AGI is potentially far more useful and powerful than nuclear weapons ever were, and also provides a possible route to breaking the global stalemate with nuclear arms.
If this is true—or perceived to be true among nuclear strategy planners and those with the authority to issue a lawful launch order—it might creates disturbingly (or delightfully; if you see this as a way to prevent the creation of AGI altogether) strong first-strike incentives for nuclear powers which don’t have AGI, don’t want to see their nuclear deterrent turned to dust, and don’t want to be put under the sword of an adversary’s AGI.
The current economics “board” has every power with enough GDP to potentially build AGI/ASI protected by their own nuclear weapons or mutual defense treaties.
So the party considering a first strike has “national death and loss of all major cities” and “under the sword of the adversary” as their outcomes. As well as the always hopeful “maybe the adversary won’t actually attack but get what they want via international treaties” as outcomes.
Put this way it looks more favorable not to push the button, let me know how your analysis differs.
If this is true—or perceived to be true among nuclear strategy planners and those with the authority to issue a lawful launch order—it might creates disturbingly (or delightfully; if you see this as a way to prevent the creation of AGI altogether) strong first-strike incentives for nuclear powers which don’t have AGI, don’t want to see their nuclear deterrent turned to dust, and don’t want to be put under the sword of an adversary’s AGI.
My idea too, I actually did mention that in a post https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/otArJmyzWgfCxNZMt/agi-deployment-as-an-act-of-aggression.
The current economics “board” has every power with enough GDP to potentially build AGI/ASI protected by their own nuclear weapons or mutual defense treaties.
So the party considering a first strike has “national death and loss of all major cities” and “under the sword of the adversary” as their outcomes. As well as the always hopeful “maybe the adversary won’t actually attack but get what they want via international treaties” as outcomes.
Put this way it looks more favorable not to push the button, let me know how your analysis differs.