But why do beliefs need to pay rent in anticipated experiences? Why can’t they pay rent in utility?
Is there a difference between utility and anticipated experiences? I can see a case that utility is probability of anticipated, desired experiences, but for purposes of this argument, I don’t think that makes for an important difference.
“Smart and beautiful” Joe is being Pascal’s-mugged by his own beliefs. His anticipated experiences lead to exorbitantly high utility. When failure costs (relatively) little, it subtracts little utility by comparison.
I suppose you could use the same argument for the lottery-playing Joe. And you would realize that people like Joe, on average, are worse off. You wouldn’t want to be Joe. But once you are Joe, his irrationality looks different from the inside.
Is there a difference between utility and anticipated experiences? I can see a case that utility is probability of anticipated, desired experiences, but for purposes of this argument, I don’t think that makes for an important difference.
“Smart and beautiful” Joe is being Pascal’s-mugged by his own beliefs. His anticipated experiences lead to exorbitantly high utility. When failure costs (relatively) little, it subtracts little utility by comparison.
I suppose you could use the same argument for the lottery-playing Joe. And you would realize that people like Joe, on average, are worse off. You wouldn’t want to be Joe. But once you are Joe, his irrationality looks different from the inside.