If you think that torture is worse than dust specks, at what step do you not go along with the reasoning?
When I first read Eliezer’s post on this subject, I was confused by this transitivity argument. It seems reasonable. But even at that point, I questioned the idea that if all of the steps as you outline them seem individually reasonable, but torture instead of dust specks seems unreasonable, it is “obvious” that I should privilege the former output of my value computation over the latter.
My position now is that in fact, thinking carefully about the steps of gradually increasing pain, there will be at least one that I object to (but it’s easy to miss because the step isn’t actually written down). There is a degree of pain that I experience that is tolerable. Ouch! That’s painful. There is an infinitesimally greater degree of pain (although the precise point at which this occurs, in terms of physical causes, depends on my mood or brain state at that particular time) that is just too much. Curses to this pain! I cannot bear this pain!
This seems like a reasonable candidate for the step at which I stop you and say no, actually I would prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter—that difference just barely exceeded my basic tolerance for pain. Of course we are talking about the same subjective level of pain in different people—not necessarily caused by the same severity of physical incident.
This doesn’t seem ideal. However, it is more compatible with my value computation than the idea of torturing someone for the sake of 3^^^3 people with dust specks in their eyes.
I can somewhat sympathise, in that when removing a plaster I prefer to remove it slowly, for a longer bearable pain, than quickly for a brief unbearable pain. However, this can only be extended so far: there is a set (expected) length of continuing bearable pain over which one would choose to eliminate the entire thing with brief unbearable pain, as with tooth disease and (hypothetical) dentistry, or unpleasant-but-survival-illness and (phobic) vaccination.
‘prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter’: applying to across time as well as across numbers, one can reach the state of comparing {one person suffering brief unbearable pain} to {a world of pain, every person constantly existing just at the theshold at which it’s possible to not go insane}. Somewhat selfishly casting oneself in the position of potential sufferer and chooser, should one look on such a world of pain and pronounce it to be acceptable as long as one does not have to undergo a moment of unbearable pain? Is the suffering one would undergo truly weightier than the suffering the civilisation wold labor under?
The above question is arguably unfair both in that I’ve extended across time without checking acceptability, and also in that I’ve put the chooser in the position of a sacrificer. For the second part, hopefully it can be resolved by letting it be given that the chooser does not notably value another’s suffering above or below the importance of the chooser’s own. (Then again, maybe not.)
As for time, can an infinite number of different people suffering a certain thing for one second be determined to be at least no less than a single person suffering the same thing for five seconds? If so, then one can hopefully extend suffering in time as well as across numbers, and thus validly reach the ‘world of pain versus moment of anguish’ situation.
(In regard to priveleging, note that dealing with large numbers is known to cause failure of degree appreciation due to the brain’s limitations, whereas induction tends to be reliable.)
When I first read Eliezer’s post on this subject, I was confused by this transitivity argument. It seems reasonable. But even at that point, I questioned the idea that if all of the steps as you outline them seem individually reasonable, but torture instead of dust specks seems unreasonable, it is “obvious” that I should privilege the former output of my value computation over the latter.
My position now is that in fact, thinking carefully about the steps of gradually increasing pain, there will be at least one that I object to (but it’s easy to miss because the step isn’t actually written down). There is a degree of pain that I experience that is tolerable. Ouch! That’s painful. There is an infinitesimally greater degree of pain (although the precise point at which this occurs, in terms of physical causes, depends on my mood or brain state at that particular time) that is just too much. Curses to this pain! I cannot bear this pain!
This seems like a reasonable candidate for the step at which I stop you and say no, actually I would prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter—that difference just barely exceeded my basic tolerance for pain. Of course we are talking about the same subjective level of pain in different people—not necessarily caused by the same severity of physical incident.
This doesn’t seem ideal. However, it is more compatible with my value computation than the idea of torturing someone for the sake of 3^^^3 people with dust specks in their eyes.
I can somewhat sympathise, in that when removing a plaster I prefer to remove it slowly, for a longer bearable pain, than quickly for a brief unbearable pain. However, this can only be extended so far: there is a set (expected) length of continuing bearable pain over which one would choose to eliminate the entire thing with brief unbearable pain, as with tooth disease and (hypothetical) dentistry, or unpleasant-but-survival-illness and (phobic) vaccination.
‘prefer any number of people to experience the former pain, rather than one having to bear the latter’: applying to across time as well as across numbers, one can reach the state of comparing {one person suffering brief unbearable pain} to {a world of pain, every person constantly existing just at the theshold at which it’s possible to not go insane}. Somewhat selfishly casting oneself in the position of potential sufferer and chooser, should one look on such a world of pain and pronounce it to be acceptable as long as one does not have to undergo a moment of unbearable pain? Is the suffering one would undergo truly weightier than the suffering the civilisation wold labor under?
The above question is arguably unfair both in that I’ve extended across time without checking acceptability, and also in that I’ve put the chooser in the position of a sacrificer. For the second part, hopefully it can be resolved by letting it be given that the chooser does not notably value another’s suffering above or below the importance of the chooser’s own. (Then again, maybe not.)
As for time, can an infinite number of different people suffering a certain thing for one second be determined to be at least no less than a single person suffering the same thing for five seconds? If so, then one can hopefully extend suffering in time as well as across numbers, and thus validly reach the ‘world of pain versus moment of anguish’ situation.
(In regard to priveleging, note that dealing with large numbers is known to cause failure of degree appreciation due to the brain’s limitations, whereas induction tends to be reliable.)