Harm/Care is unusual among the foundations in that it’s other-directed. The goal is to help other people, and it does not especially matter how that occurs. [...] In contrast, the other foundations centre on the moral actor themselves. I cannot be just, loyal, a good follower, or pure for you.
It seems to me that Harm/Care isn’t as different as you say. Native (evolved) morality is mostly deontological. The object of moral feelings is the act of helping, not the result of other people being better off. “The goal is to help other people” sounds like a consequentialist reformulation. Helping a second party to help a third party may not be efficient, but morality isn’t concerned with efficiency.
In contrast, the other foundations centre on the moral actor themselves. I cannot be just, loyal, a good follower, or pure for you.
I could say: yes, I can be just *to* you, loyal *to* you, a good follower *of* you. And pure *for* you too—think about purity pledges, aka “save it *for* your future spouse”.
In all these cases, morality is about performance—deontology—rather than about accomplishing a goal. But each case does have an apparent goal, so our System 2 can apply consequentialist logic to it. Why do you treat Harm/Care differently?
I think I would argue that harm/care isn’t obviously deontological. Many of the others are indeed about the performance of the action, but I think arguably harm/care is actually about the harm. There isn’t an extra term for “and this was done by X”.
That might just be me foisting my consequentialist intuitions on people, though.
I think I understood bryjnar differently from you.
I could say: yes, I can be just to you, loyal to you, a good follower of you. And pure for you too—think about purity pledges, aka “save it for your future spouse”.
I think that saying that “you can’t do x for someone” is supposed to be analogous to “I can’t learn the material for you” as opposed to “if you want to climb Mt Everest, you have to do it for yourself rather than for someone else”.
If you understood that the same way, then I think you’re saying that if people care about others being pure, it seems they can just as easily care about others being caring. And that we should think about people trying to observe the norm of caring and making sure others do, rather than trying to care effectively. Is that right?
“I can’t learn the material for you” as opposed to “if you want to climb Mt Everest, you have to do it for yourself rather than for someone else”.
I’m not sure I understand the difference, can you make it more explicit?
“I can’t learn the material for you”: if I learn it, it won’t achieve the goal of you having learned it, i.e. you knowing the material.
“I can’t climb the mountain for you”: if I climb it, the prestige and fun will be mine; I can’t give you the experience of climbing the mountain unless you climb it yourself.
The two cases seem the same...
if people care about others being pure, it seems they can just as easily care about others being caring. And that we should think about people trying to observe the norm of caring and making sure others do, rather than trying to care effectively. Is that right?
Yes, that’s what I think is happening: people observing norms and judging others on observing them, rather than on achieving goals efficiently or achieving more. Consequentially, we want to save everyone. Morally, we don’t judge people harshly for not saving everyone as long as they’re doing their best—and we don’t expect them to make an extraordinary effort.
And so, I don’t see a significant difference between Harm/Care and the other foundations.
It seems to me that Harm/Care isn’t as different as you say. Native (evolved) morality is mostly deontological. The object of moral feelings is the act of helping, not the result of other people being better off. “The goal is to help other people” sounds like a consequentialist reformulation. Helping a second party to help a third party may not be efficient, but morality isn’t concerned with efficiency.
I could say: yes, I can be just *to* you, loyal *to* you, a good follower *of* you. And pure *for* you too—think about purity pledges, aka “save it *for* your future spouse”.
In all these cases, morality is about performance—deontology—rather than about accomplishing a goal. But each case does have an apparent goal, so our System 2 can apply consequentialist logic to it. Why do you treat Harm/Care differently?
I think I would argue that harm/care isn’t obviously deontological. Many of the others are indeed about the performance of the action, but I think arguably harm/care is actually about the harm. There isn’t an extra term for “and this was done by X”.
That might just be me foisting my consequentialist intuitions on people, though.
I think I understood bryjnar differently from you.
I think that saying that “you can’t do x for someone” is supposed to be analogous to “I can’t learn the material for you” as opposed to “if you want to climb Mt Everest, you have to do it for yourself rather than for someone else”.
If you understood that the same way, then I think you’re saying that if people care about others being pure, it seems they can just as easily care about others being caring. And that we should think about people trying to observe the norm of caring and making sure others do, rather than trying to care effectively. Is that right?
I’m not sure I understand the difference, can you make it more explicit?
“I can’t learn the material for you”: if I learn it, it won’t achieve the goal of you having learned it, i.e. you knowing the material.
“I can’t climb the mountain for you”: if I climb it, the prestige and fun will be mine; I can’t give you the experience of climbing the mountain unless you climb it yourself.
The two cases seem the same...
Yes, that’s what I think is happening: people observing norms and judging others on observing them, rather than on achieving goals efficiently or achieving more. Consequentially, we want to save everyone. Morally, we don’t judge people harshly for not saving everyone as long as they’re doing their best—and we don’t expect them to make an extraordinary effort.
And so, I don’t see a significant difference between Harm/Care and the other foundations.
Sorry, I meant to reply and can’t see how to delete the top-level comment.
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/c5Nc9hEA9QA937Nmv/meaning-and-moral-foundations-theory#9E56sP53x8jxnnhSL