What I am familiar with of Kant’s reasoning was a bit consequentialist, and if “this leads to a bad circumstance under some circumstance → never do it even under circumstances when doing it leads to bad consequences” (which means the analysis could come to a different conclusion if it was done in a different order or reversed the action/inaction related bias) is dropped in favor of “here are the reference classes, use the policy with the highest expected utility given this fixed relationship between preference classes and policies” then it can be made into one that might meet the axioms.
I think that’s one way one could try to adapt Kantian theories, or extrapolate certain key principles from them. But I don’t think it’s what the theories themselves say. I think what you’re describing lines up very well with rule utilitarianism.
(Side note: Personally, “my favourite theory” would probably be something like two-level utilitarianism, which blends both rule and act utilitarianism, and then based on moral uncertainty I’d add some side constraints/concessions to deontological and virtue ethical theories—plus just a preference for not doing anything too drastic/irreversible in case the “correct” theory is one I haven’t heard of yet/no one’s thought of yet.)
I think that’s one way one could try to adapt Kantian theories, or extrapolate certain key principles from them. But I don’t think it’s what the theories themselves say. I think what you’re describing lines up very well with rule utilitarianism.
(Side note: Personally, “my favourite theory” would probably be something like two-level utilitarianism, which blends both rule and act utilitarianism, and then based on moral uncertainty I’d add some side constraints/concessions to deontological and virtue ethical theories—plus just a preference for not doing anything too drastic/irreversible in case the “correct” theory is one I haven’t heard of yet/no one’s thought of yet.)