It’s a bad thing if ideas can’t be criticised at all, but it’s also a bad thing if the relationship of mutual criticism is cyclic, if it doesn’t have an obvious foundation or crux.
We can also come up with criticisms that are sort of independent of where they came from, like a new criticism is somewhat linked to idea A but idea A can be wrong in some way without implying the criticism was also wrong
Do you have a concrete example?
And it’s always possible both are wrong, anyway
Kind of, but “everything is wrong” is vulgar scepticism.
It’s a bad thing if ideas can’t be criticised at all, but it’s also a bad thing if the relationship of mutual criticism is cyclic, if it doesn’t have an obvious foundation or crux.
Do you have an example? I can’t think of an example of an infinite regress except cases where there are other options which stop the regress. (I have examples of these, but they’re contrived)
> We can also come up with criticisms that are sort of independent of where they came from, like a new criticism is somewhat linked to idea A but idea A can be wrong in some way without implying the criticism was also wrong
Do you have a concrete example?
I think some of the criticisms of inductivism Popper offered are like this. Even if Popper was wrong about big chunks of critical rationalism, it wouldn’t necessarily invalidate the criticisms. Example: A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability.
(Note: I don’t think Popper was wrong but I’m also not sure it’s necessary to discuss that now if we disagree; just wanted to mention)
> And it’s always possible both are wrong, anyway
Kind of, but “everything is wrong” is vulgar scepticism.
I’m not suggesting anything I said was a reason to think both theories wrong, I listed it because it was a possibility I didn’t mention in the other paragraphs, and it’s a bit of a trivial case for this stuff (i.e. if we come up with a reason both are wrong then we don’t have to worry about them anymore if we can’t answer that criticism)
> I can’t think of an example of an infinite regress except cases where there are other options which stop the regress.
The other options need to be acceptable to both parties!
Sure, or the parties need a rational method of resolving a disagreement on acceptability. I’m not sure why that’s particularly relevant, though.
> I can’t think of an example of an infinite regress except cases where there are other options which stop the regress.
I don’t see how that is an example, principally because it seems wrong to me.
You didn’t quote an example—I’m unsure if you meant to quote a different part?
In any case, what you’ve quoted isn’t an example, and you don’t explain why it seems wrong or what about it is an issue. Do you mean that cases exist where there is an infinite regress and it’s not soluble with other methods?
I’m also not sure why this is particularly relevant.
Are we still talking about the below?
> We can also come up with criticisms that are sort of independent of where they came from, like a new criticism is somewhat linked to idea A but idea A can be wrong in some way without implying the criticism was also wrong
Do you have a concrete example?
I did give you an example (one of Popper’s arguments against inductivism).
A generalised abstract case is where someone of a particular epistemology criticises another school of epistemology on the grounds of an internal contradiction. A criticism of that person’s criticism does not necessarily relate to that person’s epistemology, and vice versa.
Sure, or the parties need a rational method of resolving a disagreement on acceptability. I’m not sure why that’s particularly relevant, though.
The relevance is that CR can’t guarantee that any given dispute is resolveable.
Do you have a concrete example?
I did give you an example (one of Popper’s arguments against inductivism)
But I don’t count it as an example, since I don’t regard it as correct, let so be as being a valid argument with the further property of floating free of questionable background assumptions.
In particular , it is based on bivalent logic where, 1 and 0 are the only possible values, but the loud and proud inductivists here base their arguments on probabilistic logic, where propositions have a probability between but not including 1 and 0. So “induction must be based on bivalent logic” is an assumption.
A generalised abstract case is where someone of a particular epistemology criticises another school of epistemology on the grounds of an internal contradiction.
The assumption that contradictions are bad is a widespread assumption, but it is still an assumption.
The assumption that contradictions are bad is a widespread assumption, but it is still an assumption.
Reality does not contradict itself; ever. An epistemology is a theory about how knowledge works. If a theory (epistemic or otherwise) contains an internal contradiction, it cannot accurately portray reality. This is not an assumption, it’s an explanatory conclusion.
I’m not convinced we can get anywhere productive continuing this discussion. If you don’t think contradictions are bad, it feels like there’s going to be a lot of work finding common ground.
But I don’t count it as an example, since I don’t regard it as correct [...]
This is irrational. Examples of relationships do not depend on whether the example is real or not. All that’s required is that the relationship is clear, whether each of us judges the idea itself as true or not doesn’t matter in this case. We don’t need to argue this point anyway, since you provided an example:
In particular , it is based on bivalent logic where, 1 and 0 are the only possible values, but the loud and proud inductivists here base their arguments on probabilistic logic, where propositions have a probability between but not including 1 and 0. So “induction must be based on bivalent logic” is an assumption.
Cool, so do you see how the argument you made is separate from whether inductivism is right or not?
Your argument proposes a criticism of Popper’s argument. The criticism is your conjecture that Popper made a mistake. Your criticism doesn’t rely on whether inductivism is right or not, just whether it’s consistent or not (and consistent according to some principles you hint at). Similarly, if Popper did make a mistake with that argument, it doesn’t mean that CR is wrong, or that Inductivism is wrong; it just means Popper’s criticism was wrong.
Curiously, you say:
But I don’t count it as an example, since I don’t regard it as correct,
Do you count yourself a Bayesian or Inductivist? What probability did you assign to it being correct? And what probability do you generally assign to a false-positive result when you evaluate the correctness of examples like this?
Firstly, epistemology goes first. You don’t know anything about reality without having the means to acquire knowledge. Secondly, I didn’t say it was the PNC was actually false.
This is irrational. Examples of relationships do not depend on whether the example is real or not
So there is a relationship between the Miller and Popper papers conclusions, and it’s assumptions. Of course there is. That is what I am saying. But you were citing it as an example of a criticism that doesn’t depend on assumptions.
Your argument proposes a criticism of Popper’s argument
No, it proposes a criticism of your argument … the criticsm that there is a contradiction between your claim that the paper makes no assumptions, and the fact that it evidently does.
So there is a relationship between the Miller and Popper papers conclusions, and it’s assumptions. Of course there is. That is what I am saying. But you were citing it as an example of a criticism that doesn’t depend on assumptions.
> Your argument proposes a criticism of Popper’s argument
No, it proposes a criticism of your argument … the criticsm that there is a contradiction between your claim that the paper makes no assumptions, and the fact that it evidently does.
I didn’t claim that paper made no assumptions. I claimed that refuting that argument^[1] would not refute CR, and vice versa. Please review the thread, I think there’s been some significant miscommunications. If something’s unclear to you, you can quote it to point it out.
Firstly, epistemology goes first. You don’t know anything about reality without having the means to acquire knowledge.
Inductivism is not compatible with this—it has no way to bootstrap except by some other, more foundational epistemic factors.
Also, you didn’t really respond to my point or the chain of discussion-logic before that. I said an internal contradiction would be a way to refute an idea (as a second example when you asked for examples). you said contradictions being bad is an assumption. i said no, it’s a conclusion, and offered an explanation (which you’ve ignored). In fact, through this discussion you haven’t—as far as I can see—actually been interested in figuring out a) what anything else things or b) where and what you might be wrong about.
Secondly, I didn’t say it was the PNC was actually false.
I don’t think there’s any point talking about this, then. We haven’t had any meaningful discussion about it and I don’t see why we would.
I didn’t claim that paper made no assumptions. I claimed that refuting that argument[1] would not refute CR, and vice versa
Theoretically, if CR consists of a set of claims , then refuting one claim wouldn’t refute the rest. In practice , critrats are dogmatically wedded to the non existence of any form of induction.
Inductivism is not compatible with this—it has no way to bootstrap except by some other, more foundational epistemic factors.
I don’t particularly identify as an inductivist , and I don’t think that the critrat version of inductivism, is what self identified inductivists believe in.
i said no, it’s a conclusion, and offered an explanation (which you’ve ignored)
Conclusion from what? The conclusion will be based on some deeper assumption.
you haven’t—as far as I can see—actually been interested in figuring out a) what anything else things
What anyone else thinks?
I am very familiar with popular CR since I used to hang out in the same forums as Curi. I’ve also read some if the great man’s works.
Anecdote time: after a long discussion about the existence of any form of induction , on a CR forum, someone eventually popped up who had asked KRP the very question, after bumping into him at a conference many years ago , and his reply was that it existed , but wasn’t suitable for science.
But of course the true believing critrats weren’t convinced by Word of God.
Secondly, I didn’t say it was the PNC was actually false.
I don’t think there’s any point talking about this, then.
The point is that every claim in general depends on assumptions. So, in particular, the critrats don’t have a disproof of induction that floats free of assumptions.
I am uncomfortable with this practice. I think I am banned from participating in curi’s forum now anyway due to my comments here so it doesn’t affect me personally but it is a little strange to have this list with people’s personal information up.
Anecdote time: after a long discussion about the existence of any form of induction , on a CR forum, someone eventually popped up who had asked KRP the very question, after bumping into him at a conference many years ago , and his reply was that it existed , but wasn’t suitable for science.
What anyone else thinks? I am very familiar with popular CR since I used to hang out in the same forums as Curi. I’ve also read some if the great man’s works.
It’s a bad thing if ideas can’t be criticised at all, but it’s also a bad thing if the relationship of mutual criticism is cyclic, if it doesn’t have an obvious foundation or crux.
Do you have a concrete example?
Kind of, but “everything is wrong” is vulgar scepticism.
Do you have an example? I can’t think of an example of an infinite regress except cases where there are other options which stop the regress. (I have examples of these, but they’re contrived)
I think some of the criticisms of inductivism Popper offered are like this. Even if Popper was wrong about big chunks of critical rationalism, it wouldn’t necessarily invalidate the criticisms. Example: A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability.
(Note: I don’t think Popper was wrong but I’m also not sure it’s necessary to discuss that now if we disagree; just wanted to mention)
I’m not suggesting anything I said was a reason to think both theories wrong, I listed it because it was a possibility I didn’t mention in the other paragraphs, and it’s a bit of a trivial case for this stuff (i.e. if we come up with a reason both are wrong then we don’t have to worry about them anymore if we can’t answer that criticism)
The other options need to be acceptable to both parties!
I don’t see how that is an example, principally because it seems wrong to me.
Sure, or the parties need a rational method of resolving a disagreement on acceptability. I’m not sure why that’s particularly relevant, though.
You didn’t quote an example—I’m unsure if you meant to quote a different part?
In any case, what you’ve quoted isn’t an example, and you don’t explain why it seems wrong or what about it is an issue. Do you mean that cases exist where there is an infinite regress and it’s not soluble with other methods?
I’m also not sure why this is particularly relevant.
Are we still talking about the below?
I did give you an example (one of Popper’s arguments against inductivism).
A generalised abstract case is where someone of a particular epistemology criticises another school of epistemology on the grounds of an internal contradiction. A criticism of that person’s criticism does not necessarily relate to that person’s epistemology, and vice versa.
The relevance is that CR can’t guarantee that any given dispute is resolveable.
But I don’t count it as an example, since I don’t regard it as correct, let so be as being a valid argument with the further property of floating free of questionable background assumptions.
In particular , it is based on bivalent logic where, 1 and 0 are the only possible values, but the loud and proud inductivists here base their arguments on probabilistic logic, where propositions have a probability between but not including 1 and 0. So “induction must be based on bivalent logic” is an assumption.
The assumption that contradictions are bad is a widespread assumption, but it is still an assumption.
Reality does not contradict itself; ever. An epistemology is a theory about how knowledge works. If a theory (epistemic or otherwise) contains an internal contradiction, it cannot accurately portray reality. This is not an assumption, it’s an explanatory conclusion.
I’m not convinced we can get anywhere productive continuing this discussion. If you don’t think contradictions are bad, it feels like there’s going to be a lot of work finding common ground.
This is irrational. Examples of relationships do not depend on whether the example is real or not. All that’s required is that the relationship is clear, whether each of us judges the idea itself as true or not doesn’t matter in this case. We don’t need to argue this point anyway, since you provided an example:
Cool, so do you see how the argument you made is separate from whether inductivism is right or not?
Your argument proposes a criticism of Popper’s argument. The criticism is your conjecture that Popper made a mistake. Your criticism doesn’t rely on whether inductivism is right or not, just whether it’s consistent or not (and consistent according to some principles you hint at). Similarly, if Popper did make a mistake with that argument, it doesn’t mean that CR is wrong, or that Inductivism is wrong; it just means Popper’s criticism was wrong.
Curiously, you say:
Do you count yourself a Bayesian or Inductivist? What probability did you assign to it being correct? And what probability do you generally assign to a false-positive result when you evaluate the correctness of examples like this?
Neither. You don’t have to treat epistemology as a religion.
Firstly, epistemology goes first. You don’t know anything about reality without having the means to acquire knowledge. Secondly, I didn’t say it was the PNC was actually false.
So there is a relationship between the Miller and Popper papers conclusions, and it’s assumptions. Of course there is. That is what I am saying. But you were citing it as an example of a criticism that doesn’t depend on assumptions.
No, it proposes a criticism of your argument … the criticsm that there is a contradiction between your claim that the paper makes no assumptions, and the fact that it evidently does.
I didn’t claim that paper made no assumptions. I claimed that refuting that argument^[1] would not refute CR, and vice versa. Please review the thread, I think there’s been some significant miscommunications. If something’s unclear to you, you can quote it to point it out.
[1]: for clarity, the argument in Q: A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability.
Inductivism is not compatible with this—it has no way to bootstrap except by some other, more foundational epistemic factors.
Also, you didn’t really respond to my point or the chain of discussion-logic before that. I said an internal contradiction would be a way to refute an idea (as a second example when you asked for examples). you said contradictions being bad is an assumption. i said no, it’s a conclusion, and offered an explanation (which you’ve ignored). In fact, through this discussion you haven’t—as far as I can see—actually been interested in figuring out a) what anything else things or b) where and what you might be wrong about.
I don’t think there’s any point talking about this, then. We haven’t had any meaningful discussion about it and I don’t see why we would.
Theoretically, if CR consists of a set of claims , then refuting one claim wouldn’t refute the rest. In practice , critrats are dogmatically wedded to the non existence of any form of induction.
I don’t particularly identify as an inductivist , and I don’t think that the critrat version of inductivism, is what self identified inductivists believe in.
Conclusion from what? The conclusion will be based on some deeper assumption.
What anyone else thinks? I am very familiar with popular CR since I used to hang out in the same forums as Curi. I’ve also read some if the great man’s works.
Anecdote time: after a long discussion about the existence of any form of induction , on a CR forum, someone eventually popped up who had asked KRP the very question, after bumping into him at a conference many years ago , and his reply was that it existed , but wasn’t suitable for science.
But of course the true believing critrats weren’t convinced by Word of God.
The point is that every claim in general depends on assumptions. So, in particular, the critrats don’t have a disproof of induction that floats free of assumptions.
1
I just discovered he keeps a wall of shame for people who left his forum:
http://curi.us/2215-list-of-fallible-ideas-evaders
Are you in this wall?
I am uncomfortable with this practice. I think I am banned from participating in curi’s forum now anyway due to my comments here so it doesn’t affect me personally but it is a little strange to have this list with people’s personal information up.
Source?
Which forums? Under what name?