I think you’re partially right. If a certain ethical code is chosen simply because it is regarded as having a divine source, there would be something necessarily nihilistic in giving the said source a positive weighting. However, it would only deny rationality itself as having any intrinsic value: but if the super-intellectual divine has absolute, intrinsic value simply as a part of its definition, the ethical code deriving from it would as well, and certain actions would become intrinsically desirable.
My point here is that there are many people who regard themselves as abiding by material reductionism as an overall worldview, but who simultaneously admit that the core of morality is essentially non-rational (Ex. the “void” described in the 13 Virtues of Rationality), and this is not internally consistent. My criticism is that attempts to answer ethical questions from a purely rational standpoint usually yield incorrect conclusions, when questions concerning the nature and origin of that non-rational component are removed from the equation.
Your reply is based on multiple misunderstandings. I cannot correct them all, but I will take a stab at the most obvious ones. First, “the Void” is not a nonrational component of morality, and the fact that you would attempt to thus make it fit your theological framework is… telling. Second, the sentence “if the super-intellectual divine has absolute, intrinsic value simply as a part of its definition, the ethical code deriving from it would as well” is nonsensical. Who is doing the defining? Either you are, in which case we’re back to your choices; or the divine thing is, in which case it’s saying “I’m good because I’m good, you better pay attention to me”. That is seriously incoherent as a moral argument. You seem to think that saying “Moral code X is defined as a good moral code, therefore it is a good moral code” is ok if you wrap up the obvious circularity in verbiage.
Tim was saying that he agreed with the original existentialists about how, from any external objective perspective, there’s no meaning to our lives, and meaning is something we create entirely for ourselves. And then he said something like, “The difference is that I don’t see why that’s a problem. Sure, I create my own meaning. So what? That’s fine with me. Sartre and Camus and that whole crowd thought this was a barely-tolerable psychological state that had to be struggled with on a daily basis… but I don’t see what the big deal is.”
I think you’re partially right. If a certain ethical code is chosen simply because it is regarded as having a divine source, there would be something necessarily nihilistic in giving the said source a positive weighting. However, it would only deny rationality itself as having any intrinsic value: but if the super-intellectual divine has absolute, intrinsic value simply as a part of its definition, the ethical code deriving from it would as well, and certain actions would become intrinsically desirable.
My point here is that there are many people who regard themselves as abiding by material reductionism as an overall worldview, but who simultaneously admit that the core of morality is essentially non-rational (Ex. the “void” described in the 13 Virtues of Rationality), and this is not internally consistent. My criticism is that attempts to answer ethical questions from a purely rational standpoint usually yield incorrect conclusions, when questions concerning the nature and origin of that non-rational component are removed from the equation.
Your reply is based on multiple misunderstandings. I cannot correct them all, but I will take a stab at the most obvious ones. First, “the Void” is not a nonrational component of morality, and the fact that you would attempt to thus make it fit your theological framework is… telling. Second, the sentence “if the super-intellectual divine has absolute, intrinsic value simply as a part of its definition, the ethical code deriving from it would as well” is nonsensical. Who is doing the defining? Either you are, in which case we’re back to your choices; or the divine thing is, in which case it’s saying “I’m good because I’m good, you better pay attention to me”. That is seriously incoherent as a moral argument. You seem to think that saying “Moral code X is defined as a good moral code, therefore it is a good moral code” is ok if you wrap up the obvious circularity in verbiage.
Greta Christina, Will Atheism Become Easier?