the argument Aaron presented wasn’t an argument for the existence of qualia, and so taking the existence of qualia as a premise doesn’t beg the question
In order for the argument to make any sense, you have to buy into several assumptions which basically are the argument. It’s “qualia are special because they’re special, QED”. I thought about calling it circular reasoning, except that it seems closer to begging the question. If you have a better way to put it, by all means share.
Could you explain this a bit more? I don’t see how it’s relevant to the argument. Searle is not arguing on the basis of any special feelings. This seems like a straw man to me, at the moment, but I may not be appreciating the flaws in Searle’s argument.
When I said that our mind detection circuitry was the root of the argument, I didn’t mean that Searle was overtly arguing on the basis of his feelings. What I’m saying is, the only evidence for Searle-type premises are the feelings created by our mind-detection circuitry. If you assume these feelings mean something, then Searle-ish arguments will seem correct, and Searle-ish premises will seem obvious beyond question.
However, if you truly grok the mind-projection fallacy, then Searle-type premises are just as obviously nonsensical, and there’s no reason to pay any attention to the arguments built on top of them. Even as basic a tool as Rationalist Taboo suffices to debunk the premises before the argument can get off the ground.
you have to buy into several assumptions which basically are the argument.
Any vald argument has a conclusion that is entiailed by its premises taken jointly. Circularity is when the whole conclusion is entailed by one premise, with the others being window-dressing.
you have to buy into several assumptions which basically are the argument.
I think there is a way that ripe tomatoes seem visually: how is that mind-projection.
In order for the argument to make any sense, you have to buy into several assumptions which basically are the argument. It’s “qualia are special because they’re special, QED”. I thought about calling it circular reasoning, except that it seems closer to begging the question. If you have a better way to put it, by all means share.
When I said that our mind detection circuitry was the root of the argument, I didn’t mean that Searle was overtly arguing on the basis of his feelings. What I’m saying is, the only evidence for Searle-type premises are the feelings created by our mind-detection circuitry. If you assume these feelings mean something, then Searle-ish arguments will seem correct, and Searle-ish premises will seem obvious beyond question.
However, if you truly grok the mind-projection fallacy, then Searle-type premises are just as obviously nonsensical, and there’s no reason to pay any attention to the arguments built on top of them. Even as basic a tool as Rationalist Taboo suffices to debunk the premises before the argument can get off the ground.
Any vald argument has a conclusion that is entiailed by its premises taken jointly. Circularity is when the whole conclusion is entailed by one premise, with the others being window-dressing.
I think there is a way that ripe tomatoes seem visually: how is that mind-projection.