To make computationalism well-defined, we need to define what it means for a computation to be instantiated or not. Most of the philosophical arguments against computationalism attempt to render it trivial by showing that according to any reasonable definition, all computations are occurring everywhere at all times, or at least there are far more computations in any complex object than a computationalist wants to admit. I won’t be reviewing those arguments here; I personally think they fail if we define computation carefully, but I’m not trying to be super-careful in the present essay.
This sounds very intriguing, as I have encountered this problem “what is computation” in some discussions, but have never seen anything satisfactory so far. I would be very glad for any links to solutions/definitions or resources that might help one to come up with a definition oneself ;).
I wrote my undergrad thesis on this problem and tentatively concluded it’s unsolveable, if you read it and think you have a solution that might satisfy me I’d love to hear it! Maybe Chalmers (linked by Jacob) solves it, idk.
One claim I found very surprising:
This sounds very intriguing, as I have encountered this problem “what is computation” in some discussions, but have never seen anything satisfactory so far. I would be very glad for any links to solutions/definitions or resources that might help one to come up with a definition oneself ;).
I wrote my undergrad thesis on this problem and tentatively concluded it’s unsolveable, if you read it and think you have a solution that might satisfy me I’d love to hear it! Maybe Chalmers (linked by Jacob) solves it, idk.
I’d be happy to chat about it some time (PM me if interested). I don’t claim to have a fully worked out solution, though.
Here’s Chalmers defending his combinatorial state automata idea.
Thanks! Exactly what I was looking for :)