This reasoning strikes me as somewhat odd. Even if it turned out that these patterns don’t emerge at all, we would still distinguish “what-we-want” from “what-is-right”.
True. The speculation is that what-we-want, when processed through advanced decision theory, comes out as a good match for our intuitions on what-is-right, and this would serve as a legitimate reductionistic grounding of metaethics. If it turned out not to match, we’d have to look for other ways to ground metaethics.
True. The speculation is that what-we-want, when processed through advanced decision theory, comes out as a good match for our intuitions on what-is-right, and this would serve as a legitimate reductionistic grounding of metaethics. If it turned out not to match, we’d have to look for other ways to ground metaethics.
Or perhaps we’d have to stop taking our intuitions on what-is-right at face value.
Or that, yes.
I wish you’d stop saying “advanced decision theory”, as it’s way too infantile currently to be called “advanced”...
I want a term to distinguish the decision theories (TDT, UDT, ADT) that pass the conditions 1-5 above. I’m open to suggestions.
Actually, hang on, I’ll make a quick Discussion post.