If you assume a Tegmark multiverse — that all definable entities actually exist — then it seems to follow that:
All malicious deprivation — some mind recognizing another mind’s definable possible pleasure, and taking steps to deny that mind’s pleasure — implies the actual existence of the pleasure it is intended to deprive;
All benevolent relief — some mind recognizing another mind’s definable possible suffering, and taking steps to alleviate that suffering — implies the actual existence of the suffering it is intended to relieve.
It does not follow from the fact that I am motivated to prevent certain kinds of suffering/pleasure, that said suffering/pleasure is “definable” in the sense I think you mean it here. That is, my brain is sufficiently screwy that it’s possible for me to want to prevent something that isn’t actually logically possible in the first place.
Since religions are human inventions, I would guess that any comprehensive simulation program already produces all conceivable religions.
But I’m guessing that you meant to talk about the simulation of all conceivable gods. That is another matter entirely. Even with unlimited computronium, you can only simulate possible gods—gods not entailing any logical contradictions. There may not be any such gods.
This doesn’t affect Tipler’s argument though. Tipler does not postulate God as simulated. Tipler postulates God as the simulator.
I’m not sure. I only read the first book—“Physics of Immortality”. But I would suppose that he doesn’t actually try to prove the truth of Christianity—he might be satisfied to simply make Christian doctrine seem less weird and impossible.
How does he get from there to Christianity in particular?
If you are assuming infinite computronium you may as well go ahead and assume simulation of all of the conceivable religions!
I suppose that leaves you in a position of Pascal’s Gang Mugging.
That’s basically Hindu theology in a nutshell. Or more accurately, Pascal’s Gang Maybe Mugging Maybe Hugging.
If you assume a Tegmark multiverse — that all definable entities actually exist — then it seems to follow that:
All malicious deprivation — some mind recognizing another mind’s definable possible pleasure, and taking steps to deny that mind’s pleasure — implies the actual existence of the pleasure it is intended to deprive;
All benevolent relief — some mind recognizing another mind’s definable possible suffering, and taking steps to alleviate that suffering — implies the actual existence of the suffering it is intended to relieve.
It does not follow from the fact that I am motivated to prevent certain kinds of suffering/pleasure, that said suffering/pleasure is “definable” in the sense I think you mean it here. That is, my brain is sufficiently screwy that it’s possible for me to want to prevent something that isn’t actually logically possible in the first place.
Since religions are human inventions, I would guess that any comprehensive simulation program already produces all conceivable religions.
But I’m guessing that you meant to talk about the simulation of all conceivable gods. That is another matter entirely. Even with unlimited computronium, you can only simulate possible gods—gods not entailing any logical contradictions. There may not be any such gods.
This doesn’t affect Tipler’s argument though. Tipler does not postulate God as simulated. Tipler postulates God as the simulator.
I’m not sure. I only read the first book—“Physics of Immortality”. But I would suppose that he doesn’t actually try to prove the truth of Christianity—he might be satisfied to simply make Christian doctrine seem less weird and impossible.