I think the advancements in command and control tech that are likely to happen in the next 20 years are more important than everything else on this list combined.
This is definitely an area where I’m not an expert at all and I’m just armchair speculating, so take it all with an awful lot of salt. That said, if I were going to write an essay on the subject, here’s some rough notes on what it would be.
War is combat between groups. A large majority of the commentary on the subject focuses on the “combat” part, and applies in principle even to individuals trying to hurt/kill each other. But looking at the outcomes of major wars over the past ~50 years, it’s the “groups” part which really matters. The enemy is not a single monolithic agent, they’re a whole bunch of agents who have varying incentives/goals and may or may not coordinate well.
With that in mind, here’s a key strategic consideration: assuming we win the war, how will our desired objective be enforced upon the individuals who comprise the enemy? How will the enemy coordinate internally in surrender, in negotiations, and especially in enforcement of concessions? What ensures that each of the individual enemy agents actually does what we want? I see three main classes of answer to that question:
Answer 1: extinction-style outcomes. We may not kill the entire enemy force, but we will at least end their ability to wage war. This is sometimes sufficient to achieve a goal, especially in defense. However, note that whatever underlying socioeconomic circumstances originally gave rise to the enemy will likely persist; the problem will likely recur later on. If the cost of the war is low enough, paying it regularly may still be acceptable.
Answer 2: centralized negotiation-style outcomes. The pre-existing leadership/coordination machinery of the enemy will enforce concessions—e.g. the enemy government formally surrenders and accepts terms, then enforces those terms on its own members/populace, or enemy government leadership is replaced by our own representatives while keeping the machinery intact (as in a coup). Key point: if we want this outcome, then preservation of the enemy leadership/coordination machinery, their legitimacy and their internal enforcement capabilities is a strategic priority for us.
Answer 3: colonization-style outcomes. We will impose a new governing structure of our own upon our enemies. If the enemy has some existing governing structure, we will destroy it in the course of the war. In this case, we cannot expect a coordinated surrender from our enemies—we must achieve victory over smaller units (possibly even individuals) on a one-by-one basis. This means clear announcement and enforcement of our rules, policing, distributed combat against decentralized opposition, and ultimately state-building or the equivalent thereof.
One of the major problems that Western nations have run into in the past half century is that we’re in wars where (a) we don’t just want to kill everyone, and (b) there is no strong central control of the opposition (or at least none we want to preserve), so we’re effectively forced into the last scenario above. If we want to enforce our will on the enemy, we effectively need to build a state de novo. In some sense, that sort of war has more in common with policing and propaganda than with “war” as it’s usually imagined, i.e. clashes between nations.
When we picture things that way, fancy weapons just aren’t all that relevant. The hard part of modern war is the policing and eventual nation-building. For that project, tools like personalized propaganda or technological omniscience are huge, whereas aimbots/battlebots or supply-chain superiority serve little role besides looking intimidating—an important role, to be sure, but not one which will determine the end result of the war.
In bottleneck terms: the limiting factor in achieving objectives in modern war is not destroying the enemy, but building stable nations de novo.
One of the major problems that Western nations have run into in the past half century is that we’re in wars where (a) we don’t just want to kill everyone, and (b) there is no strong central control of the opposition (or at least none we want to preserve), so we’re effectively forced into the last scenario above.
This argument is only supportive of your main point “command and control by far most important” insofar future wars will also be exclusively asymmetric. That assumption, though, is problematic even today. The US isn’t spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers to fight the Taliban.
The US isn’t spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers to fight the Taliban.
The US is spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers for the dual purposes of funneling money to friends and supporters, and for signaling to prevent any symmetric war.
Don’t forget major problem (c), which is that we’re not willing to make the decades-long investment that statebuilding takes. A good rule of thumb is 50 occupiers per subject-nation citizen; our recent occupations have had nowhere near that number. They have to stay long enough become fully integrated with the local culture so that they can change it, violently when necessary (think British Raj or 1945 occupation of Japan). The US military is not designed to do this, and our politicians are not willing to redesign it as an occupying force (e.g. by making postings semi-permanent instead of brief rotations and teaching all our troops the local language). Therefore our attempts at colonization-style outcomes consistently fail.
The short version is that we already have the technology to destroy anything, but the resulting power vacuum consistently leads to civil war.
I honestly don’t know much about the British conquest of India, although I’m pretty sure that the power differential between the West and the rest at that point in time was near its peak. Does anyone know how they did it?
I think phrasing this in terms of “power” is not so helpful. Cortes and Pizarro brought only a few hundred men to destroy empires. But they didn’t nuke them; rather, they allied with existing armies. Similarly, most of the Indian Army was native. Most of the administrators were Indians, too. The British had better weapons and social technology of training, but in creating the Indian Army, they gave up that advantage. The key was some tacit social technology of hierarchy, to keep command of army and country. At the beginning, the Empire had 80k British soldiers, but the East India company tried to get away with using only 40k. It failed in the Sepoy Mutiny, which is why it was replaced by the Empire, but the units with more British were more likely to rebel, so it’s not a matter of pure numbers, but of how they were deployed. (Specifically, units with more British had segregation and racism, while the units with fewer British had camaraderie. And probably responsiveness to specific concerns, like the tallow bullets.)
I get your points, but I think you may be underestimating the sheer technological advantage enjoyed by the British at that time. This was the age of “we have the Maxim gun and they have not”. Between the power of its guns and the wealth of its factories, Britain at the time had nigh-insurmountable advantages; its war against the Zanzibar Sultanate brought decisive British victory within 45 minutes.
OK, if you change the topic from occupation to conquest, then technology matters. Cortes and Pizarro didn’t equip and train their allies. Maybe in the beginning, say, 1680-1750, the East India Company acted like Cortes and Pizarro, allying with armies that they didn’t train or equip and maybe their advantages were a reason to side with them. But starting in 1750 they trained and equipped native armies and lost all their advantages.
I explicitly addressed this: the British had no advantage of guns. The Sepoy mutiny was sparked by the beef fat in the cutting-edge rifles that the British gave to the Indians.
For that matter, your wikipedia link says that the Sultan of Zanzibar did have a Maxim gun. Technology travels fast! It was more a battle of artillery. The British Raj did respond to the Sepoy Mutiny by moving artillery out of the hands of natives, but the Company had managed 50-100 years trusting artillery to Indians.
My question was mostly about the transition from conquest to occupation. How did they get from the point where native armies had been defeated to the point where natives would accept their rule? That’s the transition we’ve failed spectacularly at in Iraq and Afghanistan, so it’s a matter of considerable practical importance.
Mmmm, yes. I think it’s too quick to say that all modern war is like this; I think type 2 is definitely still possible and type 1 shouldn’t be completely ruled out either, especially if we are thinking about crazy future AI scenarios. But other than that I agree, and found your trichotomy insightful. Thanks!
Understatement.
I’d be interested to hear more about what you have in mind!
This is definitely an area where I’m not an expert at all and I’m just armchair speculating, so take it all with an awful lot of salt. That said, if I were going to write an essay on the subject, here’s some rough notes on what it would be.
War is combat between groups. A large majority of the commentary on the subject focuses on the “combat” part, and applies in principle even to individuals trying to hurt/kill each other. But looking at the outcomes of major wars over the past ~50 years, it’s the “groups” part which really matters. The enemy is not a single monolithic agent, they’re a whole bunch of agents who have varying incentives/goals and may or may not coordinate well.
With that in mind, here’s a key strategic consideration: assuming we win the war, how will our desired objective be enforced upon the individuals who comprise the enemy? How will the enemy coordinate internally in surrender, in negotiations, and especially in enforcement of concessions? What ensures that each of the individual enemy agents actually does what we want? I see three main classes of answer to that question:
Answer 1: extinction-style outcomes. We may not kill the entire enemy force, but we will at least end their ability to wage war. This is sometimes sufficient to achieve a goal, especially in defense. However, note that whatever underlying socioeconomic circumstances originally gave rise to the enemy will likely persist; the problem will likely recur later on. If the cost of the war is low enough, paying it regularly may still be acceptable.
Answer 2: centralized negotiation-style outcomes. The pre-existing leadership/coordination machinery of the enemy will enforce concessions—e.g. the enemy government formally surrenders and accepts terms, then enforces those terms on its own members/populace, or enemy government leadership is replaced by our own representatives while keeping the machinery intact (as in a coup). Key point: if we want this outcome, then preservation of the enemy leadership/coordination machinery, their legitimacy and their internal enforcement capabilities is a strategic priority for us.
Answer 3: colonization-style outcomes. We will impose a new governing structure of our own upon our enemies. If the enemy has some existing governing structure, we will destroy it in the course of the war. In this case, we cannot expect a coordinated surrender from our enemies—we must achieve victory over smaller units (possibly even individuals) on a one-by-one basis. This means clear announcement and enforcement of our rules, policing, distributed combat against decentralized opposition, and ultimately state-building or the equivalent thereof.
One of the major problems that Western nations have run into in the past half century is that we’re in wars where (a) we don’t just want to kill everyone, and (b) there is no strong central control of the opposition (or at least none we want to preserve), so we’re effectively forced into the last scenario above. If we want to enforce our will on the enemy, we effectively need to build a state de novo. In some sense, that sort of war has more in common with policing and propaganda than with “war” as it’s usually imagined, i.e. clashes between nations.
When we picture things that way, fancy weapons just aren’t all that relevant. The hard part of modern war is the policing and eventual nation-building. For that project, tools like personalized propaganda or technological omniscience are huge, whereas aimbots/battlebots or supply-chain superiority serve little role besides looking intimidating—an important role, to be sure, but not one which will determine the end result of the war.
In bottleneck terms: the limiting factor in achieving objectives in modern war is not destroying the enemy, but building stable nations de novo.
This argument is only supportive of your main point “command and control by far most important” insofar future wars will also be exclusively asymmetric. That assumption, though, is problematic even today. The US isn’t spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers to fight the Taliban.
The US is spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers for the dual purposes of funneling money to friends and supporters, and for signaling to prevent any symmetric war.
Fighting the Taliban also fulfills the purpose of funneling money to friends and supporters.
Don’t forget major problem (c), which is that we’re not willing to make the decades-long investment that statebuilding takes. A good rule of thumb is 50 occupiers per subject-nation citizen; our recent occupations have had nowhere near that number. They have to stay long enough become fully integrated with the local culture so that they can change it, violently when necessary (think British Raj or 1945 occupation of Japan). The US military is not designed to do this, and our politicians are not willing to redesign it as an occupying force (e.g. by making postings semi-permanent instead of brief rotations and teaching all our troops the local language). Therefore our attempts at colonization-style outcomes consistently fail.
The short version is that we already have the technology to destroy anything, but the resulting power vacuum consistently leads to civil war.
The British Raj had 125k colonists at the beginning in 1861 and 166k near the end in 1921, so about one per 2,000 subjects.
I honestly don’t know much about the British conquest of India, although I’m pretty sure that the power differential between the West and the rest at that point in time was near its peak. Does anyone know how they did it?
I think phrasing this in terms of “power” is not so helpful. Cortes and Pizarro brought only a few hundred men to destroy empires. But they didn’t nuke them; rather, they allied with existing armies. Similarly, most of the Indian Army was native. Most of the administrators were Indians, too. The British had better weapons and social technology of training, but in creating the Indian Army, they gave up that advantage. The key was some tacit social technology of hierarchy, to keep command of army and country. At the beginning, the Empire had 80k British soldiers, but the East India company tried to get away with using only 40k. It failed in the Sepoy Mutiny, which is why it was replaced by the Empire, but the units with more British were more likely to rebel, so it’s not a matter of pure numbers, but of how they were deployed. (Specifically, units with more British had segregation and racism, while the units with fewer British had camaraderie. And probably responsiveness to specific concerns, like the tallow bullets.)
I get your points, but I think you may be underestimating the sheer technological advantage enjoyed by the British at that time. This was the age of “we have the Maxim gun and they have not”. Between the power of its guns and the wealth of its factories, Britain at the time had nigh-insurmountable advantages; its war against the Zanzibar Sultanate brought decisive British victory within 45 minutes.
OK, if you change the topic from occupation to conquest, then technology matters. Cortes and Pizarro didn’t equip and train their allies. Maybe in the beginning, say, 1680-1750, the East India Company acted like Cortes and Pizarro, allying with armies that they didn’t train or equip and maybe their advantages were a reason to side with them. But starting in 1750 they trained and equipped native armies and lost all their advantages.
I explicitly addressed this: the British had no advantage of guns. The Sepoy mutiny was sparked by the beef fat in the cutting-edge rifles that the British gave to the Indians.
For that matter, your wikipedia link says that the Sultan of Zanzibar did have a Maxim gun. Technology travels fast! It was more a battle of artillery. The British Raj did respond to the Sepoy Mutiny by moving artillery out of the hands of natives, but the Company had managed 50-100 years trusting artillery to Indians.
My question was mostly about the transition from conquest to occupation. How did they get from the point where native armies had been defeated to the point where natives would accept their rule? That’s the transition we’ve failed spectacularly at in Iraq and Afghanistan, so it’s a matter of considerable practical importance.
Do you have a source on this? I’d be interested to read more on the subject, but don’t really know where to look.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/05/09/a-proven-formula-for-how-many-troops-we-need/5c6dbfc9-33f8-4648-bd07-40d244a1daa4/
Epistemic status: probably not as reliable as it claims to be, but a useful rule of thumb for planning purposes.
I think this is the RAND study cited there.
Mmmm, yes. I think it’s too quick to say that all modern war is like this; I think type 2 is definitely still possible and type 1 shouldn’t be completely ruled out either, especially if we are thinking about crazy future AI scenarios. But other than that I agree, and found your trichotomy insightful. Thanks!