Prior to the escalation in bombing in the Vietnam War, the Americans wargamed potential North Vietnamese responses in the Sigma I and II wargames. Regional experts were able to almost exactly predict the Vietnamese response, and working-level officers from the State and Defense departments, and the CIA, predicted the actual outcome. William Bundy, the guy running the games, thought the conclusion was “too harsh,” and the wargames never influenced actual policymakers. (see H R McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty)
(On a related note, something similar occurred with the Millennium Challenge 2002- the Red team used unexpected tactics to pull off unexpected early victories against the simulated US forces, so the general running the war game ‘refloated’ the sunk ships, then forced both sides to use prescripted plans of action, ignoring the unexpected initial events.)
The State Department’s Policy Planning Council published a separate study in 1964 which essentially also concluded that bombing wouldn’t work. Walt Rostow, its chairman, disagreed with its conclusions, so he work to suppress its conclusions; it did eventually influence policymakers, but only after the war had escalated, and even then its conclusions had to be bootlegged out of the council. (see David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest)
(On a related note, something similar occurred with the Millennium Challenge 2002- the Red team used unexpected tactics to pull off unexpected early victories against the simulated US forces, so the general running the war game ‘refloated’ the sunk ships, then forced both sides to use prescripted plans of action, ignoring the unexpected initial events.)
It’s a little more complicated than that, or so I read. After the unexpected happened, the various generals—including the one in charge of the Red team—decided that the rest of the exercise would lose a lot of its value if they continued from the point they had arrived at (with much of the “U.S.” forces unable to participate in the simulated landing) and collectively decided to hit the reset button to see what would happen in that part of the exercise.
The US bombing escalation in Vietnam.
Prior to the escalation in bombing in the Vietnam War, the Americans wargamed potential North Vietnamese responses in the Sigma I and II wargames. Regional experts were able to almost exactly predict the Vietnamese response, and working-level officers from the State and Defense departments, and the CIA, predicted the actual outcome. William Bundy, the guy running the games, thought the conclusion was “too harsh,” and the wargames never influenced actual policymakers. (see H R McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty)
(On a related note, something similar occurred with the Millennium Challenge 2002- the Red team used unexpected tactics to pull off unexpected early victories against the simulated US forces, so the general running the war game ‘refloated’ the sunk ships, then forced both sides to use prescripted plans of action, ignoring the unexpected initial events.)
The State Department’s Policy Planning Council published a separate study in 1964 which essentially also concluded that bombing wouldn’t work. Walt Rostow, its chairman, disagreed with its conclusions, so he work to suppress its conclusions; it did eventually influence policymakers, but only after the war had escalated, and even then its conclusions had to be bootlegged out of the council. (see David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest)
I think I’m detecting a trend.
It’s a little more complicated than that, or so I read. After the unexpected happened, the various generals—including the one in charge of the Red team—decided that the rest of the exercise would lose a lot of its value if they continued from the point they had arrived at (with much of the “U.S.” forces unable to participate in the simulated landing) and collectively decided to hit the reset button to see what would happen in that part of the exercise.
Well, yeah, that was General Pace’s justification. But the Red team was then forced to use a pre-set strategy for the rest of the exercise, which was restrictive enough that its commander, General Paul Van Riper, outright resigned midway through. He later said that “We were directed… to move air defences so that the army and marine units could successfully land. We were simply directed to turn [air defence systems] off or move them… So it was scripted to be whatever the control group wanted it to be.” He also later explicitly compared General Pace’s thinking to that of the Defense Department under McNamara, which is why I brought it up.
How the hell did Bundy get away with it?
I think I’m detecting a trend.