Thanks! I’m unhappy to see that, but my preferences are over states of the world, not beliefs, unless they simply strongly favor the belief that they are over states of the world.
Fortunately, we have some time, but that does bode ill I think. OTOH, the general trend, though not the universal trend, is for CEV to look more difficult and stranger with time.
If that’s not what you mean, well, if you can propose alternatives to CEV that don’t automatically fail and which also don’t look to me like variations on CEV I think you will be the first to do so. CEV is terribly underspecified, so it’s hard to think hard about the problem and propose something that doesn’t already fall within the current specification.
FWIW, Eliezer seems to have suggested an anti-selfish-bastard tweak here.
Thanks! I’m unhappy to see that, but my preferences are over states of the world, not beliefs, unless they simply strongly favor the belief that they are over states of the world.
Fortunately, we have some time, but that does bode ill I think. OTOH, the general trend, though not the universal trend, is for CEV to look more difficult and stranger with time.
I don’t trust CEV. The further you extrapolate from where you are, the less experience you have with applying the virtue you’re trying to implement.
So you would like experience with the interactions through which our virtues unfold and are developed to be part of the extrapolation dynamic? http://www.google.com/search?q=%22grown+up+further+together%22&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a That always was intended I think.
If that’s not what you mean, well, if you can propose alternatives to CEV that don’t automatically fail and which also don’t look to me like variations on CEV I think you will be the first to do so. CEV is terribly underspecified, so it’s hard to think hard about the problem and propose something that doesn’t already fall within the current specification.