When we see something blue, we don’t just “process incoming light of a certain wavelength in such a way as to create a pattern of mental activity that causes us to report having seen blue”, or whatever materialist story you want to tell. We see blue. It’s right there, right in front of our eyes. We can just look at it.
The materialist picture predicts you saying these exact words—there’s no causal anomaly happening inside your brain (if you can prove otherwise I know some Swedes who would like to give you a prize).
So the first concerning question should be—why the duplication of work? Why is there a brain that processes light and activates memories and language centers to eventually send out the words “I see blue, no, really, it’s right there. I can just look at it,” and then some mysterious consciousness-slash-soul that also does its (mysterious) work and eventually sends out the words “I see blue, no, really, it’s right there. I can just look at it.”?
Why do the work twice?
And when your physical brain reads my argument and then does some processing and then sends out the words “no, my consciousness doesn’t feel like rote processing of information at all,” where is it getting the idea?
So the first concerning question should be—why the duplication of work?
The first question should be: whether the duplication of work.
Physics is a set of theories and descriptions...a map. Usually, the ability of a map
to explain and is not exlusive of another map’s ability to do so. We can explain the death of Mr Smith as the result of bullet entering his heart, or as the result of a finger squeezing a trigger, or a a result of th einsurance policy recently taken out on his life, and so on.
So why can’t we resolve the epiphenomenal worry by saying that that physical causation and mental causation are just different, non rivalrous, maps? “I screamed because my pain fibres fired” alongside—not versus—“I screamed becaue I felt a sharp pain”. It is not the case that there is physical stuff that is doing all the causation, and mental stuff that is doing none of it: rather there is a physical view of what is going on, and a mentalistic view
According to current physical theories, the laws of physics together with the initial conditions of the universe presumably do indeed imply that he says “I have the experience of a blue sky”. But they do not seem to imply that he indeed has these experiences. That’s the problem. If everyone was a zombie, there would be no problem, since there would be no experiences to explain, just behavior. But I’m not a zombie, and I assume you aren’t either.
My comment is already a reply to this comment. If your consciousness is separate from your body, why do you do the same work twice? And seriously consider why your brain might send out the words “but surely the laws of physics don’t imply that my conscious experience has to be like it so obviously is.”
The materialist picture predicts you saying these exact words—there’s no causal anomaly happening inside your brain (if you can prove otherwise I know some Swedes who would like to give you a prize).
So the first concerning question should be—why the duplication of work? Why is there a brain that processes light and activates memories and language centers to eventually send out the words “I see blue, no, really, it’s right there. I can just look at it,” and then some mysterious consciousness-slash-soul that also does its (mysterious) work and eventually sends out the words “I see blue, no, really, it’s right there. I can just look at it.”?
Why do the work twice?
And when your physical brain reads my argument and then does some processing and then sends out the words “no, my consciousness doesn’t feel like rote processing of information at all,” where is it getting the idea?
The first question should be: whether the duplication of work.
Physics is a set of theories and descriptions...a map. Usually, the ability of a map to explain and is not exlusive of another map’s ability to do so. We can explain the death of Mr Smith as the result of bullet entering his heart, or as the result of a finger squeezing a trigger, or a a result of th einsurance policy recently taken out on his life, and so on.
So why can’t we resolve the epiphenomenal worry by saying that that physical causation and mental causation are just different, non rivalrous, maps? “I screamed because my pain fibres fired” alongside—not versus—“I screamed becaue I felt a sharp pain”. It is not the case that there is physical stuff that is doing all the causation, and mental stuff that is doing none of it: rather there is a physical view of what is going on, and a mentalistic view
According to current physical theories, the laws of physics together with the initial conditions of the universe presumably do indeed imply that he says “I have the experience of a blue sky”. But they do not seem to imply that he indeed has these experiences. That’s the problem. If everyone was a zombie, there would be no problem, since there would be no experiences to explain, just behavior. But I’m not a zombie, and I assume you aren’t either.
My comment is already a reply to this comment. If your consciousness is separate from your body, why do you do the same work twice? And seriously consider why your brain might send out the words “but surely the laws of physics don’t imply that my conscious experience has to be like it so obviously is.”