Isn’t that essentially the best case for things like Nostradamus? Even assuming that the prophecies are accurate, they aren’t useful because they are so vague. The moment that the predictions are specific enough to be useful, they could be falsified.
What use is it to call that science? How could it possibly produce superior predictions in a world in which science works at all?
I don’t understand where we disagree, so let me clarify my position: A prophecy that is so vague that it can’t be disproved is so vague that it doesn’t tell you what will happen ahead of time. Calling that a prediction abuses the term to the point of incoherency.
Yes, that’s almost entirely a definitional point. Definitions aren’t necessarily empirical statements. They are either useful or not useful in thinking carefully. Thus, the fact that they cannot be falsified is not a relevant thing to say, in the same way that it isn’t useful to object that the Pythagorean theory can’t be falsified.
Isn’t that essentially the best case for things like Nostradamus? Even assuming that the prophecies are accurate, they aren’t useful because they are so vague. The moment that the predictions are specific enough to be useful, they could be falsified.
What use is it to call that science? How could it possibly produce superior predictions in a world in which science works at all?
Yes, that is rather the question you should be answering if you want to criticize the desirability of falsifiability as being unfalsifiable itself...
I don’t understand where we disagree, so let me clarify my position: A prophecy that is so vague that it can’t be disproved is so vague that it doesn’t tell you what will happen ahead of time. Calling that a prediction abuses the term to the point of incoherency.
Yes, that’s almost entirely a definitional point. Definitions aren’t necessarily empirical statements. They are either useful or not useful in thinking carefully. Thus, the fact that they cannot be falsified is not a relevant thing to say, in the same way that it isn’t useful to object that the Pythagorean theory can’t be falsified.
If you intend to invoke some other critique of Popper and his use of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science, please by more explicit, because I don’t understand your argument.