Your reply is based on multiple misunderstandings. I cannot correct them all, but I will take a stab at the most obvious ones. First, “the Void” is not a nonrational component of morality, and the fact that you would attempt to thus make it fit your theological framework is… telling. Second, the sentence “if the super-intellectual divine has absolute, intrinsic value simply as a part of its definition, the ethical code deriving from it would as well” is nonsensical. Who is doing the defining? Either you are, in which case we’re back to your choices; or the divine thing is, in which case it’s saying “I’m good because I’m good, you better pay attention to me”. That is seriously incoherent as a moral argument. You seem to think that saying “Moral code X is defined as a good moral code, therefore it is a good moral code” is ok if you wrap up the obvious circularity in verbiage.
Your reply is based on multiple misunderstandings. I cannot correct them all, but I will take a stab at the most obvious ones. First, “the Void” is not a nonrational component of morality, and the fact that you would attempt to thus make it fit your theological framework is… telling. Second, the sentence “if the super-intellectual divine has absolute, intrinsic value simply as a part of its definition, the ethical code deriving from it would as well” is nonsensical. Who is doing the defining? Either you are, in which case we’re back to your choices; or the divine thing is, in which case it’s saying “I’m good because I’m good, you better pay attention to me”. That is seriously incoherent as a moral argument. You seem to think that saying “Moral code X is defined as a good moral code, therefore it is a good moral code” is ok if you wrap up the obvious circularity in verbiage.