First of all, congratulations! These kinds of questions are extremely challenging to even ask from within certain philosophical frameworks, and the fact that you’re here at all means that you’ve accomplished something exceptional. Further, by using the question of miracles specifically, you’ve focused on empirical, testable claims with verifiable consequences. The epistemology that you’re associating with atheism or agnosticism is fundamentally the ability to ask exactly these questions, the habit of doing so reflexively, and the willingness to follow those questions to real answers.
The basic Bayesian response to the question of miracles isn’t just “are they lying, or is there a God?” Ask the question a different way: in a hypothetical universe in which Christianity is false, how many claims of miraculous events do we expect? In a hypothetical universe in which Christianity is true, how many true (and false!) claims of miraculous intervention do we expect? Do we expect a difference in the kind of miracles that are claimed to occur? For example, we experience people claiming that God cured infertility or cancer, but never people claiming that God cured their amputation. It’s an interesting discrepancy, and which universe is that most consistent with? Etc. Don’t think about it in terms of picking apart each individual claim. Just ask yourself about an interventionist God in terms of your honest expectations for such a God, and consider the world-as-it-is in comparison. Use the miraculous as a prediction that can succeed or fail, rather than simply as an explanation that is immune to correction.
The main prediction that comes to mind is that if Christianity is true, one would expect substantially more miracle claims by Christians (legitimate claims plus false ones) than by any other religion (false claims only). If it is false, one would expect similar miracle claims by most religions that believe in them. Does anyone have data on this one way or the other?
The main prediction that comes to mind is that if Christianity is true, one would expect substantially more miracle claims by Christians (legitimate claims plus false ones) than by any other religion (false claims only).
That seems to assume an independence of the base rate of false claims, which is unlikely if the religions have different doctrine on miracles. Miracles might be a big part of one religion, and not even believed in by another. I’d expect “miracle friendly” religions to have a higher base rate.
Also, given the prevalence of miracle claims, it would take quite a high base rate of actual miracles to even be detectable among the false claims.
Also, given the prevalence of miracle claims, it would take quite a high base rate of actual miracles to even be detectable among the false claims.
High compared to what, exactly? With an interventionist Deity as a given, I can’t think of any immediate reasons to exclude regular interventions- here I’m thinking of something like Hell is the Absence of God by Ted Chiang.
The model he was working with seemed to be that only Christians get the real miracles, and everyone, including Christians, also have a base rate for falsely reporting miracles.
So, high, compared to the base rate of falsely reported miracles, and high compared to my perception of how common even believers think miracles are.
No doubt there’s a wide range of that, and for some people, God’s starting their car every morning. Maybe he starts my car every morning. It’s almost 30 years old, and it’s a minor miracle that it keeps on chugging.
I looked around a bit, and there are a few things challenging this measurement. Buddhism and Hinduism explicitly conflate miracles with supernatural human powers, and seem to take a dim view of both (they’re also not theistic in the relevant sense anyway). Islam reports many miracles (starting with the Holy Quran itself, of course), but since Al-Ghazali seems to reject material causality entirely in favor of everything being miraculous- the challenge here will be reporting events that a Christian would also interpret as miraculous or supernatural, which the religion tends to see as superstition. Judaism is probably insufficiently distinct from Christianity for your purposes. Wiccans certainly report many spirit communications and magical experiences, more often than most Christians- the invocation of these events is core to the faith, although again you might not consider these miraculous as such due to the lack of monotheism (an equivalent might be transubstantiation during the Catholic communion ceremony). Same with many new age spiritualists.
In other words, most world religions don’t even really have false claims of contemporary miracles in the theistic sense you mean, for the same reason that Christians rarely report remembering their past lives. Islam and Wicca come closest, but these are both religions that were influenced by Christianity at the time of their founding. So even the ‘Christianity is false’ universe would predict a preponderance of miracle reports to exist within Christianity.
I looked around a bit, and there are a few things challenging this measurement. Buddhism and Hinduism explicitly conflate miracles with supernatural human powers, and seem to take a dim view of both (they’re also not theistic in the relevant sense anyway).
In what way is Hinduism not theistic in the relevant sense? It is, in one sense, monotheistic, and on that scale it posits an effectively non-interventionist deity, but on the level on which it’s polytheistic, the deities tend to be highly interventionist.
It can also be atheistic, depending on the school. The Brahman is not necessarily thought of in anthropomorphic terms; this religion has a lot going on under the hood.
That said, looking at the population shares of each of the important schools of Hinduism, it looks as if by far the more common forms of worship invoke a particular, personified supreme being. So I suspect that you’re more correct than I was, and we can include most mainstream forms of Hindu worship under ‘monotheistic, with expected miracles’ banner. Happily, that gives us an example not substantially influenced by western Christianity.
The main prediction that comes to mind is that if Christianity is true, one would expect substantially more miracle claims by Christians (legitimate claims plus false ones) than by any other religion (false claims only).
This also assumes there isn’t some saturation point of people only wanting to talk about so many miracles. (Ignoring buybuydandavis’ point, which probably interacts with this one in unfortunate ways.)
If people only forward X annoying chain emails per month, you’d expect X from each religion. The best we can hope for is the true religion having on average slightly more plausible claims since some of their miracles are true.
I certainly can’t say this is the best we can hope for; the best case scenario would be one where practically nobody talks about the value of miracles as evidence for an interventionist deity the way practically nobody talks about the value of working automobiles as evidence for our models of thermodynamics; the evidence is simply too obvious to be worth belaboring.
Only anecdotal, but it’s hard to get good hard data on this because it would require collecting data in so many different languages.
You might be able to get better data by narrowing the field somewhat. For instance, by looking at the comparison in reported miracles between Mormons and conventional Christians (I recall from an earlier discussion on the topic here that Mormons reported a higher rate of answered prayers than any Christian denomination, except possibly devout Pentecostalists depending on how the measurement was taken.)
Interesting. Mormons getting answered prayers wouldn’t be too surprising-they aren’t conventional Christians, but they’re trying to pray to the same God-maybe it works? Getting higher rates of answers is unexpected though.
I don’t think this requires an assumption that it’s real at all; a higher level of commitment could very easily lead people to be more lax in their standards for whether a prayer has been “answered,” if we’re looking at it in psychological rather than supernatural terms.
...but never people claiming that God cured their amputation.
Just did a google search on this; pulled up some Christians trying to explain why (didn’t find anything convincing), some atheists claiming that this is a knockdown argument against God (to be fair, if true it seems pretty decisive) and a case of a Christian reporting that he saw an amputated ear regrown (they said it wasn’t a a full ear that came back, but a small thing that looked somewhat like an ear, and hearing was restored).
Are you going to claim that they were lying/deceived? On the one hand, it would certainly explain why a full ear didn’t come back. On the other hand, they claimed to have seen the patient’s skin break, blood come out, and an “small, ear-like thing” grow out of the gap. I cannot imagine someone decieving themselves about that!
I’d be interested in seeing a link. At first blush, it sounds most likely to me someone lost their outer ear structure along with, perhaps, some actual functionality (presumably in a traumatic event). Then the remaining “stump” of an ear healed and functionality improved over time. Maybe a significant perceived improvement was experienced as something quite dramatic during a charismatic faith healing service?
Are you going to claim that they were lying/deceived?
Maybe it’s something less malicious than that? Maybe they just projected their beliefs onto a circumstance? Maybe the story got a bit inflated in the repeated re-telling?
Couple other examples of similar miraculous healings:
Charles Templeton, one of Billy Graham’s preaching partners, before his deconversion. I found this account on a blog, and I’ve read it elsewhere. (I found a more detailed account from Templeton’s memoir here...but it might be more interesting to start with the account I’ve pasted.)
It was during the time spent as minister of the Avenue Road church in Toronto that Templeton witnessed two cases of instantaneous healing. Not to say that he is in favor of mass healing rallies, which he has always viewed as a health hazard rather than a blessing “since they leave behind an emotional wreckage and illnesses often worsened by neglect.” The two instances that Templeton witnessed occurred in private. In neither did he expect a healing to occur. In the first, an infant suffering a big defect—a muscle that was misattached, causing the baby’s head to be twisted to one side—was healed within minutes after Charles laid his hands on the child and prayed. The child’s condition prior to and after the healing was documented at the time by hospital physicians. New World, a Canadian version of Life magazine, ran the story and a full-page picture of the mother and child.
In the second instance, Templeton prayed for his aunt after exploratory surgery revealed that her stomach cancer was both malignant and inoperable. As he laid hands on her and prayed, he says he “felt something akin to an electrical charge flow through my arms and out my fingers.” Within hours his aunt, who had been bedridden for weeks, was up and about. The cancer did not return, the pain from the adhesions ended, and she lived for another forty-two years.
Despite his opposition to “the public healing services of contemporary evangelism—wherein “the ‘healers’ are often simpletons or rogues or both”—Templeton says he is convinced that “what may loosely be called faith healing is an area of medicine with unrealized potential”.
Interesting accounts since Templeton left the ministry. My my understanding, he did hold onto a belief in some sort of spiritual faith healing throughout his life, despite leaving the Christian faith.
It’s hard to know what actually happened in these cases. In the case of the infant, it’s my guess the child had something like this going on. Checking out the memoir account, the child received daily treatment and visited the hospital weekly. Also, notice the story in the New World was written four years after the event, something not mentioned in the blogger’s account.
In the case of the woman with cancer, I don’t know. It is my understanding spontaneous remission of cancer is possible. As far as the “electrical charge” Templeton felt, maybe he felt that as a result of the rather dramatic and emotional situation?
(Anytime I hear faith healing accounts, I always think. “Why don’t they just set these faith healers loose in the world’s hospitals??? Have them go room to room!”)
My general sense is that there are improvements—sometimes dramatic improvements—in people’s health that coincide with prayer. If it’s a one-in-a-million chance and you pray for one million people, you’re gonna see a miracle!
Further, I think people sometimes get a boost in adrenaline/confidence after being prayed for which perhaps masks their symptoms for a few days. In non-terminal cases, maybe they get out of bed and start eating right, exercising and being more active? Maybe their whole perspective changes and they become more positive and healthy?
My response to this one is that if we’re going to grant this miracle, by the same standard of evidence we’d probably also have to grant Mormonism.
Rather than focusing on how any particular alleged event can best be explained, I think it’s more productive to look at what accepting that standard of evidence would also lead us to grant.
I have already read the Mormonism essay and mostly agreed with it.
However, I disagree that you would be using the same standard of evidence in this case. For example, all of the witnesses for Mormonism had readily understandable motives such as not breaking up the group or offending their leader. Something similar may be true about the boy and his parents, but it isn’t true e.g. of the doctors who testified to amputating the boy’s leg. They were from a different town, were not there when the supposed restoration happened, and had nothing to gain by agreeing with a made up story. Calanda could become famous by such a story, but the doctors would get nothing out of it.
That is only one out of a number of substantial differences.
In my experience, people who are not involved in alleged miraculous events will often throw support behind their veracity, because any dramatic miracle is like a point scored for the cultural group they identify with. While arguably this might have been less the case hundreds of years ago when the cultural hegemony of Christianity meant that there was less value in dramatic evidence for it, I think that the far greater prevalence of dramatic miracle claims from that period suggests that this is not the case. Plus, in those times, the site of any dramatic alleged miracle would often gain a reputation as a holy place, greatly increasing the standing of the location and increasing business through pilgrimage.
More cultural hegemony means more status accruing to people that can credibly claim to have witnessed (or, better yet, been beneficiary of) a miracle, and therefore more coattails to ride. It also means fewer skeptics hanging around to poke holes in your testimony.
More speculatively, it might also mean a greater cultural acceptance of magical thinking, which could make supernatural explanations more salient whenever people are faced with the sort of freakish coincidences that happen a few times in every life by the laws of statistics.
Of course you can speculate on reasons why people would have been likely to make up stories like that, but Christians could also speculate that since the Bible says miracles are worked by faith (“your faith has healed you” etc), one would expect that in places where there is more faith, there will be more miracles. But those times had more faith, so one would expect that they would have more miracles. So theoretically that could be an alternate explanation for why those times had more dramatic miracle claims, however unappealing that explanation might be to you.
This is certainly an argument one could take. However, while the average levels of faith then were certainly much higher, the population now is also much higher, so even if our per-capita rate of dramatic miracles is lower, we have a much larger pool to draw on, and much better documentation.
Also, if we’re comparing hypothetical worlds where Christianity is true or false, I think a scenario where the populace becomes dramatically less faithful over time, to the point that the absolute population with sufficient faith to perform miracles goes down while the total population more than dectuples, is significantly less likely to occur in the world where Christianity is true.
Jesus is said to have said, “Will the Son of Man find faith left on the earth when he returns?” In context this looks like a rhetorical question, with the answer being “no”, at least more or less, even if he did not mean that no one at all would believe. So I don’t see how your second thing is right, since someone seems to have predicted that scenario. It’s true that that is likely to happen if Christianity is false; but apparently it is also likely to happen if it is true.
Regarding the first, Mark 6:4-6 says, “Jesus said to them, “A prophet is not without honor except in his hometown and among his own relatives and in his own household.” And He could do no miracle there except that He laid His hands on a few sick people and healed them. And He wondered at their unbelief. ” So it seems that just as faith works miracles, unbelief impedes them, even when there are a few believers around. So even if the population is greater, miracles will not necessarily increase, because of the greater population of unbelievers.
As for better documentation, Thomas Aquinas at least asserts that the reason faith should work miracles is that a person who has faith “merits” in a certain way to prove that faith to himself and others. This means that equal faith should earn equal proofs. But an equal miracle will be more capable of proving things, not equally capable, when you have better documentation; so as documentation improves, the faith you need to work the same miracle will increase, and so the frequency of miracles of a given type will decrease. This also explains why most miracles are not directly visible in a moment; because a miracle like this has too much of a capacity to prove something, in comparison to people’s level of faith.
As I said, such explanations may be unappealing, especially since apparently the consequences are exactly the same whether Christianity is true or false. However, I did not invent those explanations, but they were already presented long ago by the Bible and by Christians (such as Thomas Aquinas).
Jesus is said to have said, “Will the Son of Man find faith left on the earth when he returns?” In context this looks like a rhetorical question, with the answer being “no”, at least more or less, even if he did not mean that no one at all would believe. So I don’t see how your second thing is right, since someone seems to have predicted that scenario. It’s true that that is likely to happen if Christianity is false; but apparently it is also likely to happen if it is true.
First, I don’t think it’s at all clear from the context that the answer is intended to be “no.” Second, Jesus also indicated that some people who knew him in person would still be alive as of the time he returned to earth, so this might be better interpreted as skepticism that his followers can maintain their standards of devotion rather than doubt in the persistence of a long term tradition.
As for better documentation, Thomas Aquinas at least asserts that the reason faith should work miracles is that a person who has faith “merits” in a certain way to prove that faith to himself and others. This means that equal faith should earn equal proofs. But an equal miracle will be more capable of proving things, not equally capable, when you have better documentation; so as documentation improves, the faith you need to work the same miracle will increase, and so the frequency of miracles of a given type will decrease. This also explains why most miracles are not directly visible in a moment; because a miracle like this has too much of a capacity to prove something, in comparison to people’s level of faith.
On the other hand, Jesus himself seems to suggest a simpler model in Luke 11, according to which God answers prayers simply to satisfy those who ask, because he is good.
If unbelief inhibits miracles, then one should be able to create miracles by separating out enclaves of the faithful (and indeed, more religious communities certainly tend to segregate themselves from less religious ones.) But if you go too far down the road of expecting no miracles to occur, then this also means that you can’t update your confidence upwards based on reports of miracles either.
As C.S. Lewis would say-are they lying, are they mad, or are they telling the truth? People do lie sometimes, and perhaps my difficulty in letting go of Christianity despite a mountain of evidence against it is that my prior on people making up stories is too low. It would take an awful lot of psychosis to make someone believe that a leg had regrown, but again, people do go insane. But is there a way to get a sense of how likely/unlikely this is? With Pascal’s Wager on the table, it’s not enough to say there’s ~40% chance Christianity is true, that’s less than half, it’s probably wrong. Rejecting it without constant fear would take near certainty that accounts like this one are fraudulant or deceived.
C.S. Lewis, I think, failed to adequately account for the likelihood of stories propagating by exaggeration. Jesus need not have been a liar, a lunatic, or the lord, he could have been an honest, sane person to whom people ascribed claims of being divine after the fact (although as a religious leader setting up a splinter movement that strongly deviated from existing doctrine, I think the odds favor the historical Jesus having been at least somewhat crazy.)
I would say that the body of evidence posed by other religions suggests that, in the absence of a true religion, people will still make up stories of a religious nature (also, the degree of theological uniformity that exists among most existing strains of Christianity comes, not from the fact that early sects were at all unified, but that modern sects are almost all descended from the strain that killed the other ones off.) But my position is probably shaped to a significant extent by personal experiences with other people elaborating on outlandish lies that I came up with when I was young, with practically nothing to gain from it.
One of the interesting things about Christianity is that it’s not using a probabilistic uncertainty framework at all. “Belief” in Christ is not just some confidence >30% in the godhood of Jesus- in Christianity, one simply believes or does not believe. This is part of why Lewis’ logical dialectic has an appeal in that culture; it’s basically Aristotelian, accepting propositions as True or False (this is also one of the reasons Thomas Aquinas is so revered for integrating the two in the first place, if I had to guess).
But, while this is the accepted inside-view way to approach the question of Jesus’ divinity, it is probably a flawed way to interpret material experiences such as miracles. Note that even the Catholic church uses a formal system involving evidence and testimony, and thus in practice has a kind of rough ‘confidence interval’ for the truth of a miracle. Basically, you’re stuck with the standard of actionable confidence.
Try to think of a precise answer to the question, just as an exercise. When miracles are the load-bearing component of your religious belief, it’s going to come down to the degree of confidence that you need. If 40% is too high, what about 10%? 2%? For that matter, try to think about your current probability estimates in concrete terms as best you can, and notice when a given piece of information lowers that or raises it.
One major problem with Pascal’s Wager (among others) is that it doesn’t specify which god. It applies equally to worshiping Yahweh, Kali, and Huitzilopochtli—and offers no guidance on how to choose between them.
Right, but given a large body of Christian miracle accounts, the only two hypotheses that seem plausible are 1. Christianity is true or 2. Christianity is false, and nevertheless generates an extremely impressive body of miracle claims. Given 1. Pascal’s Wager is obviously worth taking, and given 2. I can’t see any reason to believe in any God. The Wager only works if there’s some other reason to consider the belief to be reasonable, otherwise we’d all end up praying to the Tooth Fairy.
generates an extremely impressive body of miracle claims
Keep in mind that Christianity was the dominant religion of the West for a very long time and it certainly had enough incentives to assert, promote, and otherwise, um, sanctify a large number of miracle claims. All strange and unexplained events (as long as they are beneficial) would be classified as miracles in a deeply Christian society.
And let’s not forget the hypothetical Trickster God, omnipotent ruler of the universe that sends all people that believe in Him to hell, and everyone else goes to heaven. In other words, Pascal’s wager coexists with its exact inverse.
But even without the wager on the table, I think we can safely agree that the question of God’s existence is high-stakes.
Regarding your priors, I think this case is actually just like the other cases where you said you disagreed with Less Wrong; it is always a question of priors. The prior regarding people making things up is one of them. Similarly, I think your prior on the actual occurrence of extraordinary events is much higher than for the typical Less Wronger, and closer to the prior that ordinary human beings have.
So you could just assume that since Less Wrong is made up mostly of smart rational people who have thought carefully about their epistemology, it is more likely their prior is right, and so conclude that Christianity is false.
However, personally I think it is not that simple. When Eliezer said that he would prefer a machine that would destroy the world if God existed than one which would destroy the world at odds of a billion to one (I think it was a billion, not a trillion), I think that is extremely strong evidence that he is overconfident. So likewise I think it is clearly true that Less Wrong in general is overconfident that Christianity is false. Basically Less Wrong cannot avoid the standard pressures of a political community; just as Republicans are generally overconfident that it’s ok to let people have guns, Less Wrongers are overconfident that God does not exist and that religion is false.
Generally speaking, in fact, Less Wrongers appear to have a prior regarding the occurrence of extraordinary events that is much like the prior scientists usually hold regarding such things. But that prior is in fact too low; this is why scientists took so long to admit the reality of meteorites and giant waves at sea, even after such things were sufficiently established by eyewitness testimony.
Of course, that does not mean that your prior is right; it just means the question is more difficult than simply accepting Less Wrong’s priors.
In this case the problem with it just being made up is that the witnesses seem too numerous and there seems to be too much extrinsic evidence, e.g. the records of his entrance into the hospital where the leg was amputated etc. However, it is still possible that it is simply an outlier—a case of fraud even when fraud seems very unlikely.
I’m not going to claim they were lying or deceived as such (although documentation of the event would of course help with my confidence), mostly to approach this conversation in the spirit of skeptical inquiry. If there are miracles, I want to believe that there are miracles. If there are not, I want to believe that there are not. So I think there are a number of things that this might be, one of which is a miracle, most of which are not.
But if it is a miracle, I would say it’s a particularly confusing one. Take a step back for a moment and ask: if the God of your understanding were to interfere with natural law in such a way as to heal someone, would you expect that ear to be like a normal ear, i.e. full healing? Or would you expect it to be a partial fix? I don’t mean ‘could God do the partial fix thing’, since the answer is obviously yes per the definition of God. I mean, “does this match your prior expectations of God’s behavior, as a prediction?”
On the other hand, we could take an even bigger step back, and assign this account equal validity with other miracle claims, conservatively saying that this description is parsimonious with God as presently understood. Since you only described one example, can I assume you found very few examples of somebody claiming that miracles restored a limb- and none fully functioning or articulated. So let’s just think about it statistically. Why almost never, even compared to other miracle claims? Why should we expect a massive bias in miracle claims away from amputation-related healing?
First of all, congratulations! These kinds of questions are extremely challenging to even ask from within certain philosophical frameworks, and the fact that you’re here at all means that you’ve accomplished something exceptional. Further, by using the question of miracles specifically, you’ve focused on empirical, testable claims with verifiable consequences. The epistemology that you’re associating with atheism or agnosticism is fundamentally the ability to ask exactly these questions, the habit of doing so reflexively, and the willingness to follow those questions to real answers.
The basic Bayesian response to the question of miracles isn’t just “are they lying, or is there a God?” Ask the question a different way: in a hypothetical universe in which Christianity is false, how many claims of miraculous events do we expect? In a hypothetical universe in which Christianity is true, how many true (and false!) claims of miraculous intervention do we expect? Do we expect a difference in the kind of miracles that are claimed to occur? For example, we experience people claiming that God cured infertility or cancer, but never people claiming that God cured their amputation. It’s an interesting discrepancy, and which universe is that most consistent with? Etc. Don’t think about it in terms of picking apart each individual claim. Just ask yourself about an interventionist God in terms of your honest expectations for such a God, and consider the world-as-it-is in comparison. Use the miraculous as a prediction that can succeed or fail, rather than simply as an explanation that is immune to correction.
The main prediction that comes to mind is that if Christianity is true, one would expect substantially more miracle claims by Christians (legitimate claims plus false ones) than by any other religion (false claims only). If it is false, one would expect similar miracle claims by most religions that believe in them. Does anyone have data on this one way or the other?
That seems to assume an independence of the base rate of false claims, which is unlikely if the religions have different doctrine on miracles. Miracles might be a big part of one religion, and not even believed in by another. I’d expect “miracle friendly” religions to have a higher base rate.
Also, given the prevalence of miracle claims, it would take quite a high base rate of actual miracles to even be detectable among the false claims.
High compared to what, exactly? With an interventionist Deity as a given, I can’t think of any immediate reasons to exclude regular interventions- here I’m thinking of something like Hell is the Absence of God by Ted Chiang.
The model he was working with seemed to be that only Christians get the real miracles, and everyone, including Christians, also have a base rate for falsely reporting miracles.
So, high, compared to the base rate of falsely reported miracles, and high compared to my perception of how common even believers think miracles are.
No doubt there’s a wide range of that, and for some people, God’s starting their car every morning. Maybe he starts my car every morning. It’s almost 30 years old, and it’s a minor miracle that it keeps on chugging.
Maybe some satanists and/or neopagans get something from Satan.
I looked around a bit, and there are a few things challenging this measurement. Buddhism and Hinduism explicitly conflate miracles with supernatural human powers, and seem to take a dim view of both (they’re also not theistic in the relevant sense anyway). Islam reports many miracles (starting with the Holy Quran itself, of course), but since Al-Ghazali seems to reject material causality entirely in favor of everything being miraculous- the challenge here will be reporting events that a Christian would also interpret as miraculous or supernatural, which the religion tends to see as superstition. Judaism is probably insufficiently distinct from Christianity for your purposes. Wiccans certainly report many spirit communications and magical experiences, more often than most Christians- the invocation of these events is core to the faith, although again you might not consider these miraculous as such due to the lack of monotheism (an equivalent might be transubstantiation during the Catholic communion ceremony). Same with many new age spiritualists.
In other words, most world religions don’t even really have false claims of contemporary miracles in the theistic sense you mean, for the same reason that Christians rarely report remembering their past lives. Islam and Wicca come closest, but these are both religions that were influenced by Christianity at the time of their founding. So even the ‘Christianity is false’ universe would predict a preponderance of miracle reports to exist within Christianity.
In what way is Hinduism not theistic in the relevant sense? It is, in one sense, monotheistic, and on that scale it posits an effectively non-interventionist deity, but on the level on which it’s polytheistic, the deities tend to be highly interventionist.
It can also be atheistic, depending on the school. The Brahman is not necessarily thought of in anthropomorphic terms; this religion has a lot going on under the hood.
That said, looking at the population shares of each of the important schools of Hinduism, it looks as if by far the more common forms of worship invoke a particular, personified supreme being. So I suspect that you’re more correct than I was, and we can include most mainstream forms of Hindu worship under ‘monotheistic, with expected miracles’ banner. Happily, that gives us an example not substantially influenced by western Christianity.
This also assumes there isn’t some saturation point of people only wanting to talk about so many miracles. (Ignoring buybuydandavis’ point, which probably interacts with this one in unfortunate ways.) If people only forward X annoying chain emails per month, you’d expect X from each religion. The best we can hope for is the true religion having on average slightly more plausible claims since some of their miracles are true.
I certainly can’t say this is the best we can hope for; the best case scenario would be one where practically nobody talks about the value of miracles as evidence for an interventionist deity the way practically nobody talks about the value of working automobiles as evidence for our models of thermodynamics; the evidence is simply too obvious to be worth belaboring.
Only anecdotal, but it’s hard to get good hard data on this because it would require collecting data in so many different languages.
You might be able to get better data by narrowing the field somewhat. For instance, by looking at the comparison in reported miracles between Mormons and conventional Christians (I recall from an earlier discussion on the topic here that Mormons reported a higher rate of answered prayers than any Christian denomination, except possibly devout Pentecostalists depending on how the measurement was taken.)
Interesting. Mormons getting answered prayers wouldn’t be too surprising-they aren’t conventional Christians, but they’re trying to pray to the same God-maybe it works? Getting higher rates of answers is unexpected though.
Mormons tend to be more committed, so that could explain the higher rate of answers, assuming it is real.
I don’t think this requires an assumption that it’s real at all; a higher level of commitment could very easily lead people to be more lax in their standards for whether a prayer has been “answered,” if we’re looking at it in psychological rather than supernatural terms.
...but never people claiming that God cured their amputation.
Just did a google search on this; pulled up some Christians trying to explain why (didn’t find anything convincing), some atheists claiming that this is a knockdown argument against God (to be fair, if true it seems pretty decisive) and a case of a Christian reporting that he saw an amputated ear regrown (they said it wasn’t a a full ear that came back, but a small thing that looked somewhat like an ear, and hearing was restored).
Are you going to claim that they were lying/deceived? On the one hand, it would certainly explain why a full ear didn’t come back. On the other hand, they claimed to have seen the patient’s skin break, blood come out, and an “small, ear-like thing” grow out of the gap. I cannot imagine someone decieving themselves about that!
I’d be interested in seeing a link. At first blush, it sounds most likely to me someone lost their outer ear structure along with, perhaps, some actual functionality (presumably in a traumatic event). Then the remaining “stump” of an ear healed and functionality improved over time. Maybe a significant perceived improvement was experienced as something quite dramatic during a charismatic faith healing service?
Maybe it’s something less malicious than that? Maybe they just projected their beliefs onto a circumstance? Maybe the story got a bit inflated in the repeated re-telling?
Couple other examples of similar miraculous healings:
Charles Templeton, one of Billy Graham’s preaching partners, before his deconversion. I found this account on a blog, and I’ve read it elsewhere. (I found a more detailed account from Templeton’s memoir here...but it might be more interesting to start with the account I’ve pasted.)
Interesting accounts since Templeton left the ministry. My my understanding, he did hold onto a belief in some sort of spiritual faith healing throughout his life, despite leaving the Christian faith.
It’s hard to know what actually happened in these cases. In the case of the infant, it’s my guess the child had something like this going on. Checking out the memoir account, the child received daily treatment and visited the hospital weekly. Also, notice the story in the New World was written four years after the event, something not mentioned in the blogger’s account.
In the case of the woman with cancer, I don’t know. It is my understanding spontaneous remission of cancer is possible. As far as the “electrical charge” Templeton felt, maybe he felt that as a result of the rather dramatic and emotional situation?
(Anytime I hear faith healing accounts, I always think. “Why don’t they just set these faith healers loose in the world’s hospitals??? Have them go room to room!”)
My general sense is that there are improvements—sometimes dramatic improvements—in people’s health that coincide with prayer. If it’s a one-in-a-million chance and you pray for one million people, you’re gonna see a miracle!
Further, I think people sometimes get a boost in adrenaline/confidence after being prayed for which perhaps masks their symptoms for a few days. In non-terminal cases, maybe they get out of bed and start eating right, exercising and being more active? Maybe their whole perspective changes and they become more positive and healthy?
Aiyen, see this post: http://atheistsareidiots.blogspot.sk/2013/05/myths-about-miracle-of-calanda-debunked.html
(Don’t blame me for the name of the blog...)
My response to this one is that if we’re going to grant this miracle, by the same standard of evidence we’d probably also have to grant Mormonism.
Rather than focusing on how any particular alleged event can best be explained, I think it’s more productive to look at what accepting that standard of evidence would also lead us to grant.
I have already read the Mormonism essay and mostly agreed with it.
However, I disagree that you would be using the same standard of evidence in this case. For example, all of the witnesses for Mormonism had readily understandable motives such as not breaking up the group or offending their leader. Something similar may be true about the boy and his parents, but it isn’t true e.g. of the doctors who testified to amputating the boy’s leg. They were from a different town, were not there when the supposed restoration happened, and had nothing to gain by agreeing with a made up story. Calanda could become famous by such a story, but the doctors would get nothing out of it.
That is only one out of a number of substantial differences.
In my experience, people who are not involved in alleged miraculous events will often throw support behind their veracity, because any dramatic miracle is like a point scored for the cultural group they identify with. While arguably this might have been less the case hundreds of years ago when the cultural hegemony of Christianity meant that there was less value in dramatic evidence for it, I think that the far greater prevalence of dramatic miracle claims from that period suggests that this is not the case. Plus, in those times, the site of any dramatic alleged miracle would often gain a reputation as a holy place, greatly increasing the standing of the location and increasing business through pilgrimage.
More cultural hegemony means more status accruing to people that can credibly claim to have witnessed (or, better yet, been beneficiary of) a miracle, and therefore more coattails to ride. It also means fewer skeptics hanging around to poke holes in your testimony.
More speculatively, it might also mean a greater cultural acceptance of magical thinking, which could make supernatural explanations more salient whenever people are faced with the sort of freakish coincidences that happen a few times in every life by the laws of statistics.
Of course you can speculate on reasons why people would have been likely to make up stories like that, but Christians could also speculate that since the Bible says miracles are worked by faith (“your faith has healed you” etc), one would expect that in places where there is more faith, there will be more miracles. But those times had more faith, so one would expect that they would have more miracles. So theoretically that could be an alternate explanation for why those times had more dramatic miracle claims, however unappealing that explanation might be to you.
This is certainly an argument one could take. However, while the average levels of faith then were certainly much higher, the population now is also much higher, so even if our per-capita rate of dramatic miracles is lower, we have a much larger pool to draw on, and much better documentation.
Also, if we’re comparing hypothetical worlds where Christianity is true or false, I think a scenario where the populace becomes dramatically less faithful over time, to the point that the absolute population with sufficient faith to perform miracles goes down while the total population more than dectuples, is significantly less likely to occur in the world where Christianity is true.
Jesus is said to have said, “Will the Son of Man find faith left on the earth when he returns?” In context this looks like a rhetorical question, with the answer being “no”, at least more or less, even if he did not mean that no one at all would believe. So I don’t see how your second thing is right, since someone seems to have predicted that scenario. It’s true that that is likely to happen if Christianity is false; but apparently it is also likely to happen if it is true.
Regarding the first, Mark 6:4-6 says, “Jesus said to them, “A prophet is not without honor except in his hometown and among his own relatives and in his own household.” And He could do no miracle there except that He laid His hands on a few sick people and healed them. And He wondered at their unbelief. ” So it seems that just as faith works miracles, unbelief impedes them, even when there are a few believers around. So even if the population is greater, miracles will not necessarily increase, because of the greater population of unbelievers.
As for better documentation, Thomas Aquinas at least asserts that the reason faith should work miracles is that a person who has faith “merits” in a certain way to prove that faith to himself and others. This means that equal faith should earn equal proofs. But an equal miracle will be more capable of proving things, not equally capable, when you have better documentation; so as documentation improves, the faith you need to work the same miracle will increase, and so the frequency of miracles of a given type will decrease. This also explains why most miracles are not directly visible in a moment; because a miracle like this has too much of a capacity to prove something, in comparison to people’s level of faith.
As I said, such explanations may be unappealing, especially since apparently the consequences are exactly the same whether Christianity is true or false. However, I did not invent those explanations, but they were already presented long ago by the Bible and by Christians (such as Thomas Aquinas).
First, I don’t think it’s at all clear from the context that the answer is intended to be “no.” Second, Jesus also indicated that some people who knew him in person would still be alive as of the time he returned to earth, so this might be better interpreted as skepticism that his followers can maintain their standards of devotion rather than doubt in the persistence of a long term tradition.
On the other hand, Jesus himself seems to suggest a simpler model in Luke 11, according to which God answers prayers simply to satisfy those who ask, because he is good.
If unbelief inhibits miracles, then one should be able to create miracles by separating out enclaves of the faithful (and indeed, more religious communities certainly tend to segregate themselves from less religious ones.) But if you go too far down the road of expecting no miracles to occur, then this also means that you can’t update your confidence upwards based on reports of miracles either.
As C.S. Lewis would say-are they lying, are they mad, or are they telling the truth? People do lie sometimes, and perhaps my difficulty in letting go of Christianity despite a mountain of evidence against it is that my prior on people making up stories is too low. It would take an awful lot of psychosis to make someone believe that a leg had regrown, but again, people do go insane. But is there a way to get a sense of how likely/unlikely this is? With Pascal’s Wager on the table, it’s not enough to say there’s ~40% chance Christianity is true, that’s less than half, it’s probably wrong. Rejecting it without constant fear would take near certainty that accounts like this one are fraudulant or deceived.
C.S. Lewis, I think, failed to adequately account for the likelihood of stories propagating by exaggeration. Jesus need not have been a liar, a lunatic, or the lord, he could have been an honest, sane person to whom people ascribed claims of being divine after the fact (although as a religious leader setting up a splinter movement that strongly deviated from existing doctrine, I think the odds favor the historical Jesus having been at least somewhat crazy.)
I would say that the body of evidence posed by other religions suggests that, in the absence of a true religion, people will still make up stories of a religious nature (also, the degree of theological uniformity that exists among most existing strains of Christianity comes, not from the fact that early sects were at all unified, but that modern sects are almost all descended from the strain that killed the other ones off.) But my position is probably shaped to a significant extent by personal experiences with other people elaborating on outlandish lies that I came up with when I was young, with practically nothing to gain from it.
One of the interesting things about Christianity is that it’s not using a probabilistic uncertainty framework at all. “Belief” in Christ is not just some confidence >30% in the godhood of Jesus- in Christianity, one simply believes or does not believe. This is part of why Lewis’ logical dialectic has an appeal in that culture; it’s basically Aristotelian, accepting propositions as True or False (this is also one of the reasons Thomas Aquinas is so revered for integrating the two in the first place, if I had to guess).
But, while this is the accepted inside-view way to approach the question of Jesus’ divinity, it is probably a flawed way to interpret material experiences such as miracles. Note that even the Catholic church uses a formal system involving evidence and testimony, and thus in practice has a kind of rough ‘confidence interval’ for the truth of a miracle. Basically, you’re stuck with the standard of actionable confidence.
Try to think of a precise answer to the question, just as an exercise. When miracles are the load-bearing component of your religious belief, it’s going to come down to the degree of confidence that you need. If 40% is too high, what about 10%? 2%? For that matter, try to think about your current probability estimates in concrete terms as best you can, and notice when a given piece of information lowers that or raises it.
One major problem with Pascal’s Wager (among others) is that it doesn’t specify which god. It applies equally to worshiping Yahweh, Kali, and Huitzilopochtli—and offers no guidance on how to choose between them.
Right, but given a large body of Christian miracle accounts, the only two hypotheses that seem plausible are 1. Christianity is true or 2. Christianity is false, and nevertheless generates an extremely impressive body of miracle claims. Given 1. Pascal’s Wager is obviously worth taking, and given 2. I can’t see any reason to believe in any God. The Wager only works if there’s some other reason to consider the belief to be reasonable, otherwise we’d all end up praying to the Tooth Fairy.
Keep in mind that Christianity was the dominant religion of the West for a very long time and it certainly had enough incentives to assert, promote, and otherwise, um, sanctify a large number of miracle claims. All strange and unexplained events (as long as they are beneficial) would be classified as miracles in a deeply Christian society.
And let’s not forget the hypothetical Trickster God, omnipotent ruler of the universe that sends all people that believe in Him to hell, and everyone else goes to heaven. In other words, Pascal’s wager coexists with its exact inverse.
But even without the wager on the table, I think we can safely agree that the question of God’s existence is high-stakes.
Regarding your priors, I think this case is actually just like the other cases where you said you disagreed with Less Wrong; it is always a question of priors. The prior regarding people making things up is one of them. Similarly, I think your prior on the actual occurrence of extraordinary events is much higher than for the typical Less Wronger, and closer to the prior that ordinary human beings have.
So you could just assume that since Less Wrong is made up mostly of smart rational people who have thought carefully about their epistemology, it is more likely their prior is right, and so conclude that Christianity is false.
However, personally I think it is not that simple. When Eliezer said that he would prefer a machine that would destroy the world if God existed than one which would destroy the world at odds of a billion to one (I think it was a billion, not a trillion), I think that is extremely strong evidence that he is overconfident. So likewise I think it is clearly true that Less Wrong in general is overconfident that Christianity is false. Basically Less Wrong cannot avoid the standard pressures of a political community; just as Republicans are generally overconfident that it’s ok to let people have guns, Less Wrongers are overconfident that God does not exist and that religion is false.
Generally speaking, in fact, Less Wrongers appear to have a prior regarding the occurrence of extraordinary events that is much like the prior scientists usually hold regarding such things. But that prior is in fact too low; this is why scientists took so long to admit the reality of meteorites and giant waves at sea, even after such things were sufficiently established by eyewitness testimony.
Of course, that does not mean that your prior is right; it just means the question is more difficult than simply accepting Less Wrong’s priors.
In this case the problem with it just being made up is that the witnesses seem too numerous and there seems to be too much extrinsic evidence, e.g. the records of his entrance into the hospital where the leg was amputated etc. However, it is still possible that it is simply an outlier—a case of fraud even when fraud seems very unlikely.
Interesting example! Is a link readily available?
I’m not going to claim they were lying or deceived as such (although documentation of the event would of course help with my confidence), mostly to approach this conversation in the spirit of skeptical inquiry. If there are miracles, I want to believe that there are miracles. If there are not, I want to believe that there are not. So I think there are a number of things that this might be, one of which is a miracle, most of which are not.
But if it is a miracle, I would say it’s a particularly confusing one. Take a step back for a moment and ask: if the God of your understanding were to interfere with natural law in such a way as to heal someone, would you expect that ear to be like a normal ear, i.e. full healing? Or would you expect it to be a partial fix? I don’t mean ‘could God do the partial fix thing’, since the answer is obviously yes per the definition of God. I mean, “does this match your prior expectations of God’s behavior, as a prediction?”
On the other hand, we could take an even bigger step back, and assign this account equal validity with other miracle claims, conservatively saying that this description is parsimonious with God as presently understood. Since you only described one example, can I assume you found very few examples of somebody claiming that miracles restored a limb- and none fully functioning or articulated. So let’s just think about it statistically. Why almost never, even compared to other miracle claims? Why should we expect a massive bias in miracle claims away from amputation-related healing?