We don’t kill many infants, but we do abort lots of fetuses, though. I don’t see any obvious reason why we should give a frozen corpse more rights than a fetus. Everyone who is cryopreserved actually did die; reviving one is more like creating a new person than it is like providing medical care to an existing, living person.
Everyone who is cryopreserved actually did die; reviving one is more like creating a new person than it is like providing medical care to an existing, living person.
At Alcor and CI there is much written about the definitions of death; their preferred version (mine too) is information-theoretic death. To be precise, legal death is the moment the doctors decide to stop caring for the patient, mostly because they estimate the chance of successful resuscitation too low. On the other hand, information-theoretic death is the point beyond which no technology can restore a mind. This definition is a bit more precise as it being vague requires us to consider the possibility of reversing entropy (EDIT: in other words, the finality of legal death is pretty questionable, but we can only argue against the finality of information-theoretic death if there is a way to reverse entropy).
The subjective experience of waking up from cryonic suspension could range from identical to waking up from sleep to having suffered a serious and pervasive brain trauma, depending on the circumstances of suspension and reanimation. I wouldn’t automatically categorize reanimated people as newly created persons as I wouldn’t do so in the case of sleeping people or victims of brain injury. They are new persons to the extent the continuity between their pre- and post- suspension selves is lost, and I think the same applies to brain injury victims.
We don’t kill many infants, but we do abort lots of fetuses, though.
Aborting a fetus may or may not be fully moral depending on how developed the fetus is. Killing a zygote is as morally charged as killing a random bacterium. Otherwise, causing suffering to fetuses by abortion is sure a possibility, albeit one that can be reduced by regulations informed by a detailed knowledge of neurosciences.
However, I think the strongest reason why likening cryonics patients to fetuses is ridiculous is that cryonics patients (can) have a huge pile of accumulated life experiences, memories and a unique and rich personality.
I meant that information theoretic-death is a point beyond which restoring a person requires reversing entropy. Thus we can only argue against the finality of this kind of death if there is a way to reverse entropy (which seems not to be the case). I admit my sentence there was too opaque.
Reversing entropy is insufficient. You have to interact with a past that no longer has any traces in the present. It’s not enough to have a way to turn steam into ice cubes. You need a time camera.
[I’m deleting this comment soon. No reason to pick another fight. Maybe I’ll take Morendil’s advice and write a post about how much I disagree with people assuming moral positions for anyone but themselves and where I see that heading. I don’t have time at the moment.]
I urge you to err strongly on the side of not deleting comments. If I post something I later regret, I just edit them to say “oops!” For one thing, it’s easy to overreact and underestimate their quality.
Disagree that we should discuss what people values should be in this post or anywhere on Less Wrong. This is a place about rationality right? NOT MORALIZING.
I’m not willing for this be a place where we discuss what moral judgments are appropriate or not.
We have had numerous top-level posts regarding ethics and meta-ethics; what one should do seems intimately related to rationality. This is already a place where we discuss what moral judgements are correct, and has been since its inception. Example
We don’t kill many infants, but we do abort lots of fetuses, though. I don’t see any obvious reason why we should give a frozen corpse more rights than a fetus. Everyone who is cryopreserved actually did die; reviving one is more like creating a new person than it is like providing medical care to an existing, living person.
At Alcor and CI there is much written about the definitions of death; their preferred version (mine too) is information-theoretic death. To be precise, legal death is the moment the doctors decide to stop caring for the patient, mostly because they estimate the chance of successful resuscitation too low. On the other hand, information-theoretic death is the point beyond which no technology can restore a mind. This definition is a bit more precise as it being vague requires us to consider the possibility of reversing entropy (EDIT: in other words, the finality of legal death is pretty questionable, but we can only argue against the finality of information-theoretic death if there is a way to reverse entropy).
The subjective experience of waking up from cryonic suspension could range from identical to waking up from sleep to having suffered a serious and pervasive brain trauma, depending on the circumstances of suspension and reanimation. I wouldn’t automatically categorize reanimated people as newly created persons as I wouldn’t do so in the case of sleeping people or victims of brain injury. They are new persons to the extent the continuity between their pre- and post- suspension selves is lost, and I think the same applies to brain injury victims.
Aborting a fetus may or may not be fully moral depending on how developed the fetus is. Killing a zygote is as morally charged as killing a random bacterium. Otherwise, causing suffering to fetuses by abortion is sure a possibility, albeit one that can be reduced by regulations informed by a detailed knowledge of neurosciences.
However, I think the strongest reason why likening cryonics patients to fetuses is ridiculous is that cryonics patients (can) have a huge pile of accumulated life experiences, memories and a unique and rich personality.
That doesn’t sound quite right, can you be a little more precise? If cryonics depended on breaking the Second Law I would have no time for it.
I meant that information theoretic-death is a point beyond which restoring a person requires reversing entropy. Thus we can only argue against the finality of this kind of death if there is a way to reverse entropy (which seems not to be the case). I admit my sentence there was too opaque.
Reversing entropy is insufficient. You have to interact with a past that no longer has any traces in the present. It’s not enough to have a way to turn steam into ice cubes. You need a time camera.
I think the definition is clearer if you avoid reference to entropy, but I get what you’re getting at now. Thanks!
[I’m deleting this comment soon. No reason to pick another fight. Maybe I’ll take Morendil’s advice and write a post about how much I disagree with people assuming moral positions for anyone but themselves and where I see that heading. I don’t have time at the moment.]
I urge you to err strongly on the side of not deleting comments. If I post something I later regret, I just edit them to say “oops!” For one thing, it’s easy to overreact and underestimate their quality.
OK.* I was mainly just trying to prevent another big long sidetrack. Since thomblake already replied, it needs to stay anyway.
*From now on, I’ll just edit with an ‘oops’.
We have had numerous top-level posts regarding ethics and meta-ethics; what one should do seems intimately related to rationality. This is already a place where we discuss what moral judgements are correct, and has been since its inception. Example