Well, if B is defined sufficiently precisely, ie, have X money at time Y, then B shouldn’t be greater than the lottery which, even if the lose happens, produces the exact same outcome.
ie, unless I misunderstand, the objection only arises out of being a bit fuzzy about what B actually precisely means, letting the B in the lottery be a different B then the, well, regular B.
Would you agree with that interpretation of things, or am I missing something critical here?
I think you’re right—I meant mainly that a lot depends on the specifics of the situation, so even with A>B, it is not necessarily irrational to prefer B to the probability.
I think Nick Tarleton refuted this in the other subthread—a lottery here means a lottery over states of the world, which include your knowledge state, so if you get your knowledge of the outcome later it’s not really the same thing.
It’s still true that this is a reason to disprefer realistic lotteries where you learn the outcome later, but maybe this is better termed “unpredictability aversion” than “risk aversion”? After all, it can happen even when all lottery outcomes are equally desirable. (Example: you like soup and potatoes equally, but prefer either to a lottery over them because you want to know whether to get a spoon or a fork.)
Okay. I’d say then that case is comparing B with a lottery involving some different B’.
(ie, like saying sometimes x=x is false of the x on the left is 2 and the one on the right is 3. Of course 2 is not = 3, but that’s a counterexample of x=x, rather that’s a case of ignoring what we actually mean by using the same variable name on both sides)
Well, if B is defined sufficiently precisely, ie, have X money at time Y, then B shouldn’t be greater than the lottery which, even if the lose happens, produces the exact same outcome.
ie, unless I misunderstand, the objection only arises out of being a bit fuzzy about what B actually precisely means, letting the B in the lottery be a different B then the, well, regular B.
Would you agree with that interpretation of things, or am I missing something critical here?
I think you’re right—I meant mainly that a lot depends on the specifics of the situation, so even with A>B, it is not necessarily irrational to prefer B to the probability.
I think Nick Tarleton refuted this in the other subthread—a lottery here means a lottery over states of the world, which include your knowledge state, so if you get your knowledge of the outcome later it’s not really the same thing.
It’s still true that this is a reason to disprefer realistic lotteries where you learn the outcome later, but maybe this is better termed “unpredictability aversion” than “risk aversion”? After all, it can happen even when all lottery outcomes are equally desirable. (Example: you like soup and potatoes equally, but prefer either to a lottery over them because you want to know whether to get a spoon or a fork.)
(In that link, I’m actually just restating Thom Blake’s argument.)
Thanks for the link!
Okay. I’d say then that case is comparing B with a lottery involving some different B’.
(ie, like saying sometimes x=x is false of the x on the left is 2 and the one on the right is 3. Of course 2 is not = 3, but that’s a counterexample of x=x, rather that’s a case of ignoring what we actually mean by using the same variable name on both sides)