I don’t think Mormonism is true. I’m not even sure I should consider my friends’ experiences evidence in favor of the proposition that Mormonism is true, especially given that I know other religions have similarly experience-laden representatives and “Alicorn’s friends” isn’t a group representative of the population as a whole. I do, however, suspect that they should consider it evidence—even strong evidence—to exactly that effect.
I do, however, suspect that they should consider it evidence—even strong evidence—to exactly that effect.
Why? Unless the experience displays obvious entanglement with external facts they couldn’t have known at the time, “it’s all in my head” is a perfectly good explanation.
Also, I agree that some experiences are incommunicable in practice, but it still seems that enough information is available that your friends should conclude (with a touch of Outside View reasoning) that other people who claim incommunicable evidence for their religions are probably experiencing about the same thing they are.
Why? Unless the experience displays obvious entanglement with external facts they couldn’t have known at the time, “it’s all in my head” is a perfectly good explanation.
Unfortunately, there’s a slippery slope from “it’s all in your head” to “it doesn’t matter”/”you’re making it up”. Look at the history of psychiatry and mental health for examples.
Not saying you’re wrong, just that there may be layers of complicated cultural biases preventing people from accepting that answer.
A human mind is a physical object in the universe, mine as well as yours. An experience that you have should not produce a qualitatively different update in beliefs to an experience I report. In either case, the fact of the matter is, on such and such date and time, a human brain under such and such circumstances underwent such and such experiences.
To take it to an extreme case, no one has access to information which a scientist with a super-MRI machine observing the excitation of each individual neuron does not, in principle, have.
Yes, of course—but I don’t have a super-MRI. I can’t access the content of my friends’ experiences; I can’t take it into account the way I could entertain a communicable proposition, because they can’t even describe their experiences. If someone tells me a piece of evidence that would be excellent evidence for proposition P, but they say it in Swahili, I have no such evidence for P.
I don’t think Mormonism is true. I’m not even sure I should consider my friends’ experiences evidence in favor of the proposition that Mormonism is true, especially given that I know other religions have similarly experience-laden representatives and “Alicorn’s friends” isn’t a group representative of the population as a whole. I do, however, suspect that they should consider it evidence—even strong evidence—to exactly that effect.
Why? Unless the experience displays obvious entanglement with external facts they couldn’t have known at the time, “it’s all in my head” is a perfectly good explanation.
Also, I agree that some experiences are incommunicable in practice, but it still seems that enough information is available that your friends should conclude (with a touch of Outside View reasoning) that other people who claim incommunicable evidence for their religions are probably experiencing about the same thing they are.
Unfortunately, there’s a slippery slope from “it’s all in your head” to “it doesn’t matter”/”you’re making it up”. Look at the history of psychiatry and mental health for examples.
Not saying you’re wrong, just that there may be layers of complicated cultural biases preventing people from accepting that answer.
A human mind is a physical object in the universe, mine as well as yours. An experience that you have should not produce a qualitatively different update in beliefs to an experience I report. In either case, the fact of the matter is, on such and such date and time, a human brain under such and such circumstances underwent such and such experiences.
To take it to an extreme case, no one has access to information which a scientist with a super-MRI machine observing the excitation of each individual neuron does not, in principle, have.
Yes, of course—but I don’t have a super-MRI. I can’t access the content of my friends’ experiences; I can’t take it into account the way I could entertain a communicable proposition, because they can’t even describe their experiences. If someone tells me a piece of evidence that would be excellent evidence for proposition P, but they say it in Swahili, I have no such evidence for P.