It’s possible to behave in a way you don’t endorse on reflection. Or even merely wouldn’t endorse, especially using modes of reflection you lack skill/knowledge for. Calling this condition “revealed preferences” is erring in the other direction from what you point out, an overly behaviorist view that ignores the less observable process of coming up with preferences. There is also something to be said about lacking preferences in some ways where it would be healthier to have them, even absent their spontaneous emergence.
I’ve read a good chunk of Eliezer’s paper on TDT, and it’s in that context that I am interpreting reflection. Forgive me if I misunderstand some of it; it’s new to me.
TDT is motivated by requiring a decision rule that is consistent under reflection. It doesn’t seem to pass judgment on preferences themselves, only on how actions ought to be chosen given preferences. Am I mistaken here?
Perhaps I should have been clearer with Voldemort’s “revealed” preferences. JKR writes him as a fairly simple character and I did take for granted that what we saw was what we got. I agree that in general actions aren’t indicative of beliefs.
EDIT: Ah, there is an exception. Eliezer is quite critical in the paper of preferring a decision rule for its own sake.
It’s possible to behave in a way you don’t endorse on reflection. Or even merely wouldn’t endorse, especially using modes of reflection you lack skill/knowledge for. Calling this condition “revealed preferences” is erring in the other direction from what you point out, an overly behaviorist view that ignores the less observable process of coming up with preferences. There is also something to be said about lacking preferences in some ways where it would be healthier to have them, even absent their spontaneous emergence.
I’ve read a good chunk of Eliezer’s paper on TDT, and it’s in that context that I am interpreting reflection. Forgive me if I misunderstand some of it; it’s new to me.
TDT is motivated by requiring a decision rule that is consistent under reflection. It doesn’t seem to pass judgment on preferences themselves, only on how actions ought to be chosen given preferences. Am I mistaken here?
Perhaps I should have been clearer with Voldemort’s “revealed” preferences. JKR writes him as a fairly simple character and I did take for granted that what we saw was what we got. I agree that in general actions aren’t indicative of beliefs.
EDIT: Ah, there is an exception. Eliezer is quite critical in the paper of preferring a decision rule for its own sake.