the goal is to have fewer people believe things in the category ‘conspiracy theory.’
Depends how we define the term — a “conspiracy theory” is more than just a hypothesis that a conspiracy took place. Conspiracy theories tend to come with a bundle of suspicious behaviors.
Consider: as soon as three of four Nord Stream pipelines ruptured, I figured that Putin ordered it. This is an even more “conspiratorial” thought than I usually have, mainly because, before it happened, I thought Putin was bluffing by shutting down Nord Stream 1 and that he would (1) restore the gas within a month or two and (2) finally back down from the whole “Special Military Operation” thing. So I thought Putin would do X one week and decided that he had done opposite-of-X the next week, and that’s suspicious—just how a conspiracy theorist might respond to undeniable facts! Was I doing something epistemically wrong? I think it helped that I had contemplated whether Putin would double down and do a “partial mobilization” literally a few minutes before I heard the news that he had done exactly that. I had given a 40% chance to that event, so when it happened, I felt like my understanding wasn’t too far off base. And, once Putin had made another belligerent, foolish and rash decision in 2022, it made sense that he might do a third thing that was belligerent, foolish and rash; blowing up pipelines certainly fits the bill. Plus, I was only like 90% sure Putin did it (the most well-known proponents of conspiracy theorists usually seem even more certain).
When I finally posted my “conspiracy theory” on Slashdot, it was well-received, even though I was mistaken in my mind about the Freeport explosion (it only reduced U.S. export capacity by 16%; I expected more). I then honed the argument a bit for the ACX version. I think most people who read it didn’t pick up on it being a “conspiracy theory”. So… what’s different about what I posted versus what people recognize as a “conspiracy theory”?
I didn’t express certainty
I just admitted a mistake about Freeport. Conspiracy theorists rarely weaken their theory based on new evidence. Also note that I found the 16% figure by actively seeking it out, and I updated my thinking based on it, though it didn’t shift the probability by a lot. (I would’ve edited my post, but Slashdot doesn’t support editing.)
I didn’t “sound nuts” (conspiracy theorists often lack self-awareness about how they sound)
It didn’t appear to be in the “conspiracy theory cluster”. Conspiracy theorists usually believe lots of odd things. Their warped world model usually bleeds into the conspiracy theory somehow, making it “look like” a conspiracy theory.
My comment appears in response to award-winning[1] journalist Seymour Hersh’s piece. Hersh has a single anonymous source saying that Joe Biden blew up Nord Stream, even though this would harm the economic interests of U.S. allies. He shows no signs of having vetted his information, but he solicits official opinions and is told “this is false and complete fiction”. After that, he treats his source’s claims as undisputed facts — so undisputed that claims from the anonymous source are simply stated as raw statements of truth, e.g. he says “The plan to blow up Nord Stream 1 and 2 was suddenly downgraded” rather than “The source went on to say that the plan to blow up Nord Stream 1 and 2 was suddenly downgraded”. Later, OSINT investigator Oliver Alexander pokes holes in the story, and then finds evidence that NS2 ruptured accidentally (which explains why only one of the two NS2 lines was affected) while NS1 was blown up with help from the Minerva Julie, owned by a Russia-linked company. He also notes that the explosives destroyed low points in the pipelines that would minimize corrosion damage to the rest of the lines. This information doesn’t affect Hersh’s opinions, and his responses are a little strange [1][2][3]. Finally, Oliver points out that the NS1 damage looks different from the NS2 damage.
If you see a theory whose proponents have high certainty, refuse to acknowledge data that doesn’t fit the theory (OR: enlarge the conspiracy to “explain” the new data by assuming it was falsified), speak in the “conspiracy theory genre”, and sound unhinged, you see a “conspiracy theory”[2]. If it’s just a hypothesis that a conspiracy happened, then no.
So, as long as people are looking for the right signs of a “conspiracy theory”, we should want fewer people to believe things in that category. So in that vein, it’s worth discussing which signs are more or less important. What other signs can we look for?
Hersh arguably ticks all these boxes, but especially the first two which are the most important. Hersh ignores the satellite data, and assumes the AIS ship location data is falsified (on both the U.S. military ship(s) and the Russia-linked ship?)
I dislike this definition of a conspiracy theory. It tacks on way more meaning to the phrase than it contains on its own, forcing someone to know the definition you’re using, and allowing motte and bailey behavior (you call a conspiracy theory a conspiracy theory to discredit it because by definition it is not epistemically sound, but then when provided evidence for it you say ‘well it’s a theory about a conspiracy, so it’s a conspiracy theory’. I’m not saying you would do that, just that defining it like so allows that.)
It’s better to keep “conspiracy theory” as “a theory about a conspiracy”, and then discuss which ones are legitimate and which ones aren’t.
That’s a very reasonable concern. But I don’t think your proposal describes how people use the term “conspiracy theory” most of the time. Note that the reverse can happen too, where people dismiss an idea as a “conspiracy theory” merely because it’s a theory about a conspiracy. Perhaps we just have to accept that there are two meanings and be explicit about which one we’re talking about.
Depends how we define the term — a “conspiracy theory” is more than just a hypothesis that a conspiracy took place. Conspiracy theories tend to come with a bundle of suspicious behaviors.
Consider: as soon as three of four Nord Stream pipelines ruptured, I figured that Putin ordered it. This is an even more “conspiratorial” thought than I usually have, mainly because, before it happened, I thought Putin was bluffing by shutting down Nord Stream 1 and that he would (1) restore the gas within a month or two and (2) finally back down from the whole “Special Military Operation” thing. So I thought Putin would do X one week and decided that he had done opposite-of-X the next week, and that’s suspicious—just how a conspiracy theorist might respond to undeniable facts! Was I doing something epistemically wrong? I think it helped that I had contemplated whether Putin would double down and do a “partial mobilization” literally a few minutes before I heard the news that he had done exactly that. I had given a 40% chance to that event, so when it happened, I felt like my understanding wasn’t too far off base. And, once Putin had made another belligerent, foolish and rash decision in 2022, it made sense that he might do a third thing that was belligerent, foolish and rash; blowing up pipelines certainly fits the bill. Plus, I was only like 90% sure Putin did it (the most well-known proponents of conspiracy theorists usually seem even more certain).
When I finally posted my “conspiracy theory” on Slashdot, it was well-received, even though I was mistaken in my mind about the Freeport explosion (it only reduced U.S. export capacity by 16%; I expected more). I then honed the argument a bit for the ACX version. I think most people who read it didn’t pick up on it being a “conspiracy theory”. So… what’s different about what I posted versus what people recognize as a “conspiracy theory”?
I didn’t express certainty
I just admitted a mistake about Freeport. Conspiracy theorists rarely weaken their theory based on new evidence. Also note that I found the 16% figure by actively seeking it out, and I updated my thinking based on it, though it didn’t shift the probability by a lot. (I would’ve edited my post, but Slashdot doesn’t support editing.)
I didn’t “sound nuts” (conspiracy theorists often lack self-awareness about how they sound)
It didn’t appear to be in the “conspiracy theory cluster”. Conspiracy theorists usually believe lots of odd things. Their warped world model usually bleeds into the conspiracy theory somehow, making it “look like” a conspiracy theory.
My comment appears in response to award-winning[1] journalist Seymour Hersh’s piece. Hersh has a single anonymous source saying that Joe Biden blew up Nord Stream, even though this would harm the economic interests of U.S. allies. He shows no signs of having vetted his information, but he solicits official opinions and is told “this is false and complete fiction”. After that, he treats his source’s claims as undisputed facts — so undisputed that claims from the anonymous source are simply stated as raw statements of truth, e.g. he says “The plan to blow up Nord Stream 1 and 2 was suddenly downgraded” rather than “The source went on to say that the plan to blow up Nord Stream 1 and 2 was suddenly downgraded”. Later, OSINT investigator Oliver Alexander pokes holes in the story, and then finds evidence that NS2 ruptured accidentally (which explains why only one of the two NS2 lines was affected) while NS1 was blown up with help from the Minerva Julie, owned by a Russia-linked company. He also notes that the explosives destroyed low points in the pipelines that would minimize corrosion damage to the rest of the lines. This information doesn’t affect Hersh’s opinions, and his responses are a little strange [1][2][3]. Finally, Oliver points out that the NS1 damage looks different from the NS2 damage.
If you see a theory whose proponents have high certainty, refuse to acknowledge data that doesn’t fit the theory (OR: enlarge the conspiracy to “explain” the new data by assuming it was falsified), speak in the “conspiracy theory genre”, and sound unhinged, you see a “conspiracy theory”[2]. If it’s just a hypothesis that a conspiracy happened, then no.
So, as long as people are looking for the right signs of a “conspiracy theory”, we should want fewer people to believe things in that category. So in that vein, it’s worth discussing which signs are more or less important. What other signs can we look for?
He won a Pulitzer Prize 53 years ago
Hersh arguably ticks all these boxes, but especially the first two which are the most important. Hersh ignores the satellite data, and assumes the AIS ship location data is falsified (on both the U.S. military ship(s) and the Russia-linked ship?)
I dislike this definition of a conspiracy theory. It tacks on way more meaning to the phrase than it contains on its own, forcing someone to know the definition you’re using, and allowing motte and bailey behavior (you call a conspiracy theory a conspiracy theory to discredit it because by definition it is not epistemically sound, but then when provided evidence for it you say ‘well it’s a theory about a conspiracy, so it’s a conspiracy theory’. I’m not saying you would do that, just that defining it like so allows that.)
It’s better to keep “conspiracy theory” as “a theory about a conspiracy”, and then discuss which ones are legitimate and which ones aren’t.
That’s a very reasonable concern. But I don’t think your proposal describes how people use the term “conspiracy theory” most of the time. Note that the reverse can happen too, where people dismiss an idea as a “conspiracy theory” merely because it’s a theory about a conspiracy. Perhaps we just have to accept that there are two meanings and be explicit about which one we’re talking about.