(Suppose for example that a couple voluntarily sign a marriage contract stipulating death penalty, or even just flogging, for adultery. How can one oppose the enforcement of this contract without renouncing the libertarian principle?)
I want to talk about this. I do not feel that the contract described here is unacceptable. I find it strange to come to terms with how it might be the case. Would someone mind enlightening me about why they would feel it unethical to engage in a contract of the sort?
(By the way, I understand the practical objections to such a contract being allowed. People might sign it without fully realizing the implications of it, or they might be coerced by social pressures into signing it. Are reasons like these the only reasons? It seems though that people who argue that contracts like that should be banned are not generally saying so because of reasons like these, but rather they say it from some deeper moral principles, which I would like to know what they are.)
Given the possibility of coercion, it should be at least very heavily regulated.
(But how involved can such a procedure be that you’d need to hire someone on a contract basis? In a sane society you’d petition for barbituates, be investigated to ensure you aren’t being coerced, and receive them. I’d hate to live in a world where I couldn’t even afford my own suicide.)
But how involved can such a procedure be that you’d need to hire someone on a contract basis?
You might be too disabled to to perform your own suicide. Reliable and safe suicide can be hard to do, see Sister Y’s blog for more discussion of this. Even if you make it so the state is the one acquiring the service on behalf of the patient, someone will have as part of his contract assisting suicides.
(But how involved can such a procedure be that you’d need to hire someone on a contract basis? In a sane society you’d petition for barbituates, be investigated to ensure you aren’t being coerced, and receive them. I’d hate to live in a world where I couldn’t even afford my own suicide.)
In Rome, suicide was never a general offense in law, though the whole approach to the question was essentially pragmatic. This is illustrated by the example given by Titus Livy of the colony of Massalia (the present day Marseilles), where those who wanted to kill themselves merely applied to the Senate, and if their reasons were judged sound they were then given hemlock free of charge. It was specifically forbidden in three cases: those accused of capital crimes, soldiers and slaves. The reason behind all three was the same—it was uneconomic for these people to die. If the accused killed themselves prior to trial and conviction then the state lost the right to seize their property, a loophole that was only closed by Domitian in the 1st century AD, who decreed that those who died prior to trial were without legal heirs. The suicide of a soldier was treated on the same basis as desertion. If a slave killed himself or herself within six months of purchase, the master could claim a full refund from the former owner.
I find it amusing to note that despite us having the benefit of hindsight in the form of quite a bit of information about their civilization and the advantage of great advances made in the sciences since then, ancient Romans where still saner on some things than we are.
Also Robin Hanson might want to review his ancient Roman law for insight into how a future of competing emulated human minds might look like. If I bought an em that chaotically self-destructs in less than six months of subjective time I would very much like a refund too.
First, my opinion: I think some contracts should not be enforced (or allowed to be made in the first place), precisely because of the practical consequences you cited. For instance, if you allowed people to enslave themselves, some would, and some of those will live a crappy life because of a mean master, and I don’t like that.
Now I don’t think there is any deeper moral principle. It’s just simpler to act indignant and stick to one-sided, simple arguments. If you argue about the badness of some consequences, you also have to accept any goodness that could arise. And then you need to decide if the Bad out-weight the Good. And then to convince others of your conclusion.
Such a reasonable way of doing things is completely demolished by one-sided soldier arguments in some settings (typically when one has to convince a wide audience in less than a minute).
If slavery contracts are banned, work-for-money contracts will be offered instead. People who prefer slavery to starvation will prefer that to slavery, and so are better off despite the removal of an option they previously took.
For further detail of how this sort of thing works, see here
But not everyone who would have gotten a slavery contract would get a work-for-money contract. Also, while one side (the slaves/employees) are being made better off, the other side is being made worse off.
If people enter into such contracts, it’s because they prefer to be in them.
First, I challenge that. They may not be fully aware of what they are getting into. Second, the very possibility of such contracts could bend the society into generalizing them. For instance, if voluntary slavery is permitted, it might become the only way, but for an elite few, to get a job.
Why do your preferences override theirs?
Why not? My preferences do take other’s preferences into account, to the point I would mostly let them live their lives in peace. But the buck has to stop somewhere. For instance, when 2 persons’ preferences conflict (like, they are at war), my preferences says something about acceptable resolutions of the conflict. Having both parties risk their lives is not acceptable. I would strip them of their weapons if I could.
OK. I can accept that. In the theoretical sense I think that basic libertarian principles are extremely obvious, and it’s strange to me that people refuse them out of hand. Of course I know that in practice you also have to weigh the potential negative effects, and sometimes that does outweigh the value of giving people freedom of choice, and sometimes it doesn’t. This seems to be the criteria that should be used when deciding if to ban things like this.
As such, I do agree with what you are saying. In particular, your point about why people don’t in practice weigh the possibilities in this way seems sadly accurate.
I don’t know about anyone else, but I don’t think anyone should be killed for being adulterous, even if they entered into a contract that stipulates such.
Even if the individuals in question want badly not to be adulterous, but the only way they expect to be able to hold themselves to that commitment is by the knowledge that their life literally depends on it?
Possibly more realistically, the person may realize—from observing the world—that the only way he or she will be able to maintain monogamy is through social (not just government) enforcement of the marriage contract—not that his or her life literally depends on it, but that his or her social death will result from violation of the contract. And people care a whole lot about social death. This aspect of social support of marriage is already gone from all but a few recent immigrant communities in the United States. Even if marriage were government-enforced for reals, collusion (pretending grounds for divorce existed) and stretched notions of “cruelty” were already common before no-fault swept the nation. The government maybe slowly changes its enforcement toward the enforcement of whatever limping modern non-tribal community happens to exist.
Anyway. People are sometimes harmed by getting extra choices. And people are sometimes harmed by losing choices.
I want to talk about this. I do not feel that the contract described here is unacceptable. I find it strange to come to terms with how it might be the case. Would someone mind enlightening me about why they would feel it unethical to engage in a contract of the sort?
(By the way, I understand the practical objections to such a contract being allowed. People might sign it without fully realizing the implications of it, or they might be coerced by social pressures into signing it. Are reasons like these the only reasons? It seems though that people who argue that contracts like that should be banned are not generally saying so because of reasons like these, but rather they say it from some deeper moral principles, which I would like to know what they are.)
To probe intuitions further. Should it be illegal to sign a contract with someone to assist in your suicide?
Given the possibility of coercion, it should be at least very heavily regulated.
(But how involved can such a procedure be that you’d need to hire someone on a contract basis? In a sane society you’d petition for barbituates, be investigated to ensure you aren’t being coerced, and receive them. I’d hate to live in a world where I couldn’t even afford my own suicide.)
You might be too disabled to to perform your own suicide. Reliable and safe suicide can be hard to do, see Sister Y’s blog for more discussion of this. Even if you make it so the state is the one acquiring the service on behalf of the patient, someone will have as part of his contract assisting suicides.
At this point I would like to quote:
I find it amusing to note that despite us having the benefit of hindsight in the form of quite a bit of information about their civilization and the advantage of great advances made in the sciences since then, ancient Romans where still saner on some things than we are.
Also Robin Hanson might want to review his ancient Roman law for insight into how a future of competing emulated human minds might look like. If I bought an em that chaotically self-destructs in less than six months of subjective time I would very much like a refund too.
Wouldn’t it be more surprising if we were saner than some society in every single respect? But yes.
First, my opinion: I think some contracts should not be enforced (or allowed to be made in the first place), precisely because of the practical consequences you cited. For instance, if you allowed people to enslave themselves, some would, and some of those will live a crappy life because of a mean master, and I don’t like that.
Now I don’t think there is any deeper moral principle. It’s just simpler to act indignant and stick to one-sided, simple arguments. If you argue about the badness of some consequences, you also have to accept any goodness that could arise. And then you need to decide if the Bad out-weight the Good. And then to convince others of your conclusion.
Such a reasonable way of doing things is completely demolished by one-sided soldier arguments in some settings (typically when one has to convince a wide audience in less than a minute).
If people enter into such contracts, it’s because they prefer to be in them. Why do your preferences override theirs?
People want to defect in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, but would be better off if there was a law against it.
I don’t see how this is relevant. People would prefer not to be able to defect in a prisoner’s dilemma—that’s their own preference.
If slavery contracts are banned, work-for-money contracts will be offered instead. People who prefer slavery to starvation will prefer that to slavery, and so are better off despite the removal of an option they previously took.
For further detail of how this sort of thing works, see here
But not everyone who would have gotten a slavery contract would get a work-for-money contract. Also, while one side (the slaves/employees) are being made better off, the other side is being made worse off.
At the cost of all of the people who prefer slavery>starvation>work. What makes people with that preference order inherently irrelevant?
Their rarity.
How large of a minority is irrelevant to oppress? If someone develops a nonsensical (to you) value function, does that make them irrelevant?
First, I challenge that. They may not be fully aware of what they are getting into. Second, the very possibility of such contracts could bend the society into generalizing them. For instance, if voluntary slavery is permitted, it might become the only way, but for an elite few, to get a job.
Why not? My preferences do take other’s preferences into account, to the point I would mostly let them live their lives in peace. But the buck has to stop somewhere. For instance, when 2 persons’ preferences conflict (like, they are at war), my preferences says something about acceptable resolutions of the conflict. Having both parties risk their lives is not acceptable. I would strip them of their weapons if I could.
OK. I can accept that. In the theoretical sense I think that basic libertarian principles are extremely obvious, and it’s strange to me that people refuse them out of hand. Of course I know that in practice you also have to weigh the potential negative effects, and sometimes that does outweigh the value of giving people freedom of choice, and sometimes it doesn’t. This seems to be the criteria that should be used when deciding if to ban things like this.
As such, I do agree with what you are saying. In particular, your point about why people don’t in practice weigh the possibilities in this way seems sadly accurate.
I don’t know about anyone else, but I don’t think anyone should be killed for being adulterous, even if they entered into a contract that stipulates such.
Flogging I don’t care as much about.
Even if the individuals in question want badly not to be adulterous, but the only way they expect to be able to hold themselves to that commitment is by the knowledge that their life literally depends on it?
Possibly more realistically, the person may realize—from observing the world—that the only way he or she will be able to maintain monogamy is through social (not just government) enforcement of the marriage contract—not that his or her life literally depends on it, but that his or her social death will result from violation of the contract. And people care a whole lot about social death. This aspect of social support of marriage is already gone from all but a few recent immigrant communities in the United States. Even if marriage were government-enforced for reals, collusion (pretending grounds for divorce existed) and stretched notions of “cruelty” were already common before no-fault swept the nation. The government maybe slowly changes its enforcement toward the enforcement of whatever limping modern non-tribal community happens to exist.
Anyway. People are sometimes harmed by getting extra choices. And people are sometimes harmed by losing choices.