So the first concerning question should be—why the duplication of work?
The first question should be: whether the duplication of work.
Physics is a set of theories and descriptions...a map. Usually, the ability of a map
to explain and is not exlusive of another map’s ability to do so. We can explain the death of Mr Smith as the result of bullet entering his heart, or as the result of a finger squeezing a trigger, or a a result of th einsurance policy recently taken out on his life, and so on.
So why can’t we resolve the epiphenomenal worry by saying that that physical causation and mental causation are just different, non rivalrous, maps? “I screamed because my pain fibres fired” alongside—not versus—“I screamed becaue I felt a sharp pain”. It is not the case that there is physical stuff that is doing all the causation, and mental stuff that is doing none of it: rather there is a physical view of what is going on, and a mentalistic view
The first question should be: whether the duplication of work.
Physics is a set of theories and descriptions...a map. Usually, the ability of a map to explain and is not exlusive of another map’s ability to do so. We can explain the death of Mr Smith as the result of bullet entering his heart, or as the result of a finger squeezing a trigger, or a a result of th einsurance policy recently taken out on his life, and so on.
So why can’t we resolve the epiphenomenal worry by saying that that physical causation and mental causation are just different, non rivalrous, maps? “I screamed because my pain fibres fired” alongside—not versus—“I screamed becaue I felt a sharp pain”. It is not the case that there is physical stuff that is doing all the causation, and mental stuff that is doing none of it: rather there is a physical view of what is going on, and a mentalistic view