In this sense, this brand of non-consequentialist theories seems to be an amalgamation of ‘moral theories’.
I’m not sure I see what you mean by that.
The section on the Borda Rule is about how to combine theories under consideration that only rank outcomes ordinally. The lack of information about how these non-consequentialist theories rank outcomes could stem from them being underspecified—or a combination approach as your post describes, though probably one of a different form than described here.
is basically what you’d get if you averaged (or took a credence-weighted average) across all moral theories”?
I wouldn’t say “all”—though it might be an average across moral theories that could be considered separately. They’re complicated theories, but maybe the pieces make more sense, or it’ll make more sense if disassembled and reassembled.
like the hypothesised Kantian theory, don’t meet the axions of expected utility theory.
This may be true of other non-consequentialist theories. What I am familiar with of Kant’s reasoning was a bit consequentialist, and if “this leads to a bad circumstance under some circumstance → never do it even under circumstances when doing it leads to bad consequences” (which means the analysis could come to a different conclusion if it was done in a different order or reversed the action/inaction related bias) is dropped in favor of “here are the reference classes, use the policy with the highest expected utility given this fixed relationship between preference classes and policies” then it can be made into one that might meet the axioms.
What I am familiar with of Kant’s reasoning was a bit consequentialist, and if “this leads to a bad circumstance under some circumstance → never do it even under circumstances when doing it leads to bad consequences” (which means the analysis could come to a different conclusion if it was done in a different order or reversed the action/inaction related bias) is dropped in favor of “here are the reference classes, use the policy with the highest expected utility given this fixed relationship between preference classes and policies” then it can be made into one that might meet the axioms.
I think that’s one way one could try to adapt Kantian theories, or extrapolate certain key principles from them. But I don’t think it’s what the theories themselves say. I think what you’re describing lines up very well with rule utilitarianism.
(Side note: Personally, “my favourite theory” would probably be something like two-level utilitarianism, which blends both rule and act utilitarianism, and then based on moral uncertainty I’d add some side constraints/concessions to deontological and virtue ethical theories—plus just a preference for not doing anything too drastic/irreversible in case the “correct” theory is one I haven’t heard of yet/no one’s thought of yet.)
The section on the Borda Rule is about how to combine theories under consideration that only rank outcomes ordinally. The lack of information about how these non-consequentialist theories rank outcomes could stem from them being underspecified—or a combination approach as your post describes, though probably one of a different form than described here.
I wouldn’t say “all”—though it might be an average across moral theories that could be considered separately. They’re complicated theories, but maybe the pieces make more sense, or it’ll make more sense if disassembled and reassembled.
This may be true of other non-consequentialist theories. What I am familiar with of Kant’s reasoning was a bit consequentialist, and if “this leads to a bad circumstance under some circumstance → never do it even under circumstances when doing it leads to bad consequences” (which means the analysis could come to a different conclusion if it was done in a different order or reversed the action/inaction related bias) is dropped in favor of “here are the reference classes, use the policy with the highest expected utility given this fixed relationship between preference classes and policies” then it can be made into one that might meet the axioms.
I think that’s one way one could try to adapt Kantian theories, or extrapolate certain key principles from them. But I don’t think it’s what the theories themselves say. I think what you’re describing lines up very well with rule utilitarianism.
(Side note: Personally, “my favourite theory” would probably be something like two-level utilitarianism, which blends both rule and act utilitarianism, and then based on moral uncertainty I’d add some side constraints/concessions to deontological and virtue ethical theories—plus just a preference for not doing anything too drastic/irreversible in case the “correct” theory is one I haven’t heard of yet/no one’s thought of yet.)