What does it mean for an ethical system to get “better”? Physics contains no such thing.
You say that as though there is no other possible basis to make an objective judgement. Naturalists tend to reject the idea of a separate ontological domain of ethical value, whoch is fair enough. but nihilism is too hasty a conclusion. There is also the domain of human cultural constructs, which is neither derivable from physics, nor ontologically non-physical.[*]
Norms about how well things function, how well they do their job, are objective enough, yet are not rooted in physics. There are norms about how to play chess well, although chess is clearly a human construct. There are norms about how to play run a economy , although money is clearly a human construct.
To judge the quality of an ethical system you must do so through your own ethical system
Ethical philosophy itself is an attempt to judge ethics by norms that are not ethical, such as rational norms. (Or mathematical ones in the case of “torture vs. dust specs”).
The assumption that ethics has a function, that it is part of the “operating system” of society
allows us to make judgements about better and worse systems of ethics, where “better” and “worse” are
cashed out as fulfilling a function well or badly, and are not therefore circular appeals to the ethical sense of better and worse.
A universal standard of ethics must have practical utility in every society at every point in history.
I suppose so, but why would you want one? In order to justify moral progress, you need an objective standard of ethics, not a universal one.
Minimally, an objective truth is not a subjective truth, that is to say, it is not
mind-dependent. Lack of mind dependence does not imply that objective truth needs to be the
same everywhere, which is to say it does not imply universalism. Truths that are objective but not universal
would be truths that vary with objective circumstances: that does not entail subjectivity, because subjectivity is mind
dependence.
I like to use the analogy of big G and little g in physics. Big G is a universal constant, little g is the local acceleration
due to gravity, and will vary from planet to planet (and, in a fine-grained way, at different points on the earths surface). But little g is perfectly objective, for all its lack of universality.
To give some examples that are actually about morality and how it is contextual:
A food-scarce society will develop rules about who can eat how much of which kind of food.
A society without birth control and close to Malthusian limits will develop restrictions on
sexual behaviour, in order to prevent people being born who are doomed to starve, whereas a society with birth control can afford to be more liberal.
[* from Vaniver’s review of Hariri’s Sapiens]
But, of course, those modern institutions (as well as the ‘primitive’ ones) function. One division Harari discusses that I found useful was objective, subjective, and inter-subjective:
An objective phenomenon exists independently of human consciousness and human beliefs. … [Radioactivity is his example.]
The subjective is something that exists depending on the consciousness and beliefs of a single individual. … [A child’s imaginary friend is his example.]
The inter-subjective is something that exists within the communication network linking the subjective consciousness of many individuals. If a single individual changes his or her beliefs, or even dies, it is of little importance. However, if most individuals in the network die or change their beliefs, the inter-subjective phenomenon will mutate or disappear. …
Many of history’s most important drivers are inter-subjective: law, money, gods, nations.
That last list looks familiar. Gods and prices are not features of the wavefunction of the physical universe—they’re features of communication networks, or cultures. The creation of a third, explicitly defined category (phrases that mean similar things are “social construct” and “myth,” at least when used non-pejoratively) solves the epistemic crisis of realizing that many, if not most, of the interesting things in life are neither objective nor subjective. The rules of association football are not objective natural laws baked into the universe before there was time, but neither can they be changed by a single person deciding to play differently. (Many authors fall headlong into this epistemic crisis, and Harari every now and then seems to have his presentation, if not his arguments, tripped up by it. But on the whole he manages it well.)
A universal standard of ethics must have practical utility in every society at every point in history.
I suppose so, but why would you want one?
Because if I do not follow a universal standard of ethics then my entire ethical system will be founded on nothing more than transient fashions. Little g is sufficient for most practical applications. Big G is about understanding the universe. I want to understand the universe.
Because if I do not follow a universal standard of ethics then my entire ethical system will be founded on nothing more than transient fashions.
Alas, you won’t find that in mysticism, as mystics’ ethics isn’t universal either.
What I observed reading and listening to many mystics over the years is that, while their ethics did indeed change in a more or less similar way due to their mystical experiences, it didn’t do so in a “big G” way, but rather only in a “little g” way. Basically, their experiences change their utility function in a very specific way: they end up believing that achieving those experiences is a value unto itself, that everyone should have them, and so they propose changes and tweaks to their pre-existing, culturally conditioned moral framework that, if applied at large, result in facilitating and encouraging more people to achieve mystical experiences.
Now, this isn’t to say that having those experiences doesn’t provide objective benefits. It seems to do, as it’s been shown that people who’ve had them are in general calmer, more focused, less anxious etc. But that’s a far cry from “understanding the universe”. Mystical experiences don’t provide for that, for if they did, mystics wouldn’t all keep disagreeing with each other about how the universe works, which they definitely do, on most of everything.
Also, depending on how those tweaks to pre-existing moral norms are done, the end result sometimes can be worse than the original. For a remarkable example check Kelley L. Ross’s article Zen and the Art of Divebombing, or The Dark Side of the Tao, which shows how incredibly wrong things can go in that area.
My answer to that question it is so far off the collective map of Less Wrong that stating it here would not result in a productive conversation. If our timeline is the blue walk of the post’s 3D plot then my answer comes from the red one.
You say that as though there is no other possible basis to make an objective judgement. Naturalists tend to reject the idea of a separate ontological domain of ethical value, whoch is fair enough. but nihilism is too hasty a conclusion. There is also the domain of human cultural constructs, which is neither derivable from physics, nor ontologically non-physical.[*]
Norms about how well things function, how well they do their job, are objective enough, yet are not rooted in physics. There are norms about how to play chess well, although chess is clearly a human construct. There are norms about how to play run a economy , although money is clearly a human construct.
Ethical philosophy itself is an attempt to judge ethics by norms that are not ethical, such as rational norms. (Or mathematical ones in the case of “torture vs. dust specs”).
The assumption that ethics has a function, that it is part of the “operating system” of society allows us to make judgements about better and worse systems of ethics, where “better” and “worse” are cashed out as fulfilling a function well or badly, and are not therefore circular appeals to the ethical sense of better and worse.
I suppose so, but why would you want one? In order to justify moral progress, you need an objective standard of ethics, not a universal one.
Minimally, an objective truth is not a subjective truth, that is to say, it is not mind-dependent. Lack of mind dependence does not imply that objective truth needs to be the same everywhere, which is to say it does not imply universalism. Truths that are objective but not universal would be truths that vary with objective circumstances: that does not entail subjectivity, because subjectivity is mind dependence.
I like to use the analogy of big G and little g in physics. Big G is a universal constant, little g is the local acceleration due to gravity, and will vary from planet to planet (and, in a fine-grained way, at different points on the earths surface). But little g is perfectly objective, for all its lack of universality.
To give some examples that are actually about morality and how it is contextual:
A food-scarce society will develop rules about who can eat how much of which kind of food.
A society without birth control and close to Malthusian limits will develop restrictions on sexual behaviour, in order to prevent people being born who are doomed to starve, whereas a society with birth control can afford to be more liberal.
[* from Vaniver’s review of Hariri’s Sapiens]
Because if I do not follow a universal standard of ethics then my entire ethical system will be founded on nothing more than transient fashions. Little g is sufficient for most practical applications. Big G is about understanding the universe. I want to understand the universe.
Alas, you won’t find that in mysticism, as mystics’ ethics isn’t universal either.
What I observed reading and listening to many mystics over the years is that, while their ethics did indeed change in a more or less similar way due to their mystical experiences, it didn’t do so in a “big G” way, but rather only in a “little g” way. Basically, their experiences change their utility function in a very specific way: they end up believing that achieving those experiences is a value unto itself, that everyone should have them, and so they propose changes and tweaks to their pre-existing, culturally conditioned moral framework that, if applied at large, result in facilitating and encouraging more people to achieve mystical experiences.
Now, this isn’t to say that having those experiences doesn’t provide objective benefits. It seems to do, as it’s been shown that people who’ve had them are in general calmer, more focused, less anxious etc. But that’s a far cry from “understanding the universe”. Mystical experiences don’t provide for that, for if they did, mystics wouldn’t all keep disagreeing with each other about how the universe works, which they definitely do, on most of everything.
Also, depending on how those tweaks to pre-existing moral norms are done, the end result sometimes can be worse than the original. For a remarkable example check Kelley L. Ross’s article Zen and the Art of Divebombing, or The Dark Side of the Tao, which shows how incredibly wrong things can go in that area.
What universal system of ethics would apply both to humans and aliens who eat their own young?
My answer to that question it is so far off the collective map of Less Wrong that stating it here would not result in a productive conversation. If our timeline is the blue walk of the post’s 3D plot then my answer comes from the red one.