If we live in a simulation, then it’s likely to be turned off at some point, breaking the induction hypothesis. But then, maybe it doesn’t matter as we wouldn’t be able to observe this.
The problem of induction of is more than one thing, because everything is more than one thing.
The most often discussed version is the epistemic problem, the problem of justifying why you should believe that future patterns will continue. That isn’t much affected by ontologcal issues like whether the universe is simulated. Using probabilistic reasoning , it still makes sense to bet on patterns continuing, mainly because you have no specific information about the alternatives. But you do need to abandon certainty and use probability if ontology can pull the rug from under you.
The ontologcal problem is pretty much equivalent to the problem of the nature of physical law—what makes the future resemble the past? The standard answer , that physical laws are just descriptions, does not work.
Theories of how quarks, electromagnetism and gravity produce planets with intelligent species on them are scientific accomplishments by virtue of the compression they achieve, regardless of why quarks appear to be a thing.
There’s no general agreement on what science is supposed to achieve—specifically, there is an instrumentalism versus realism debate. For realists, it does matter if science fails to discover what’s really real.
If we live in a simulation, then it’s likely to be turned off at some point, breaking the induction hypothesis. But then, maybe it doesn’t matter as we wouldn’t be able to observe this.
The problem of induction of is more than one thing, because everything is more than one thing.
The most often discussed version is the epistemic problem, the problem of justifying why you should believe that future patterns will continue. That isn’t much affected by ontologcal issues like whether the universe is simulated. Using probabilistic reasoning , it still makes sense to bet on patterns continuing, mainly because you have no specific information about the alternatives. But you do need to abandon certainty and use probability if ontology can pull the rug from under you.
The ontologcal problem is pretty much equivalent to the problem of the nature of physical law—what makes the future resemble the past? The standard answer , that physical laws are just descriptions, does not work.
Theories of how quarks, electromagnetism and gravity produce planets with intelligent species on them are scientific accomplishments by virtue of the compression they achieve, regardless of why quarks appear to be a thing.
There’s no general agreement on what science is supposed to achieve—specifically, there is an instrumentalism versus realism debate. For realists, it does matter if science fails to discover what’s really real.