This is basically just the Coase Theorem. What Coase made clear is that externalities are fundamentally symmetrical; allowing the neighbour (Clarisse?) to have the peace and quiet she wants means that A cannot play the music at the volume she wants, and vice-versa. The “ethical duties,” at least in a normal sense, are symmetrical too; why is A obliged to put up with quiet music for C’s benefit? Why isn’t C obliged to put up with loud music for A’s benefit? Indeed, one of the examples cited in Coase’s original paper was a confectioner’s machine causing shaking in a doctor’s surgery, which is essentially analogous to this.
Let’s get down to brass tacks. If C doesn’t want A to play music so loud, but it’s A’s right to do so, why should A oblige? What is in it for A? That doesn’t mean C necessarily has to make some monetary payment, but is C going to (say) bake cookies for A? Or at the very least, can C credibly promise likely future benefits for A from good-neighbourliness, etc? And note that those benefits need to be greater than the utility A gets from playing the music at such a volume.
On a practical level, I would ask—what is the relationship like between A and C? Is C normally a good neighbour to A, and is now making an unusual request, or is C constantly bombarding A with such requests? Is C respectful of the fact that she is asking A to go out of her way to help, or is she demanding? Is she willing to “sweeten the deal” for A by doing (or refraining from doing) something else to please A, or is C such an exquisite bundle of neuroses that she could never do anything for anyone? Does C bother her neighbours, and how does she respond to similar requests herself? And so on.
Application of this to any other situations is left as an exercise for the reader.
If C doesn’t want A to play music so loud, but it’s A’s right to do so, why should A oblige? What is in it for A?
Some (myself included) would say that A should oblige if doing so would increase total utility, even if there’s nothing in it for A self-interestedly. (I’m assuming your saying A had a right to play loud music wasn’t meant to exclude this.)
Economically speaking, externalities are fundamentally symmetrical; morally, not so much.
There’s a defeasible presumption that if I project matter and/or energy into you, and that directly causes you to suffer, I’m in the moral wrong. Sound waves are energy, of a type which can cause biological damage, and at lower levels (varying by person) can still cause the pain that signals damage. So this counts as direct causation of suffering, in the relevant sense.
(Indirect causation of suffering can get tricky. For example if the sounds that I emit cause you to correctly conclude, “Oh no, he’s an atheist, oh no oh no,” well, we have rules about Free Speech. On the other hand if my sounds say, “There’s a gun in my pocket; your money or your life,” that’s different. It’s tricky. Luckily, the OP chose an easier example.)
When we make good ethical choices about what kind of political/legal system to have, we allow people to inflict certain levels of noise, pollution, etc., on each other. Else, the system would be unworkable. But this doesn’t mean that everything allowed under the law—even an optimal law—is morally OK.
There’s a defeasible presumption that if I project matter and/or energy into you, and that directly causes you to suffer, I’m in the moral wrong.
I’m not at all sure I agree. It doesn’t seem at all clear that if (say) you are upset by the look of my shirt (caused by light from my shirt hitting your retina) that I have presumptively wronged you. Why is the direction of energy transfer relevant? Where does your presumption come from? It does not appear to be encoded in any widespread legal or moral system that I am aware of. It looks rather like a principle idiosyncratic to you. And that’s fine—you can have idiosyncratic principles—but it’s incumbent on you to justify them.
In this case, I would note that the OP specified that the level of noise is well within legal and social norms. So even if there is some general principle (which I doubt) it has been specifically defeated here.
A defeasible presumption that if I project matter and/or energy into you, and that directly causes you to suffer, I’m in the moral wrong.
Ideas about what counts as projecting matter and energy that do not follow the literal definition of projecting matter and energy.
People don’t think of seeing a shirt as the shirt doing something to their retina. They think of it as them reacting to a shirt and the shirt just sitting there. The fact that you see the shirt by reflected light is an irrelevant technical detail. If the shirt was illuminated by a lamp on your front lawn instead of by the sun, the technical details would change (since the light is coming from you) but the answer to who is wrong would not change.
You’re right. I explained it badly. Or to put it differently, my theory of the doing-to-you vs something-that-just-happens distinction, was badly simplistic.
It doesn’t seem at all clear that if (say) you are upset by the look of my shirt (caused by light from my shirt hitting your retina) that I have presumptively wronged you.
That would be a case of indirect causation of suffering, as I discussed above with the example of atheistic speech upsetting someone. I’m not sure exactly what the direct/indirect distinction amounts to, but, in practice, I don’t think people usually have a very hard time with the distinction. Some features that might be relevant: the upset in the ugly shirt case and the atheistic speech case are both cognitively mediated, and neither of them is biologically hardwired.
The direction of matter/energy transfer is relevant because it distinguishes something I do to you, from something that just happens. If a hot sunny day overheats you, that just happens. If I burn you with a laser, that is something I did to you. Similar points apply to stabbings, shootings, poisonings, but with matter instead of energy becoming the weapon. In most people’s moral views, the action / mere-happening distinction is important.
In the above, I basically offered a theory of the distinction between me doing something to you, versus something just happening to you. The theory focuses on projections of matter and energy. Jiro’s reply convinced me that my theory is overly simplistic.
So please, mentally substitute the doing/letting-happen distinction itself, rather than my explanation of it. I realize that consequentialists will deny the importance of the distinction, at least at a fundamental level. My comment above (with this correction) is directed at those who will entertain doubts about consequentialism.
This is basically just the Coase Theorem. What Coase made clear is that externalities are fundamentally symmetrical; allowing the neighbour (Clarisse?) to have the peace and quiet she wants means that A cannot play the music at the volume she wants, and vice-versa. The “ethical duties,” at least in a normal sense, are symmetrical too; why is A obliged to put up with quiet music for C’s benefit? Why isn’t C obliged to put up with loud music for A’s benefit? Indeed, one of the examples cited in Coase’s original paper was a confectioner’s machine causing shaking in a doctor’s surgery, which is essentially analogous to this.
Let’s get down to brass tacks. If C doesn’t want A to play music so loud, but it’s A’s right to do so, why should A oblige? What is in it for A? That doesn’t mean C necessarily has to make some monetary payment, but is C going to (say) bake cookies for A? Or at the very least, can C credibly promise likely future benefits for A from good-neighbourliness, etc? And note that those benefits need to be greater than the utility A gets from playing the music at such a volume.
On a practical level, I would ask—what is the relationship like between A and C? Is C normally a good neighbour to A, and is now making an unusual request, or is C constantly bombarding A with such requests? Is C respectful of the fact that she is asking A to go out of her way to help, or is she demanding? Is she willing to “sweeten the deal” for A by doing (or refraining from doing) something else to please A, or is C such an exquisite bundle of neuroses that she could never do anything for anyone? Does C bother her neighbours, and how does she respond to similar requests herself? And so on.
Application of this to any other situations is left as an exercise for the reader.
Some (myself included) would say that A should oblige if doing so would increase total utility, even if there’s nothing in it for A self-interestedly. (I’m assuming your saying A had a right to play loud music wasn’t meant to exclude this.)
How are you doing cross-person utility comparisons?
Economically speaking, externalities are fundamentally symmetrical; morally, not so much.
There’s a defeasible presumption that if I project matter and/or energy into you, and that directly causes you to suffer, I’m in the moral wrong. Sound waves are energy, of a type which can cause biological damage, and at lower levels (varying by person) can still cause the pain that signals damage. So this counts as direct causation of suffering, in the relevant sense.
(Indirect causation of suffering can get tricky. For example if the sounds that I emit cause you to correctly conclude, “Oh no, he’s an atheist, oh no oh no,” well, we have rules about Free Speech. On the other hand if my sounds say, “There’s a gun in my pocket; your money or your life,” that’s different. It’s tricky. Luckily, the OP chose an easier example.)
When we make good ethical choices about what kind of political/legal system to have, we allow people to inflict certain levels of noise, pollution, etc., on each other. Else, the system would be unworkable. But this doesn’t mean that everything allowed under the law—even an optimal law—is morally OK.
I’m not at all sure I agree. It doesn’t seem at all clear that if (say) you are upset by the look of my shirt (caused by light from my shirt hitting your retina) that I have presumptively wronged you. Why is the direction of energy transfer relevant? Where does your presumption come from? It does not appear to be encoded in any widespread legal or moral system that I am aware of. It looks rather like a principle idiosyncratic to you. And that’s fine—you can have idiosyncratic principles—but it’s incumbent on you to justify them.
In this case, I would note that the OP specified that the level of noise is well within legal and social norms. So even if there is some general principle (which I doubt) it has been specifically defeated here.
There’s a combination of
A defeasible presumption that if I project matter and/or energy into you, and that directly causes you to suffer, I’m in the moral wrong.
Ideas about what counts as projecting matter and energy that do not follow the literal definition of projecting matter and energy.
People don’t think of seeing a shirt as the shirt doing something to their retina. They think of it as them reacting to a shirt and the shirt just sitting there. The fact that you see the shirt by reflected light is an irrelevant technical detail. If the shirt was illuminated by a lamp on your front lawn instead of by the sun, the technical details would change (since the light is coming from you) but the answer to who is wrong would not change.
You’re right. I explained it badly. Or to put it differently, my theory of the doing-to-you vs something-that-just-happens distinction, was badly simplistic.
That would be a case of indirect causation of suffering, as I discussed above with the example of atheistic speech upsetting someone. I’m not sure exactly what the direct/indirect distinction amounts to, but, in practice, I don’t think people usually have a very hard time with the distinction. Some features that might be relevant: the upset in the ugly shirt case and the atheistic speech case are both cognitively mediated, and neither of them is biologically hardwired.
The direction of matter/energy transfer is relevant because it distinguishes something I do to you, from something that just happens. If a hot sunny day overheats you, that just happens. If I burn you with a laser, that is something I did to you. Similar points apply to stabbings, shootings, poisonings, but with matter instead of energy becoming the weapon. In most people’s moral views, the action / mere-happening distinction is important.
Nope. Suffering is not a blank check to control a shared environment. And you recognize that as such later on:
Yes. If you’re not a theocrat, legal and moral are not the same things.
In the above, I basically offered a theory of the distinction between me doing something to you, versus something just happening to you. The theory focuses on projections of matter and energy. Jiro’s reply convinced me that my theory is overly simplistic.
So please, mentally substitute the doing/letting-happen distinction itself, rather than my explanation of it. I realize that consequentialists will deny the importance of the distinction, at least at a fundamental level. My comment above (with this correction) is directed at those who will entertain doubts about consequentialism.
Pain and suffering aren’t the same thing. Most people do suffer when they are in pair but’s it’s nothing automatic.