Re memantine, it helped with overactive inhibition some, but not all that much, and it made my short term memory worse and spaced me out. Not at all like the alcohol-in-a-pill I was going for, but of course benzos are better for that anyway.
New rationalists… reminds me of New Atheism these days, for a rationalist to be new. They’ve missed out on x-rationalism’s golden days, and the current currents are more hoi polloi and less interesting for, how should I put it, those who are “intelligent” in the 19th-century French sense. I don’t really identify as a rationalist, but maybe I can be identified as one. I think perhaps it would mean reading a lot in general, e.g. in history and philosophy, and reading some core LW texts like GEB, while holding back on forming any opinions, and instead just keeping a careful account of who says what and why you or others think they said what they said. I haven’t been to university but I would guess they encourage a similar attitude, at least in philosophy undergrad? I hope. Anyway I think just reading a bunch of stuff is undervalued; the most impressive rationalists according to the LW community are generally those who have read a bunch of stuff, they just have a lot of information at hand to draw from. Old books too: Wealth of Nations, Origin of Species; the origins of the modern worldview. Intelligence matters a lot, but reading a lot is equally essential.
Studying Eliezer’s Technical Explanation of Technical Explanation in depth is good for Yudkowskology which is important hermeneutical knowledge if you plan on reading through all the Sequences without being overwhelmed (whether attractively or repulsively) by their particular Yudkowskyan perspective. I do think Eliezer’s worth reading, by the way, it’s just not the core of rationality, it’s not a reliable source of epistemic norms, and it has some questionable narratives driving it that some people miss and thereby accept semi-unquestioningly. The subtext shapes the text more than is easily seen. (Of course, this also applies to those who dismiss it by assuming less credible subtext than is actually there.)
Re memantine, it helped with overactive inhibition some, but not all that much, and it made my short term memory worse and spaced me out. Not at all like the alcohol-in-a-pill I was going for, but of course benzos are better for that anyway.
New rationalists… reminds me of New Atheism these days, for a rationalist to be new. They’ve missed out on x-rationalism’s golden days, and the current currents are more hoi polloi and less interesting for, how should I put it, those who are “intelligent” in the 19th-century French sense. I don’t really identify as a rationalist, but maybe I can be identified as one. I think perhaps it would mean reading a lot in general, e.g. in history and philosophy, and reading some core LW texts like GEB, while holding back on forming any opinions, and instead just keeping a careful account of who says what and why you or others think they said what they said. I haven’t been to university but I would guess they encourage a similar attitude, at least in philosophy undergrad? I hope. Anyway I think just reading a bunch of stuff is undervalued; the most impressive rationalists according to the LW community are generally those who have read a bunch of stuff, they just have a lot of information at hand to draw from. Old books too: Wealth of Nations, Origin of Species; the origins of the modern worldview. Intelligence matters a lot, but reading a lot is equally essential.
Studying Eliezer’s Technical Explanation of Technical Explanation in depth is good for Yudkowskology which is important hermeneutical knowledge if you plan on reading through all the Sequences without being overwhelmed (whether attractively or repulsively) by their particular Yudkowskyan perspective. I do think Eliezer’s worth reading, by the way, it’s just not the core of rationality, it’s not a reliable source of epistemic norms, and it has some questionable narratives driving it that some people miss and thereby accept semi-unquestioningly. The subtext shapes the text more than is easily seen. (Of course, this also applies to those who dismiss it by assuming less credible subtext than is actually there.)