So the ability to steal without getting caught is a virtue?
If it’s good for the person who decides to steal. The first problem is that logical control makes individual decisions into group decisions, so if social welfare suffers, so does the person, as a result of individual decisions. Thus, deciding to steal might make everyone worse off, because it’s the same decision as one made by other people. The second problem is that the act of stealing itself might be terminally undesirable for the person who steals.
I see. So you agree that ability to steal without getting caught is a virtue according to the definition thomblake cited, and see this as a reducio of thomblake’s definition, showing that it doesn’t capture the notion as it’s used in virtue ethics.
My comment was oblivious to your intention, and discussed how much “ability to steal without getting caught” corresponds to thomblake’s definition, without relating that to how well either of these concepts fits “virtues” of virtue ethics.
How do you think that works as a reductio? What is it about your example of a putative virtue that makes it fit my definition, but not the ‘virtues’ of virtue ethics? (is it simply the ‘stronger’ notions of virtue I offered in the same comment?)
I just looked at your objections in another comment, and will try another reductio. Lots of people have the skill to cheat on their spouses and never get caught. Is doing so virtuous? I’m pretty sure this makes them feel happier, and doesn’t interfere with their ability to have meaningful interpersonal relationships :-)
If it’s good for the person who decides to steal. The first problem is that logical control makes individual decisions into group decisions, so if social welfare suffers, so does the person, as a result of individual decisions. Thus, deciding to steal might make everyone worse off, because it’s the same decision as one made by other people. The second problem is that the act of stealing itself might be terminally undesirable for the person who steals.
Parent, grandparent and great-grandparent to my comment were all about “virtues” in virtue ethics.
I see. So you agree that ability to steal without getting caught is a virtue according to the definition thomblake cited, and see this as a reducio of thomblake’s definition, showing that it doesn’t capture the notion as it’s used in virtue ethics.
My comment was oblivious to your intention, and discussed how much “ability to steal without getting caught” corresponds to thomblake’s definition, without relating that to how well either of these concepts fits “virtues” of virtue ethics.
Yes, all correct.
How do you think that works as a reductio? What is it about your example of a putative virtue that makes it fit my definition, but not the ‘virtues’ of virtue ethics? (is it simply the ‘stronger’ notions of virtue I offered in the same comment?)
I just looked at your objections in another comment, and will try another reductio. Lots of people have the skill to cheat on their spouses and never get caught. Is doing so virtuous? I’m pretty sure this makes them feel happier, and doesn’t interfere with their ability to have meaningful interpersonal relationships :-)