Do you think the available evidence, overall, is so finely balanced that somewhere between 5% and 95% confidence (say) is appropriate? That would be fairly surprising given how much evidence there is out there that’s somewhat relevant to the question of gods. Or do you think that, even in the absence of dramatic epiphanies of one’s own, we should all be way more than 95% confident of (something kinda like) theism?
I think I understand your statement about social epistemic rationality but it seems to me that a better response to the situation where you think there are many many bits of evidence for one position but lots of people hold a contrary one is to estimate your probabilities in the usual way but be aware that this is an area in which either you or many others have gone badly wrong, and therefore be especially watchful for errors in your thinking, surprising new evidence, etc.
No, without epiphanies you probably shouldn’t be more than 95% confident, I think; with the institutions we currently have for epistemic communication, and with the polarizing nature of the subject, I don’t think most people can be very confident either way. So I would say yes, I think between 5% and 95% would be appropriate, and I don’t think I share your intuition that that would be fairly surprising, perhaps because I don’t understand it. Take cold fusion, say, and ask a typical college student studying in psychology how plausible they think it is that it has been developed or will soon be developed et cetera. I think they should give an answer between 5% and 95% for most variations on that question. I think the supernatural is in that reference class. You have in mind a better reference class?
I agree the response you propose in your second paragraph is good. I don’t remember what I was proposing instead but if it was at odds with what you’re proposing then it might not be good, especially if what I recommended requires somewhat complex engineering/politics, which IIRC it did.
Do you think the available evidence, overall, is so finely balanced that somewhere between 5% and 95% confidence (say) is appropriate? That would be fairly surprising given how much evidence there is out there that’s somewhat relevant to the question of gods. Or do you think that, even in the absence of dramatic epiphanies of one’s own, we should all be way more than 95% confident of (something kinda like) theism?
I think I understand your statement about social epistemic rationality but it seems to me that a better response to the situation where you think there are many many bits of evidence for one position but lots of people hold a contrary one is to estimate your probabilities in the usual way but be aware that this is an area in which either you or many others have gone badly wrong, and therefore be especially watchful for errors in your thinking, surprising new evidence, etc.
No, without epiphanies you probably shouldn’t be more than 95% confident, I think; with the institutions we currently have for epistemic communication, and with the polarizing nature of the subject, I don’t think most people can be very confident either way. So I would say yes, I think between 5% and 95% would be appropriate, and I don’t think I share your intuition that that would be fairly surprising, perhaps because I don’t understand it. Take cold fusion, say, and ask a typical college student studying in psychology how plausible they think it is that it has been developed or will soon be developed et cetera. I think they should give an answer between 5% and 95% for most variations on that question. I think the supernatural is in that reference class. You have in mind a better reference class?
I agree the response you propose in your second paragraph is good. I don’t remember what I was proposing instead but if it was at odds with what you’re proposing then it might not be good, especially if what I recommended requires somewhat complex engineering/politics, which IIRC it did.