Another way to reach the conclusion that dust specks are worse is by transitivity. Consider something that is slightly worse than getting a dust speck in your eye. For instance, maybe hearing the annoying sound of static on television is just a bit worse, as long as it’s relatively brief and low volume. Now,
1a. Which is worse: everyone on Earth gets a dust speck in their eye, or one person hears a second of the annoying sound of static on a television with the volume set at a fairly low level [presumably you think that the dust specks are worse] 1b. Which is worse: one person briefly hears static, or 7 billion people each get a dust speck [generalizing 1a, to not depend on population of Earth or fact that it’s “everyone”] 1c. Which is worse: n people briefly hear static, or (7 billion) x n people get a dust speck [generalizing 1b, equivalent to repeating 1b n times]
Now, consider something that is slightly worse than the static (or whatever you picked). For instance, maybe someone lightly flicking their finger into the palm of your hand is a bit more unpleasant.
2a. Which is worse: everyone on Earth hears a second of the annoying sound of fairly low volume static, or one person gets lightly flicked in the palm, the sensation of which fades entirely within a few seconds 2b. Which is worse: one person gets lightly flicked in the palm, or 7 billion people each briefly hear static 2c. Which is worse: n people get lightly flicked in the palm, or (7 billion) x n people each briefly hear static 2d. Which is worse: n people get lightly flicked in the palm, or (7 billion)^2 x n people get a dust speck [transitivity, from 1c & 2c]
And keep gradually increasing the badness of the alternative, with dust specks remaining the worse option (by transitivity), until you get to:
10000a. Which is worse: everyone on Earth gets 25 years of torture, or one person gets 50 years of torture 10000b. Which is worse: one person gets 50 years of torture, or 7 billion people each get 25 years of torture 10000c. Which is worse: n people get 50 years of torture, or (7 billion) x n people get 25 years of torture 10000d. Which is worse: n people get 50 years of torture, or (7 billion)^10000 x n people get a dust speck
10000e. Which is worse: 1 person gets 50 years of torture, or 3^^^3 people get a dust speck [from 10000d, letting n=1 and drastically increasing the number of dust specks]
If you think that torture is worse than dust specks, at what step do you not go along with the reasoning?
If you think that torture is worse than dust specks, at what step do you not go along with the reasoning?
When I first read Eliezer’s post on this subject, I was confused by this transitivity argument. It seems reasonable. But even at that point, I questioned the idea that if all of the steps as you outline them seem individually reasonable, but torture instead of dust specks seems unreasonable, it is “obvious” that I should privilege the former output of my value computation over the latter.
My position now is that in fact, thinking carefully about the steps of gradually increasing pain, there will be at least one that I object to (but it’s easy to miss because the step isn’t actually written down). There is a degree of pain that I experience that is tolerable. Ouch! That’s painful. There is an infinitesimally greater degree of pain (although the precise point at which this occurs, in terms of physical causes, depends on my mood or brain state at that particular time) that is just too much. Curses to this pain! I cannot bear this pain!
This seems like a reasonable candidate for the step at which I stop you and say no, actually I would prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter—that difference just barely exceeded my basic tolerance for pain. Of course we are talking about the same subjective level of pain in different people—not necessarily caused by the same severity of physical incident.
This doesn’t seem ideal. However, it is more compatible with my value computation than the idea of torturing someone for the sake of 3^^^3 people with dust specks in their eyes.
I can somewhat sympathise, in that when removing a plaster I prefer to remove it slowly, for a longer bearable pain, than quickly for a brief unbearable pain. However, this can only be extended so far: there is a set (expected) length of continuing bearable pain over which one would choose to eliminate the entire thing with brief unbearable pain, as with tooth disease and (hypothetical) dentistry, or unpleasant-but-survival-illness and (phobic) vaccination.
‘prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter’: applying to across time as well as across numbers, one can reach the state of comparing {one person suffering brief unbearable pain} to {a world of pain, every person constantly existing just at the theshold at which it’s possible to not go insane}. Somewhat selfishly casting oneself in the position of potential sufferer and chooser, should one look on such a world of pain and pronounce it to be acceptable as long as one does not have to undergo a moment of unbearable pain? Is the suffering one would undergo truly weightier than the suffering the civilisation wold labor under?
The above question is arguably unfair both in that I’ve extended across time without checking acceptability, and also in that I’ve put the chooser in the position of a sacrificer. For the second part, hopefully it can be resolved by letting it be given that the chooser does not notably value another’s suffering above or below the importance of the chooser’s own. (Then again, maybe not.)
As for time, can an infinite number of different people suffering a certain thing for one second be determined to be at least no less than a single person suffering the same thing for five seconds? If so, then one can hopefully extend suffering in time as well as across numbers, and thus validly reach the ‘world of pain versus moment of anguish’ situation.
(In regard to priveleging, note that dealing with large numbers is known to cause failure of degree appreciation due to the brain’s limitations, whereas induction tends to be reliable.)
Another way to reach the conclusion that dust specks are worse is by transitivity. Consider something that is slightly worse than getting a dust speck in your eye. For instance, maybe hearing the annoying sound of static on television is just a bit worse, as long as it’s relatively brief and low volume. Now,
1a. Which is worse: everyone on Earth gets a dust speck in their eye, or one person hears a second of the annoying sound of static on a television with the volume set at a fairly low level [presumably you think that the dust specks are worse]
1b. Which is worse: one person briefly hears static, or 7 billion people each get a dust speck [generalizing 1a, to not depend on population of Earth or fact that it’s “everyone”]
1c. Which is worse: n people briefly hear static, or (7 billion) x n people get a dust speck [generalizing 1b, equivalent to repeating 1b n times]
Now, consider something that is slightly worse than the static (or whatever you picked). For instance, maybe someone lightly flicking their finger into the palm of your hand is a bit more unpleasant.
2a. Which is worse: everyone on Earth hears a second of the annoying sound of fairly low volume static, or one person gets lightly flicked in the palm, the sensation of which fades entirely within a few seconds
2b. Which is worse: one person gets lightly flicked in the palm, or 7 billion people each briefly hear static
2c. Which is worse: n people get lightly flicked in the palm, or (7 billion) x n people each briefly hear static
2d. Which is worse: n people get lightly flicked in the palm, or (7 billion)^2 x n people get a dust speck [transitivity, from 1c & 2c]
And keep gradually increasing the badness of the alternative, with dust specks remaining the worse option (by transitivity), until you get to:
10000a. Which is worse: everyone on Earth gets 25 years of torture, or one person gets 50 years of torture
10000b. Which is worse: one person gets 50 years of torture, or 7 billion people each get 25 years of torture
10000c. Which is worse: n people get 50 years of torture, or (7 billion) x n people get 25 years of torture
10000d. Which is worse: n people get 50 years of torture, or (7 billion)^10000 x n people get a dust speck
10000e. Which is worse: 1 person gets 50 years of torture, or 3^^^3 people get a dust speck [from 10000d, letting n=1 and drastically increasing the number of dust specks]
If you think that torture is worse than dust specks, at what step do you not go along with the reasoning?
When I first read Eliezer’s post on this subject, I was confused by this transitivity argument. It seems reasonable. But even at that point, I questioned the idea that if all of the steps as you outline them seem individually reasonable, but torture instead of dust specks seems unreasonable, it is “obvious” that I should privilege the former output of my value computation over the latter.
My position now is that in fact, thinking carefully about the steps of gradually increasing pain, there will be at least one that I object to (but it’s easy to miss because the step isn’t actually written down). There is a degree of pain that I experience that is tolerable. Ouch! That’s painful. There is an infinitesimally greater degree of pain (although the precise point at which this occurs, in terms of physical causes, depends on my mood or brain state at that particular time) that is just too much. Curses to this pain! I cannot bear this pain!
This seems like a reasonable candidate for the step at which I stop you and say no, actually I would prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter—that difference just barely exceeded my basic tolerance for pain. Of course we are talking about the same subjective level of pain in different people—not necessarily caused by the same severity of physical incident.
This doesn’t seem ideal. However, it is more compatible with my value computation than the idea of torturing someone for the sake of 3^^^3 people with dust specks in their eyes.
I can somewhat sympathise, in that when removing a plaster I prefer to remove it slowly, for a longer bearable pain, than quickly for a brief unbearable pain. However, this can only be extended so far: there is a set (expected) length of continuing bearable pain over which one would choose to eliminate the entire thing with brief unbearable pain, as with tooth disease and (hypothetical) dentistry, or unpleasant-but-survival-illness and (phobic) vaccination.
‘prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter’: applying to across time as well as across numbers, one can reach the state of comparing {one person suffering brief unbearable pain} to {a world of pain, every person constantly existing just at the theshold at which it’s possible to not go insane}. Somewhat selfishly casting oneself in the position of potential sufferer and chooser, should one look on such a world of pain and pronounce it to be acceptable as long as one does not have to undergo a moment of unbearable pain? Is the suffering one would undergo truly weightier than the suffering the civilisation wold labor under?
The above question is arguably unfair both in that I’ve extended across time without checking acceptability, and also in that I’ve put the chooser in the position of a sacrificer. For the second part, hopefully it can be resolved by letting it be given that the chooser does not notably value another’s suffering above or below the importance of the chooser’s own. (Then again, maybe not.)
As for time, can an infinite number of different people suffering a certain thing for one second be determined to be at least no less than a single person suffering the same thing for five seconds? If so, then one can hopefully extend suffering in time as well as across numbers, and thus validly reach the ‘world of pain versus moment of anguish’ situation.
(In regard to priveleging, note that dealing with large numbers is known to cause failure of degree appreciation due to the brain’s limitations, whereas induction tends to be reliable.)