At some point, this thing which does not seem like coercion, becomes a clear case of coercion. When the power used to gently nudge is absolute, no matter how slight the suggestion, its victim remains intimidated by the knowledge of the unlimited power behind it. Thus, because government necessarily sits in a position of almost unlimited power over the individual, any lifestyle suggestions they make are not compatible with libertarian ideals.
Variations of this idea have been running through my head for the last few months as I’ve been trying to re-evaluate my views of how concepts like “oppression” and “coercion” ought to be defined, and how immensely such categories could (when taken seriously enough) complicate the search for an ethical and practicable socio-economic structure. [1] Seeing it spelled out explicitly here gives me a high prior on the authors’ understanding of the ethics of choice.
Looking at the reviews of Nudge in mainstream liberal publications, I see praise for the specific examples of “nudges” proposed in the areas of finance, healthcare, etc, and I can’t help but agree. However, civil unions are a much more important and sensitive matter, and the authors seem to lean heavily on the side of caution/liberalism here. What they have suggested—separation of religion/tradition and law; eliminating restrictions on who can participate; a set of unambiguious default rules that would favour the vulnerable party; the requirement to plan ahead for situations where emotions would run high, etc—is all well and good.
However, I can’t see them saying anything about what Vladimir seems to be arguing against! It does not appear that the authors even hint at changing the boundaries of what is legally enforceable for a civil union contract, and what the methods of enforcement could be. That they don’t even mention the possibility of “wild radical implications” such as “flogging for adultery”, and that they propose denying all legal status to private “marriage”, certainly puts me at ease as to the direction of their “libertarianism”—but how is it even distinctly libertarian at this point? Why not call it the updated and streamlined version of modern liberal progressivism?
Tl;dr: we ought to take note that this is not libertarianism or conservatism, the authors are just using libertarian concepts to make good old progressivism more coherent and effective. I’m totally fine with it :)
1] One of the effects is that I’m now considerably more pro-markets, yet still opposed to the actually existing capitalist or feudal modes of production. See e.g. here
However, I can’t see them saying anything about what Vladimir seems to be arguing against! It does not appear that the authors even hint at changing the boundaries of what is legally enforceable for a civil union contract, and what the methods of enforcement could be.
They aren’t from what I read. This article cites several essays. To understand what Vladimir is commenting on I suggest you follow the links to the original thread.
To understand what Vladimir is commenting on I suggest you follow the links to the original thread.
Why, I’ve read it and understand what he’s commenting on. I’ve seen arguments for unlimited enforcement of all private contracts building on the framework of “property rights”—for example, in Moldbug’s idea of “Pronomianism”. I agree with Vladimir that 1) this would be the “consistently libertarian” position, and that 2) it’s kind of batshit insane (to put it mildly) and that attempting to put it into practice would terrify and outrage practically everyone. Therefore, I find it more meaningful to call the authors’ platform “liberal”/”progressivist” rather than “libertarian”. The title of “Libertarian paternalism” in particular sounds like it would involve various social-conservative points, explicit support for traditional marriage, etc—but it doesn’t.
I’d bet that the authors were simply aware of how massively uncool/conformist/stale calling something “liberal” or “progressive” would sound nowdays, so they slapped a mostly arbitrary level on a system of (rather reasonable, hardly novel) “Prog” policy suggestions.
It’s not like people are denied the right to have less-binding-than-marriage contracts, the only interesting territory is in the more-binding direction.
As I hinted above, the “right” being asked for here is (in libertarian terminology) a positive right to others’ help in enforcing the contract … against those others’ objection that they would not willingly choose to help enforce it.
In other words, the question that may need an answer is not “Why don’t I have the right to enter into such a contract?” but “Why should anyone help the other party enforce it against me?”
An ideological “freedom of contract” answer runs into an opposing “freedom of association” response.
“Why should anyone help the other party enforce it against me?”
Because I ask them to. Indeed why not outsource this? Why not have the state allow people to pay non-government agencies to enforce contracts the government does not wish to.
Why not have the state allow people to pay non-government agencies to enforce contracts the government does not wish to.
State monopoly on legitimate violence is a Schelling point for all modern states, both autocracies and democracies. If you break it up, the problem of distributing the right to use violence so that it wouldn’t just lead to tyrannies and chaos must practically be solved from scratch for the modern world.
De facto states do not have monopoly on violence. Also de jure private security firms do have some room for violence.
Also there is the minor issues of Government being this huge amorphous blob, that agents and institutions should have access to violence if and only if they belong to this strange set doesn’t seem like necessarily something that helps to prevent tyrannies and chaos.
Also choosing between many small tyrannies and one big one I see good pro-liberty arguments for the former.
against those others’ objection that they would not willingly choose to help enforce it
Most of the examples given are things governments already do enforce in other types of contracts. And many are things governments used to enforce in marriage contracts.
Most of the examples given are things governments already do enforce in other types of contracts.
Can you give an example of a non-marriage-related contract that specifies a penalty for one party having sex with someone other than the other party? I’m aware of employment contracts that specify termination of contract for disreputable sexual behavior, but that’s not really the same thing. Possibly the closest thing might be employment contracts for porn actors which require them to use protection against STDs, but I’m not sure if those apply to their non-professional sex acts.
And many are things governments used to enforce in marriage contracts.
Yes, policies change; as do societal norms.
Governments once enforced all sorts of conditions on marriage that are contrary to social norms today. For instance, in many Western societies a man could have his wife prosecuted and punished by the state with physical violence for being unsubmissive to him. This is no longer the case — and it certainly cannot be altered by contract, since it was a criminal matter … and since the punishment required a society willing to participate in, e.g., mocking and throwing filth at the condemned “scold”. The institution of marriage has changed in ways that cannot be reverted by mere consent of the spouses, since the surrounding society has changed.
Moreover, governments reject many sorts of claims on enforcement power which they once accepted, both within and beyond contractual matters. Governments in the West used to enforce slavery as a property right; they no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce property rights at all? Similarly, they once enforced racially discriminatory covenants on real estate, but no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce any covenants on real estate? They used to enforce the right of fathers to marry off their daughters against the daughter’s wishes; they no longer do so — does that mean they do not enforce any parental rights?
In each case, no; rather, the enforcing party is picking and choosing which sorts of claims to enforce, on the basis of what I’ve called moral-like (see above; no more quibbling, please!) judgments as to which sorts of claims are harmful and shouldn’t be enforced. This doesn’t work particularly differently for claims on contract enforcement than for claims on property or parental-rights enforcement.
They used to enforce the right of fathers to marry off their daughters against the daughter’s wishes; they no longer do so — does that mean they do not enforce any parental rights?
Actually I don’t see much of a problem with fathers marrying off their daughters against their wishes because arranged marriages work out quite well by most metrics.
And yes fathers losing that right was part of a grand march in taking away most parental rights, in may ways it represents the crossing of an important Schelling fence. Today’s exist only as very weak things since children are now legally de facto property of the state not parents.
arranged marriages work out quite well by most metrics
You seem to be mistaking arranged marriage for forced marriage. This is a grievous error of fact about human social practices; it is not a difference of opinion or values.
The difference between arranged and forced marriage is mostly one of degree. Indeed many studies trying to measure the outcomes of arranged marriages don’t really have good ways to screen out forced marriages, some don’t even attempt to.
I think historically most Western people who used the legal right of forced marriage where closer to the arranged part of that spectrum.
But you know what? I just realized that I simply assumed the latter was the case without good reason. Which tells me that I should drop the conversation and continue it another time, when I’m perhaps more clear headed and have done some more study of history.
I don’t think this carves reality at the joints. Not only are border cases hard to tell apart in many societies most of the instances cluster around where we would deem border cases.
Arranged marriages, like work, often involve driving external factors that don’t amount to ‘coercion’. Forced marriages, like slavery, always involve coercion. (The definition of coercion is the border dispute here). Do you concur? Or is there a continuum of marriage where “It sure would be nice to have grandkids someday” is only a matter of degree different from “If you refuse you will be stoned to death” or even “You have married this person.”
More realistic than reality? All four of those are things which currently happen. If there is a continuum, they are all on it.
I would put ‘You will not gain a legal right to the property which I currently have the legal rights to.’ on the arranged side rather than the forced side. Where would you put it, assuming a qualitative difference between the two (or more) categories?
Governments in the West used to enforce slavery as a property right; they no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce property rights at all?
Must … resist …. urge to troll … by steel maning that. :)
I said that I think a plausible steel man of the position that the abolition of slavery was closely tied to the abolition of other kinds of private property can be made. Not obviously from a legalistic perspective but from a moral and cultural one.
I also think it’s plausible. I don’t think that would be trolling, I think that would be a highly useful way to examine one’s values and ethics. Including your own views.
Consider the hardcore “reactionary” position on such relations of dominance and social control:
...The result was, publically, an ideology that strongly linked the subordination of women and the subordination of blacks with the defense of white liberty and white private property. Few issues were as intricately linked in antebellum times as were black rights and women’s rights. Southern ideologists weren’t alone in noticing that in the North women’s rights activists came almost exclusively out of the ranks of abolitionists. While abolitionists imagined liberty as about individual self-possession and control, Southern ideologues imagined it as household self-possession and control, possession and control being exercised by the white man. George Fitzhugh wrote that abolitionists “give at once the coup de grace to the old world, and to usher in the new golden age, of free love and free lands, of free women and free negroes, of free children and free men.” (these are all bad things, for Fitzhugh). In Cannibals All, he constantly refers to the “women, children, and free negroes” as one group, those fit to be ruled. He also, interestingly, accuses all abolitionists of being socialists: “men once fairly committed to negro slavery agitation—once committed to the sweeping principle, “that man being a moral agent, accountable to God for his actions, should not have those actions controlled and directed by the will of another,”[1] - are, in effect, committed to Socialism and Communism, to the most ultra doctrines of Garrison, Goodell, Smith and Andrews – to no private property, no church, no law, no government, – to free love, free lands, free women and free churches.”
And the “compassionate conservative” one (from an interview with a British author whom you’ve linked to, Roger Scruton):
Among the ills of the post-1968 cultural revolution are, apparently, the “deconstructionist, feminist, counter-cultural” ideas that encourage the destruction of all hierarchy. Feminism is an ill? Radical feminism only, it turns out, “which tries to overthrow the whole system of thinking on which we have hitherto depended” as opposed to “the tradition of female emancipation, beginning with Wollstonecraft and people like that, which is I think a completely different thing, and part of the natural reform of our institutions and our way of seeing things.” Wollstonecraft was, of course, no friend of Burke’s; interesting how radicalism, after the passage of years, can safely be absorbed as tradition.
And gay rights activists? In the past Scruton has written that homophobia is understandable. “I took the view that feeling repelled by something might have a justification, even if it’s not a justification that the person themselves can give. Like, we’re all repelled by incest – well, not all, but most people are. And there’s a perfectly good justification, if you look at it in terms of the long-term interest of society. And in that essay I experimented with the view that maybe something similar can be said about homosexuality. And I don’t now agree with that, because I think that – it’s such a complicated thing, homosexuality. It’s not one thing, anyway. So I wouldn’t stand by what I said then.” Though yes, “people got very cross”.
As you can see, the latter view is inconsistent—as you have said yourself many times before, rallying against the futility and weakness of “mere conservatism”, with its aquiescence to nearly any reform. The former view—no government or outsider should restrict a subject’s control over his inferiors and subordinates, to do so in any one case is to threaten the whole structure of hierarchy and dominance—certainly seems to be a stable Schelling point. And to prevent any drift from that point, you’d need a ruthless zero-tolerance policy of enforcement.
So what is your judgment here? Any bullets you’d bite on the subject of hierarchy and dominance?
^ (1) The line in italics, although excluded in the linked quote, appears in the source text (Cannibals All: Slaves Without Masters). I assume that you can recognize the significance. Universalism—as a theistic creed or as a secular one—really did make tyrants “fear for their domination.”
I think that would be a highly useful way to examine one’s values and ethics. Including your own views.
I was thinking of making a strong pseudo-Marxist argument in this direction, so I’m not sure how relevant it would be to my own views.
As you can see, the latter view is inconsistent—as you have said yourself many times before, rallying against the futility and weakness of “mere conservatism”, with its aquiescence to nearly any reform. The former view—no government or outsider should restrict a subject’s control over his inferiors and subordinates, to do so in any one case is to threaten the whole structure of hierarchy and dominance—certainly seems to be a stable Schelling point. And to prevent any drift from that point, you’d need a ruthless zero-tolerance policy of enforcement.
A different plausible Schelling point is the preservation of existing hierarchies but opposing the creation of new ones. Note that Americans spoken of had previously rejected the hierarchy of aristocracy without rejecting in general stratification by class, wealth, education, nationality, beauty, ancestry, race, gender, merit or ability. Some of these are preserved to this day.
So what is your judgment here? Any bullets you’d bite on the subject of hierarchy and dominance?
Overall a society without hierarchies is something that I doubt would be optimally matched to human values and I might even find disturbing. At the very least it would have high costs. I however need to think about these issues more before committing myself to biting any bullets.
And in that essay I experimented with the view that maybe something similar can be said about homosexuality
He might actually be right homophobia arising as an adaptive norm in past societies if homosexually is indeed caused as a side effect of a mother’s infection with a pathogen.
The speaker has an ideological vision of what the society should look like, and in particular, what the government-dictated universal terms of marriage should be (both with regards to the institution of marriage itself and its tremendous implications on all the other social institutions). He uses the libertarian argument because its implications happen to coincide with his ideological position in this particular situation, but he would never accept a libertarian argument in any other situation in which it would imply something disfavored by his ideology.
Tl;dr: we ought to take note that this is not libertarianism or conservatism, the authors are just using libertarian concepts to make good old progressivism more coherent and effective. I’m totally fine with it :)
It is a libertarian approach to doing progressivism. Those have been tried in the past, most notably much of the progressivism in the first half of the 19th century was libertarian in approach, but I would argue they have been systematically underused at least in the 20th century.
Variations of this idea have been running through my head for the last few months as I’ve been trying to re-evaluate my views of how concepts like “oppression” and “coercion” ought to be defined, and how immensely such categories could (when taken seriously enough) complicate the search for an ethical and practicable socio-economic structure. [1] Seeing it spelled out explicitly here gives me a high prior on the authors’ understanding of the ethics of choice.
Looking at the reviews of Nudge in mainstream liberal publications, I see praise for the specific examples of “nudges” proposed in the areas of finance, healthcare, etc, and I can’t help but agree. However, civil unions are a much more important and sensitive matter, and the authors seem to lean heavily on the side of caution/liberalism here. What they have suggested—separation of religion/tradition and law; eliminating restrictions on who can participate; a set of unambiguious default rules that would favour the vulnerable party; the requirement to plan ahead for situations where emotions would run high, etc—is all well and good.
However, I can’t see them saying anything about what Vladimir seems to be arguing against! It does not appear that the authors even hint at changing the boundaries of what is legally enforceable for a civil union contract, and what the methods of enforcement could be. That they don’t even mention the possibility of “wild radical implications” such as “flogging for adultery”, and that they propose denying all legal status to private “marriage”, certainly puts me at ease as to the direction of their “libertarianism”—but how is it even distinctly libertarian at this point? Why not call it the updated and streamlined version of modern liberal progressivism?
Tl;dr: we ought to take note that this is not libertarianism or conservatism, the authors are just using libertarian concepts to make good old progressivism more coherent and effective. I’m totally fine with it :)
1] One of the effects is that I’m now considerably more pro-markets, yet still opposed to the actually existing capitalist or feudal modes of production. See e.g. here
They aren’t from what I read. This article cites several essays. To understand what Vladimir is commenting on I suggest you follow the links to the original thread.
Why, I’ve read it and understand what he’s commenting on. I’ve seen arguments for unlimited enforcement of all private contracts building on the framework of “property rights”—for example, in Moldbug’s idea of “Pronomianism”. I agree with Vladimir that 1) this would be the “consistently libertarian” position, and that 2) it’s kind of batshit insane (to put it mildly) and that attempting to put it into practice would terrify and outrage practically everyone. Therefore, I find it more meaningful to call the authors’ platform “liberal”/”progressivist” rather than “libertarian”. The title of “Libertarian paternalism” in particular sounds like it would involve various social-conservative points, explicit support for traditional marriage, etc—but it doesn’t.
I’d bet that the authors were simply aware of how massively uncool/conformist/stale calling something “liberal” or “progressive” would sound nowdays, so they slapped a mostly arbitrary level on a system of (rather reasonable, hardly novel) “Prog” policy suggestions.
To put it another way:
As I hinted above, the “right” being asked for here is (in libertarian terminology) a positive right to others’ help in enforcing the contract … against those others’ objection that they would not willingly choose to help enforce it.
In other words, the question that may need an answer is not “Why don’t I have the right to enter into such a contract?” but “Why should anyone help the other party enforce it against me?”
An ideological “freedom of contract” answer runs into an opposing “freedom of association” response.
Because I ask them to. Indeed why not outsource this? Why not have the state allow people to pay non-government agencies to enforce contracts the government does not wish to.
State monopoly on legitimate violence is a Schelling point for all modern states, both autocracies and democracies. If you break it up, the problem of distributing the right to use violence so that it wouldn’t just lead to tyrannies and chaos must practically be solved from scratch for the modern world.
De facto states do not have monopoly on violence. Also de jure private security firms do have some room for violence.
Also there is the minor issues of Government being this huge amorphous blob, that agents and institutions should have access to violence if and only if they belong to this strange set doesn’t seem like necessarily something that helps to prevent tyrannies and chaos.
Also choosing between many small tyrannies and one big one I see good pro-liberty arguments for the former.
De jure security firms are specifically licensed for the violence that they do.
Most of the examples given are things governments already do enforce in other types of contracts. And many are things governments used to enforce in marriage contracts.
Can you give an example of a non-marriage-related contract that specifies a penalty for one party having sex with someone other than the other party? I’m aware of employment contracts that specify termination of contract for disreputable sexual behavior, but that’s not really the same thing. Possibly the closest thing might be employment contracts for porn actors which require them to use protection against STDs, but I’m not sure if those apply to their non-professional sex acts.
Yes, policies change; as do societal norms.
Governments once enforced all sorts of conditions on marriage that are contrary to social norms today. For instance, in many Western societies a man could have his wife prosecuted and punished by the state with physical violence for being unsubmissive to him. This is no longer the case — and it certainly cannot be altered by contract, since it was a criminal matter … and since the punishment required a society willing to participate in, e.g., mocking and throwing filth at the condemned “scold”. The institution of marriage has changed in ways that cannot be reverted by mere consent of the spouses, since the surrounding society has changed.
Moreover, governments reject many sorts of claims on enforcement power which they once accepted, both within and beyond contractual matters. Governments in the West used to enforce slavery as a property right; they no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce property rights at all? Similarly, they once enforced racially discriminatory covenants on real estate, but no longer do so — does that mean that they no longer enforce any covenants on real estate? They used to enforce the right of fathers to marry off their daughters against the daughter’s wishes; they no longer do so — does that mean they do not enforce any parental rights?
In each case, no; rather, the enforcing party is picking and choosing which sorts of claims to enforce, on the basis of what I’ve called moral-like (see above; no more quibbling, please!) judgments as to which sorts of claims are harmful and shouldn’t be enforced. This doesn’t work particularly differently for claims on contract enforcement than for claims on property or parental-rights enforcement.
Actually I don’t see much of a problem with fathers marrying off their daughters against their wishes because arranged marriages work out quite well by most metrics.
And yes fathers losing that right was part of a grand march in taking away most parental rights, in may ways it represents the crossing of an important Schelling fence. Today’s exist only as very weak things since children are now legally de facto property of the state not parents.
You seem to be mistaking arranged marriage for forced marriage. This is a grievous error of fact about human social practices; it is not a difference of opinion or values.
The difference between arranged and forced marriage is mostly one of degree. Indeed many studies trying to measure the outcomes of arranged marriages don’t really have good ways to screen out forced marriages, some don’t even attempt to.
I think historically most Western people who used the legal right of forced marriage where closer to the arranged part of that spectrum.
But you know what? I just realized that I simply assumed the latter was the case without good reason. Which tells me that I should drop the conversation and continue it another time, when I’m perhaps more clear headed and have done some more study of history.
If the difference between arranged and forced marriage is one of degree, than the difference between employment and slavery is also one of degree.
I don’t think this carves reality at the joints. Not only are border cases hard to tell apart in many societies most of the instances cluster around where we would deem border cases.
Arranged marriages, like work, often involve driving external factors that don’t amount to ‘coercion’. Forced marriages, like slavery, always involve coercion. (The definition of coercion is the border dispute here). Do you concur? Or is there a continuum of marriage where “It sure would be nice to have grandkids someday” is only a matter of degree different from “If you refuse you will be stoned to death” or even “You have married this person.”
What about a more realistic scenario: if you refuse, you’ll be disinherited?
More realistic than reality? All four of those are things which currently happen. If there is a continuum, they are all on it.
I would put ‘You will not gain a legal right to the property which I currently have the legal rights to.’ on the arranged side rather than the forced side. Where would you put it, assuming a qualitative difference between the two (or more) categories?
It isn’t?
Is slavery immoral? Is employment immoral? Can morality be a matter of degree?
Probably. Possibly. Yes.
Can you describe something which is a difference of kind instead of a difference of degree?
Must … resist …. urge to troll … by steel maning that. :)
What are you talking about?
As a lawyer, I think I qualify as a relevant expert.
I said that I think a plausible steel man of the position that the abolition of slavery was closely tied to the abolition of other kinds of private property can be made. Not obviously from a legalistic perspective but from a moral and cultural one.
But that I think that would be trolling.
I also think it’s plausible. I don’t think that would be trolling, I think that would be a highly useful way to examine one’s values and ethics. Including your own views.
Consider the hardcore “reactionary” position on such relations of dominance and social control:
http://phdoctopus.com/2012/03/02/liberty-for-the-few-slavery-in-every-form-for-the-mass-the-deep-roots-of-the-birth-control-freakout/
And the “compassionate conservative” one (from an interview with a British author whom you’ve linked to, Roger Scruton):
http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2010/jun/05/roger-scruton-interview
As you can see, the latter view is inconsistent—as you have said yourself many times before, rallying against the futility and weakness of “mere conservatism”, with its aquiescence to nearly any reform. The former view—no government or outsider should restrict a subject’s control over his inferiors and subordinates, to do so in any one case is to threaten the whole structure of hierarchy and dominance—certainly seems to be a stable Schelling point. And to prevent any drift from that point, you’d need a ruthless zero-tolerance policy of enforcement.
So what is your judgment here? Any bullets you’d bite on the subject of hierarchy and dominance?
^ (1) The line in italics, although excluded in the linked quote, appears in the source text (Cannibals All: Slaves Without Masters). I assume that you can recognize the significance. Universalism—as a theistic creed or as a secular one—really did make tyrants “fear for their domination.”
I was thinking of making a strong pseudo-Marxist argument in this direction, so I’m not sure how relevant it would be to my own views.
A different plausible Schelling point is the preservation of existing hierarchies but opposing the creation of new ones. Note that Americans spoken of had previously rejected the hierarchy of aristocracy without rejecting in general stratification by class, wealth, education, nationality, beauty, ancestry, race, gender, merit or ability. Some of these are preserved to this day.
Overall a society without hierarchies is something that I doubt would be optimally matched to human values and I might even find disturbing. At the very least it would have high costs. I however need to think about these issues more before committing myself to biting any bullets.
He might actually be right homophobia arising as an adaptive norm in past societies if homosexually is indeed caused as a side effect of a mother’s infection with a pathogen.
I was thinking of making a strong pseudo-Marxist argument in this direction, so I’m not sure how relevant it would be to my own views.
You should note this is a left-wing take on a a reactionary position, not writing done by an actual reactionary.
And that this is a left-wing take on the conservative positions of the author, not a summary written by the author himself.
You will find plenty of ungood thoughts and writings in the original sources no need to add an additional layer of interpretation to them.
Ah. (I had taken “by steel manning that” to be modifying “resist” rather than “troll”, and couldn’t make sense of it.)
It is a libertarian approach to doing progressivism. Those have been tried in the past, most notably much of the progressivism in the first half of the 19th century was libertarian in approach, but I would argue they have been systematically underused at least in the 20th century.
Not that I’m a dirty prog mind you. (~_^)