The distinction between observed behavior (preferences that do explain behavior) and endorsed preference (a construction of reason not necessarily derived from observation of behavior) is actionable. It’s not just a matter of terminology (where preference is redefined to be whatever observed behavior seems to seek) or hypocrisy (where endorsed preference is public relations babble not directly involved in determining behavior). Both senses of “preference” can be coherent. But endorsed preference can start getting increasignly involved in determining the purposes of observed behavior, and plotting how this is to happen requires keeping the distinction clear.
I think that the “endorsed” preference mostly affects behavior only because of the need to keep up the pretense. But also, I’m not sure how your claim is related to my original comment?
Humans can be spontaneous (including in the direction of gradual change). It’s possible to decide to do an unreasonable thing unrelated to revealed preference or previous activity. Thus the need to keep up the pretense is not a necessary ingredient of the relationship between behavior and endorsed preference. It’s possible to start out an engineer, then change behavior to pursuit of musical skill, all the while endorsing (but not effecting) promotion of communism as the most valuable activity. Or else the behavior might have changed to pursuit of promotion of communism. There is no clear recipe to these things, only clear ingredients that shouldn’t be mixed up.
I’m not sure how your claim is related to my original comment
The statement in the original comment framed pursuit of rationality skills as pursuit of things that are better. This seems to substitute endorsed preference (things that are better) for revealed preference (actual pursuit of rationality skills). As I understand this, it’s not necessary to consider an actual pursuit a good thing, but it’s also prudent to keep track of what counts as a good thing, as it might one day influence behavior.
IMO going from engineer to musician is not a change of preferences, only a change of the strategy you follow to satisfy those preferences. Therefore, the question is, is rationality a good strategy for satisfying the preferences you are already trying to satisfy.
IMO going from engineer to musician is not a change of preferences, only a change of the strategy you follow to satisfy those preferences.
I would say about a person for whom this is accurate that they didn’t really care about engineering, or then music. But there are different people who do care about engineering, or about music. There is a difference between the people who should be described as only changing their strategy, and those who change their purpose. I was referring to the latter, as an example analogous to changing one’s revealed preference to one’s endorsed preference, without being beholden to any overarching ambient preference satisfied by either.
IMO such “change of purpose” doesn’t really exist. Some changes happen with aging, some changes might be caused by drugs or diet, but I don’t think conscious reasoning can cause it.
The distinction between observed behavior (preferences that do explain behavior) and endorsed preference (a construction of reason not necessarily derived from observation of behavior) is actionable. It’s not just a matter of terminology (where preference is redefined to be whatever observed behavior seems to seek) or hypocrisy (where endorsed preference is public relations babble not directly involved in determining behavior). Both senses of “preference” can be coherent. But endorsed preference can start getting increasignly involved in determining the purposes of observed behavior, and plotting how this is to happen requires keeping the distinction clear.
I think that the “endorsed” preference mostly affects behavior only because of the need to keep up the pretense. But also, I’m not sure how your claim is related to my original comment?
Humans can be spontaneous (including in the direction of gradual change). It’s possible to decide to do an unreasonable thing unrelated to revealed preference or previous activity. Thus the need to keep up the pretense is not a necessary ingredient of the relationship between behavior and endorsed preference. It’s possible to start out an engineer, then change behavior to pursuit of musical skill, all the while endorsing (but not effecting) promotion of communism as the most valuable activity. Or else the behavior might have changed to pursuit of promotion of communism. There is no clear recipe to these things, only clear ingredients that shouldn’t be mixed up.
The statement in the original comment framed pursuit of rationality skills as pursuit of things that are better. This seems to substitute endorsed preference (things that are better) for revealed preference (actual pursuit of rationality skills). As I understand this, it’s not necessary to consider an actual pursuit a good thing, but it’s also prudent to keep track of what counts as a good thing, as it might one day influence behavior.
IMO going from engineer to musician is not a change of preferences, only a change of the strategy you follow to satisfy those preferences. Therefore, the question is, is rationality a good strategy for satisfying the preferences you are already trying to satisfy.
I would say about a person for whom this is accurate that they didn’t really care about engineering, or then music. But there are different people who do care about engineering, or about music. There is a difference between the people who should be described as only changing their strategy, and those who change their purpose. I was referring to the latter, as an example analogous to changing one’s revealed preference to one’s endorsed preference, without being beholden to any overarching ambient preference satisfied by either.
IMO such “change of purpose” doesn’t really exist. Some changes happen with aging, some changes might be caused by drugs or diet, but I don’t think conscious reasoning can cause it.