Thomas Ricks and other have argued that the military does not provide senior officers with strong incentives for competence or excellence. (This is usually presented as two overlapping claims: 1) Performance of current officers would improve if they were given stronger incentives; 2) The military’s lower competence officers ought to be removed from command so as to ensure that only highly-competent senior officers remain in command.) Paul Yingling: “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.”
I think that statement right there is the crux of it.
I have mixed feelings on Clausewitz, but one thing I that did seep in from my first read of On War was that it is very hard to achieve success (let alone measure it) if you don’t have a clear idea of what your goal is. “Kill lots of enemy” is not particularly good goal.
Removing the less competent officers is obviously a good call, but how does that call get made? How is it different than what is currently being done?
I disagree with the logic that being given stronger incentives will help senior officers win wars. What kind of incentives/disincentives could be offered? Increasing monetary rewards or job promotions could lead to ethical violations, while at the same time not necessarily helping our performance.
Fear of losing their job? I would guess that the most common reason for a senior officer gets kicked out is sexual harassment and/or adultery and/or fraternization. Namely, all the sexual violations. Somehow, knowledge that if they get caught they will get kicked out (or thrown in the brig) has not seemed to affect people’s actions very much.
I agree with Yingling’s quote, although losing a rifle is almost always your fault; losing a war, however, is a much more complex issue than “I left it outside while I was using the head...”
Thomas Ricks and other have argued that the military does not provide senior officers with strong incentives for competence or excellence. (This is usually presented as two overlapping claims: 1) Performance of current officers would improve if they were given stronger incentives; 2) The military’s lower competence officers ought to be removed from command so as to ensure that only highly-competent senior officers remain in command.) Paul Yingling: “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.”
Measuring success in war related matters isn’t easy.
The US army did a lot of bad things because generals got the goal of achieve a high body count of dead Taliban.
I think that statement right there is the crux of it.
I have mixed feelings on Clausewitz, but one thing I that did seep in from my first read of On War was that it is very hard to achieve success (let alone measure it) if you don’t have a clear idea of what your goal is. “Kill lots of enemy” is not particularly good goal.
And, ironically, this goal was apparently set by a failed-out Air National Guard pilot.
Removing the less competent officers is obviously a good call, but how does that call get made? How is it different than what is currently being done?
I disagree with the logic that being given stronger incentives will help senior officers win wars. What kind of incentives/disincentives could be offered? Increasing monetary rewards or job promotions could lead to ethical violations, while at the same time not necessarily helping our performance.
Fear of losing their job? I would guess that the most common reason for a senior officer gets kicked out is sexual harassment and/or adultery and/or fraternization. Namely, all the sexual violations. Somehow, knowledge that if they get caught they will get kicked out (or thrown in the brig) has not seemed to affect people’s actions very much.
I agree with Yingling’s quote, although losing a rifle is almost always your fault; losing a war, however, is a much more complex issue than “I left it outside while I was using the head...”