consider it.
It sounds like your terminal value is preference fulfillment or something to that extent.
I would be more inclined to say that if you prefer to be happy then you should have the freedom—the option—to be happy.
So I don’t know that we agree on that—as I would not prefer to be “happy” (in fact, I worry very much about becoming content and as a result sliding into complacency; I believe dissatisfaction with the now is an integral element of what makes me personally a “worthwhile” human being) -- but I do know that my belief in freedom as currently expressed means that just because I want to be one way does not mean that I am asserting that all people should wind up like me.
Diversity of individual outcomes in order to allow individuals to seek out and obtain their individual preferences (in a manner that does not directly impede the ability of others to do the same) is (or is close to) an intrinsic good.
So, freedom is an instrumental value, but happiness is not the terminal value?
It sounds like your terminal value is preference fulfillment or something to that extent.
I’m not sure that the mere fact that something is a terminal value prevents it from also being an instrumental value. Perhaps I might agree with the notion that “maintaining high instrumental value is a terminal value”—though I haven’t really put deep thought into that one. I’ll have to consider it.
Passively, yes.