Perhaps the same calculation could simulate different real world phenomena, but it doesn’t follow that the subjective experiences are different in each case.
I see what you mean I think—I suppose if you’re into multiple realizability perhaps the set of all physical processes that the alien settles on all implement the same experience. But this just depends on how broad this set is. If it contains two brains, one thinking about the roman empire and one eating a sandwich, we’re stuck.
This also does not follow. Both experiences could happen in the same brain. You—being experience A—may not be aware of experience B—but that does not mean that experience B does not exist.
Yea I did consider this as a counterpoint. I don’t have a good answer to this, besides it being unintuitive and violating occam’s razor in some sense.
But this just depends on how broad this set is. If it contains two brains, one thinking about the roman empire and one eating a sandwich, we’re stuck.
I suspect that if you do actually follow Aaronson (as linked by Davidmanheim) to extract a unique efficient calculation that interacts with the external world in a sensible way, that unique efficient externally-interacting calculation will end up corresponding to a consistent set of experiences, even if it could still correspond to simulations of different real-world phenomena.
But I also don’t think that consistent set of experiences necessarily has to be a single experience! It could be multiple experiences unaware of each other, for example.
I see what you mean I think—I suppose if you’re into multiple realizability perhaps the set of all physical processes that the alien settles on all implement the same experience. But this just depends on how broad this set is. If it contains two brains, one thinking about the roman empire and one eating a sandwich, we’re stuck.
Yea I did consider this as a counterpoint. I don’t have a good answer to this, besides it being unintuitive and violating occam’s razor in some sense.
I suspect that if you do actually follow Aaronson (as linked by Davidmanheim) to extract a unique efficient calculation that interacts with the external world in a sensible way, that unique efficient externally-interacting calculation will end up corresponding to a consistent set of experiences, even if it could still correspond to simulations of different real-world phenomena.
But I also don’t think that consistent set of experiences necessarily has to be a single experience! It could be multiple experiences unaware of each other, for example.