If doubting is/was accepted in our current society, and we wanted Archimede to doubt about his beliefs, would we have to doubt about the value doubting, or be certain about the value of doubting?
It’s a joke. As Eliezer said “to get nonobvious output, you need nonobvious input”, so obviously, we’d just have to find something nonobvious. :-)
I wonder if we will ever come up with something that is as nonobvious to us right now as bayesian thinking was to Archimede.
If doubting is/was accepted in our current society, and we wanted Archimede to doubt about his beliefs, would we have to doubt about the value doubting, or be certain about the value of doubting?
It’s a joke. As Eliezer said “to get nonobvious output, you need nonobvious input”, so obviously, we’d just have to find something nonobvious. :-)
I wonder if we will ever come up with something that is as nonobvious to us right now as bayesian thinking was to Archimede.