The problem of induction of is more than one thing, because everything is more than one thing.
The most often discussed version is the epistemic problem, the problem of justifying why you should believe that future patterns will continue. That isn’t much affected by ontologcal issues like whether the universe is simulated. Using probabilistic reasoning , it still makes sense to bet on patterns continuing, mainly because you have no specific information about the alternatives. But you do need to abandon certainty and use probability if ontology can pull the rug from under you.
The ontologcal problem is pretty much equivalent to the problem of the nature of physical law—what makes the future resemble the past? The standard answer , that physical laws are just descriptions, does not work.
The problem of induction of is more than one thing, because everything is more than one thing.
The most often discussed version is the epistemic problem, the problem of justifying why you should believe that future patterns will continue. That isn’t much affected by ontologcal issues like whether the universe is simulated. Using probabilistic reasoning , it still makes sense to bet on patterns continuing, mainly because you have no specific information about the alternatives. But you do need to abandon certainty and use probability if ontology can pull the rug from under you.
The ontologcal problem is pretty much equivalent to the problem of the nature of physical law—what makes the future resemble the past? The standard answer , that physical laws are just descriptions, does not work.