I don’t understand where we disagree, so let me clarify my position: A prophecy that is so vague that it can’t be disproved is so vague that it doesn’t tell you what will happen ahead of time. Calling that a prediction abuses the term to the point of incoherency.
Yes, that’s almost entirely a definitional point. Definitions aren’t necessarily empirical statements. They are either useful or not useful in thinking carefully. Thus, the fact that they cannot be falsified is not a relevant thing to say, in the same way that it isn’t useful to object that the Pythagorean theory can’t be falsified.
Yes, that is rather the question you should be answering if you want to criticize the desirability of falsifiability as being unfalsifiable itself...
I don’t understand where we disagree, so let me clarify my position: A prophecy that is so vague that it can’t be disproved is so vague that it doesn’t tell you what will happen ahead of time. Calling that a prediction abuses the term to the point of incoherency.
Yes, that’s almost entirely a definitional point. Definitions aren’t necessarily empirical statements. They are either useful or not useful in thinking carefully. Thus, the fact that they cannot be falsified is not a relevant thing to say, in the same way that it isn’t useful to object that the Pythagorean theory can’t be falsified.
If you intend to invoke some other critique of Popper and his use of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science, please by more explicit, because I don’t understand your argument.